yoann@mandrakesoft.com:
> law@sgi.com writes:
>
> [snip]
>
> > it is called "auditing". If you want a security increase, the wait
> > until the Labeled Security Protection Profile (LSPP) is applied to
> > a Linux target. That would provide serious ammo to defending a system.
> > Adding MAC and least priviledge, file-based capabilities, and
> > non executable stack and you have something a bit more tedious to break
> ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>
> As it was already pointed on this list, this kind of defense do not
> protect against stack overflow, it'll be just a little more hard for
> the attacker to execute the offending code ( he will need to add
> the execve code to his eggshell ).
>
> Also this "feature" forbid some program to run,
> program using nested functions like lisp / ada program are some exemple.
Neither LISP nor Ada requires execution on stack. Some languages implement
traps that way, but it is not required that they do so. That is up to the
implementation. BTW, the execve can't be on the stack. The penetration
must put the address of an already existing execve system call on the
stack. Only parameters can be on the non-executable stack.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jesse I Pollard, II
Email: pollard@navo.hpc.mil
Any opinions expressed are solely my own.
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This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Sun Apr 23 2000 - 21:00:13 EST