The problem is that non-executable stacks on x86 boxes can be gotten
around in all cases where there already is an exploit. If you included
Solar Designer's non-exec stack into the linux kernel and made it the
default that'd just mean that non-exec stack exploits would become the
norm. The result would be no net increase in security.
Stackguard is useful because it does block a class of exploits completely.
If all you can do is overrun a single buffer and the only interesting
thing you can do from there is modify the RA on the stack then StackGuard
really will protect you. Of course if you can tweak a variable on the
current stack frame and never touch the RA, then StackGuard buys you
nothing. Libsafe is similarly useful.
On Mon, 3 Jul 2000, Robert Dinse wrote:
> I don't disagree that the non-executable user stack area can be gotten
> around, so can Stackguard, and I haven't looked at libsafe yet but I don't feel
> comfortable counting on anything as a complete solution. The more layers the
> better.
>
>
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