On Tue, Oct 15, 2002 at 05:07:06PM -0700, Greg KH wrote:
>
> I'll work on fixing up the rest of the hooks, and removing the external
> reference to security_ops, and actually test this thing, later this
> evening.
Here's all the hooks converted over to function calls. Chris Wright
pointed out I need to do some extra work with the existing capabilities
hooks, but I'll do that in the morning.
Thanks to John Levon for pointing out cond_syscall() to me, very cool
function. That removes the need to have a sys_security.c file.
Patch is against 2.5.43, and builds for me, both with and without
CONFIG_SECURITY set. Haven't booted it yet though...
thanks,
greg k-h
===== arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c 1.14 vs edited =====
--- 1.14/arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c Sun Oct 13 07:32:28 2002
+++ edited/arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c Wed Oct 16 00:46:07 2002
@@ -719,8 +719,7 @@
/* are we already being traced? */
if (current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)
goto out;
- ret = security_ops->ptrace(current->parent, current);
- if (ret)
+ if ((ret = security_ptrace(current->parent, current)))
goto out;
/* set the ptrace bit in the process flags. */
current->ptrace |= PT_PTRACED;
===== arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c 1.13 vs edited =====
--- 1.13/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c Fri Jul 19 16:00:55 2002
+++ edited/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c Tue Oct 15 22:24:45 2002
@@ -160,8 +160,7 @@
/* are we already being traced? */
if (current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)
goto out;
- ret = security_ops->ptrace(current->parent, current);
- if (ret)
+ if ((ret = security_ptrace(current->parent, current)))
goto out;
/* set the ptrace bit in the process flags. */
current->ptrace |= PT_PTRACED;
===== arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c 1.12 vs edited =====
--- 1.12/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c Tue Sep 17 23:22:09 2002
+++ edited/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c Wed Oct 16 00:45:53 2002
@@ -1101,8 +1101,7 @@
/* are we already being traced? */
if (current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)
goto out;
- ret = security_ops->ptrace(current->parent, current);
- if (ret)
+ if ((ret = security_ptrace(current->parent, current)))
goto out;
current->ptrace |= PT_PTRACED;
ret = 0;
===== arch/ppc/kernel/ptrace.c 1.10 vs edited =====
--- 1.10/arch/ppc/kernel/ptrace.c Sun Sep 15 21:51:59 2002
+++ edited/arch/ppc/kernel/ptrace.c Wed Oct 16 00:45:41 2002
@@ -166,8 +166,7 @@
/* are we already being traced? */
if (current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)
goto out;
- ret = security_ops->ptrace(current->parent, current);
- if (ret)
+ if ((ret = security_ptrace(current->parent, current)))
goto out;
/* set the ptrace bit in the process flags. */
current->ptrace |= PT_PTRACED;
===== arch/ppc64/kernel/ptrace.c 1.3 vs edited =====
--- 1.3/arch/ppc64/kernel/ptrace.c Wed Aug 28 23:42:43 2002
+++ edited/arch/ppc64/kernel/ptrace.c Wed Oct 16 00:45:16 2002
@@ -59,8 +59,7 @@
/* are we already being traced? */
if (current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)
goto out;
- ret = security_ops->ptrace(current->parent, current);
- if (ret)
+ if ((ret = security_ptrace(current->parent, current)))
goto out;
/* set the ptrace bit in the process flags. */
current->ptrace |= PT_PTRACED;
===== arch/ppc64/kernel/ptrace32.c 1.5 vs edited =====
--- 1.5/arch/ppc64/kernel/ptrace32.c Wed Aug 28 23:42:43 2002
+++ edited/arch/ppc64/kernel/ptrace32.c Wed Oct 16 00:45:29 2002
@@ -48,8 +48,7 @@
/* are we already being traced? */
if (current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)
goto out;
- ret = security_ops->ptrace(current->parent, current);
- if (ret)
+ if ((ret = security_ptrace(current->parent, current)))
goto out;
/* set the ptrace bit in the process flags. */
current->ptrace |= PT_PTRACED;
===== arch/ppc64/kernel/sys_ppc32.c 1.24 vs edited =====
--- 1.24/arch/ppc64/kernel/sys_ppc32.c Fri Oct 11 19:04:17 2002
+++ edited/arch/ppc64/kernel/sys_ppc32.c Wed Oct 16 00:15:31 2002
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
#include <linux/mman.h>
#include <linux/sysctl.h>
#include <linux/binfmts.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <asm/types.h>
#include <asm/ipc.h>
@@ -3519,8 +3520,7 @@
if ((retval = bprm.envc) < 0)
goto out_mm;
- retval = security_ops->bprm_alloc_security(&bprm);
- if (retval)
+ if ((retval = security_bprm_alloc(&bprm)))
goto out;
retval = prepare_binprm(&bprm);
@@ -3543,7 +3543,7 @@
retval = search_binary_handler(&bprm,regs);
if (retval >= 0) {
/* execve success */
- security_ops->bprm_free_security(&bprm);
+ security_bprm_free(&bprm);
return retval;
}
@@ -3556,7 +3556,7 @@
}
if (bprm.security)
- security_ops->bprm_free_security(&bprm);
+ security_bprm_free(&bprm);
out_mm:
mmdrop(bprm.mm);
===== arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c 1.9 vs edited =====
--- 1.9/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c Fri Oct 4 09:16:18 2002
+++ edited/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c Wed Oct 16 00:44:51 2002
@@ -330,8 +330,7 @@
ret = -EPERM;
if (current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)
goto out;
- ret = security_ops->ptrace(current->parent, current);
- if (ret)
+ if ((ret = security_ptrace(current->parent, current)))
goto out;
/* set the ptrace bit in the process flags. */
current->ptrace |= PT_PTRACED;
===== arch/s390x/kernel/ptrace.c 1.8 vs edited =====
--- 1.8/arch/s390x/kernel/ptrace.c Fri Oct 4 09:16:18 2002
+++ edited/arch/s390x/kernel/ptrace.c Wed Oct 16 00:44:40 2002
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <linux/user.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <asm/segment.h>
#include <asm/page.h>
@@ -568,8 +569,7 @@
ret = -EPERM;
if (current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)
goto out;
- ret = security_ops->ptrace(current->parent, current);
- if (ret)
+ if ((ret = security_ptrace(current->parent, current)))
goto out;
/* set the ptrace bit in the process flags. */
current->ptrace |= PT_PTRACED;
===== arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace.c 1.11 vs edited =====
--- 1.11/arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace.c Sat Aug 24 04:08:41 2002
+++ edited/arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace.c Wed Oct 16 00:44:06 2002
@@ -291,8 +291,7 @@
pt_error_return(regs, EPERM);
goto out;
}
- ret = security_ops->ptrace(current->parent, current);
- if (ret) {
+ if ((ret = security_ptrace(current->parent, current))) {
pt_error_return(regs, -ret);
goto out;
}
===== arch/sparc64/kernel/ptrace.c 1.16 vs edited =====
--- 1.16/arch/sparc64/kernel/ptrace.c Sat Aug 24 03:59:14 2002
+++ edited/arch/sparc64/kernel/ptrace.c Wed Oct 16 00:43:53 2002
@@ -140,8 +140,7 @@
pt_error_return(regs, EPERM);
goto out;
}
- ret = security_ops->ptrace(current->parent, current);
- if (ret) {
+ if ((ret = security_ptrace(current->parent, current))) {
pt_error_return(regs, -ret);
goto out;
}
===== arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc32.c 1.39 vs edited =====
--- 1.39/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc32.c Mon Oct 14 05:17:46 2002
+++ edited/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc32.c Wed Oct 16 00:14:27 2002
@@ -2972,8 +2972,7 @@
if ((retval = bprm.envc) < 0)
goto out_mm;
- retval = security_ops->bprm_alloc_security(&bprm);
- if (retval)
+ if ((retval = security_bprm_alloc(&bprm)))
goto out;
retval = prepare_binprm(&bprm);
@@ -2996,7 +2995,7 @@
retval = search_binary_handler(&bprm, regs);
if (retval >= 0) {
/* execve success */
- security_ops->bprm_free_security(&bprm);
+ security_bprm_free(&bprm);
return retval;
}
@@ -3009,7 +3008,7 @@
}
if (bprm.security)
- security_ops->bprm_free_security(&bprm);
+ security_bprm_free(&bprm);
out_mm:
mmdrop(bprm.mm);
===== arch/um/kernel/ptrace.c 1.1 vs edited =====
--- 1.1/arch/um/kernel/ptrace.c Fri Sep 6 10:50:31 2002
+++ edited/arch/um/kernel/ptrace.c Wed Oct 16 00:43:41 2002
@@ -33,8 +33,7 @@
if (current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)
goto out;
- ret = security_ops->ptrace(current->parent, current);
- if(ret)
+ if ((ret = security_ptrace(current->parent, current)))
goto out;
/* set the ptrace bit in the process flags. */
===== arch/x86_64/kernel/ptrace.c 1.4 vs edited =====
--- 1.4/arch/x86_64/kernel/ptrace.c Fri Oct 11 16:52:38 2002
+++ edited/arch/x86_64/kernel/ptrace.c Wed Oct 16 00:43:30 2002
@@ -178,8 +178,7 @@
/* are we already being traced? */
if (current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)
goto out;
- ret = security_ops->ptrace(current->parent, current);
- if (ret)
+ if ((ret = security_ptrace(current->parent, current)))
goto out;
/* set the ptrace bit in the process flags. */
current->ptrace |= PT_PTRACED;
===== drivers/base/fs/class.c 1.2 vs edited =====
--- 1.2/drivers/base/fs/class.c Mon Aug 26 08:39:22 2002
+++ edited/drivers/base/fs/class.c Tue Oct 15 22:24:45 2002
@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/limits.h>
+#include <linux/stat.h>
#include "fs.h"
static struct driver_dir_entry class_dir;
===== drivers/base/fs/intf.c 1.2 vs edited =====
--- 1.2/drivers/base/fs/intf.c Mon Aug 26 09:24:18 2002
+++ edited/drivers/base/fs/intf.c Tue Oct 15 22:24:45 2002
@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@
#include <linux/device.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/limits.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
#include "fs.h"
/**
===== fs/attr.c 1.10 vs edited =====
--- 1.10/fs/attr.c Mon Jul 22 03:12:48 2002
+++ edited/fs/attr.c Tue Oct 15 23:50:23 2002
@@ -153,13 +153,12 @@
}
if (inode->i_op && inode->i_op->setattr) {
- error = security_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, attr);
- if (!error)
+ if (!(error = security_inode_setattr(dentry, attr)))
error = inode->i_op->setattr(dentry, attr);
} else {
error = inode_change_ok(inode, attr);
if (!error)
- error = security_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, attr);
+ error = security_inode_setattr(dentry, attr);
if (!error) {
if ((ia_valid & ATTR_UID && attr->ia_uid != inode->i_uid) ||
(ia_valid & ATTR_GID && attr->ia_gid != inode->i_gid))
===== fs/dquot.c 1.48 vs edited =====
--- 1.48/fs/dquot.c Sun Oct 13 08:39:23 2002
+++ edited/fs/dquot.c Tue Oct 15 22:55:27 2002
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
@@ -1305,8 +1306,7 @@
error = -EIO;
if (!f->f_op || !f->f_op->read || !f->f_op->write)
goto out_f;
- error = security_ops->quota_on(f);
- if (error)
+ if ((error = security_quota_on(f)))
goto out_f;
inode = f->f_dentry->d_inode;
error = -EACCES;
===== fs/exec.c 1.51 vs edited =====
--- 1.51/fs/exec.c Sun Oct 13 09:32:22 2002
+++ edited/fs/exec.c Tue Oct 15 23:03:20 2002
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
#include <linux/namei.h>
#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/pgalloc.h>
@@ -818,8 +819,7 @@
}
/* fill in binprm security blob */
- retval = security_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm);
- if (retval)
+ if ((retval = security_bprm_set(bprm)))
return retval;
memset(bprm->buf,0,BINPRM_BUF_SIZE);
@@ -867,7 +867,7 @@
if(do_unlock)
unlock_kernel();
- security_ops->bprm_compute_creds(bprm);
+ security_bprm_compute_creds(bprm);
}
void remove_arg_zero(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
@@ -936,8 +936,7 @@
}
}
#endif
- retval = security_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
- if (retval)
+ if ((retval = security_bprm_check(bprm)))
return retval;
/* kernel module loader fixup */
@@ -1033,8 +1032,7 @@
if ((retval = bprm.envc) < 0)
goto out_mm;
- retval = security_ops->bprm_alloc_security(&bprm);
- if (retval)
+ if ((retval = security_bprm_alloc(&bprm)))
goto out;
retval = prepare_binprm(&bprm);
@@ -1057,7 +1055,7 @@
retval = search_binary_handler(&bprm,regs);
if (retval >= 0) {
/* execve success */
- security_ops->bprm_free_security(&bprm);
+ security_bprm_free(&bprm);
return retval;
}
@@ -1070,7 +1068,7 @@
}
if (bprm.security)
- security_ops->bprm_free_security(&bprm);
+ security_bprm_free(&bprm);
out_mm:
mmdrop(bprm.mm);
===== fs/fcntl.c 1.20 vs edited =====
--- 1.20/fs/fcntl.c Sun Oct 13 08:39:40 2002
+++ edited/fs/fcntl.c Wed Oct 16 00:04:50 2002
@@ -274,8 +274,7 @@
{
int err;
- err = security_ops->file_set_fowner(filp);
- if (err)
+ if ((err = security_file_set_fowner(filp)))
return err;
f_modown(filp, arg, current->uid, current->euid, force);
@@ -368,8 +367,7 @@
if (!filp)
goto out;
- err = security_ops->file_fcntl(filp, cmd, arg);
- if (err) {
+ if ((err = security_file_fcntl(filp, cmd, arg))) {
fput(filp);
return err;
}
@@ -392,8 +390,7 @@
if (!filp)
goto out;
- err = security_ops->file_fcntl(filp, cmd, arg);
- if (err) {
+ if ((err = security_file_fcntl(filp, cmd, arg))) {
fput(filp);
return err;
}
@@ -444,7 +441,7 @@
if (!sigio_perm(p, fown))
return;
- if (security_ops->file_send_sigiotask(p, fown, fd, reason))
+ if (security_file_send_sigiotask(p, fown, fd, reason))
return;
switch (fown->signum) {
===== fs/file_table.c 1.13 vs edited =====
--- 1.13/fs/file_table.c Sun Oct 13 08:39:40 2002
+++ edited/fs/file_table.c Wed Oct 16 00:04:27 2002
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@
files_stat.nr_free_files--;
new_one:
memset(f, 0, sizeof(*f));
- if (security_ops->file_alloc_security(f)) {
+ if (security_file_alloc(f)) {
list_add(&f->f_list, &free_list);
files_stat.nr_free_files++;
file_list_unlock();
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@
if (file->f_op && file->f_op->release)
file->f_op->release(inode, file);
- security_ops->file_free_security(file);
+ security_file_free(file);
fops_put(file->f_op);
if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
put_write_access(inode);
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@
void put_filp(struct file *file)
{
if(atomic_dec_and_test(&file->f_count)) {
- security_ops->file_free_security(file);
+ security_file_free(file);
file_list_lock();
list_del(&file->f_list);
list_add(&file->f_list, &free_list);
===== fs/inode.c 1.74 vs edited =====
--- 1.74/fs/inode.c Sun Oct 13 08:39:23 2002
+++ edited/fs/inode.c Tue Oct 15 23:49:49 2002
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@
inode->i_bdev = NULL;
inode->i_cdev = NULL;
inode->i_security = NULL;
- if (security_ops->inode_alloc_security(inode)) {
+ if (security_inode_alloc(inode)) {
if (inode->i_sb->s_op->destroy_inode)
inode->i_sb->s_op->destroy_inode(inode);
else
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@
{
if (inode_has_buffers(inode))
BUG();
- security_ops->inode_free_security(inode);
+ security_inode_free(inode);
if (inode->i_sb->s_op->destroy_inode) {
inode->i_sb->s_op->destroy_inode(inode);
} else {
@@ -922,7 +922,7 @@
if (inode->i_data.nrpages)
truncate_inode_pages(&inode->i_data, 0);
- security_ops->inode_delete(inode);
+ security_inode_delete(inode);
if (op && op->delete_inode) {
void (*delete)(struct inode *) = op->delete_inode;
===== fs/ioctl.c 1.5 vs edited =====
--- 1.5/fs/ioctl.c Mon Jul 22 03:12:48 2002
+++ edited/fs/ioctl.c Wed Oct 16 00:06:16 2002
@@ -59,8 +59,7 @@
goto out;
error = 0;
- error = security_ops->file_ioctl(filp, cmd, arg);
- if (error) {
+ if ((error = security_file_ioctl(filp, cmd, arg))) {
fput(filp);
goto out;
}
===== fs/locks.c 1.30 vs edited =====
--- 1.30/fs/locks.c Thu Sep 26 10:36:16 2002
+++ edited/fs/locks.c Wed Oct 16 00:06:00 2002
@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@
#include <linux/timer.h>
#include <linux/time.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <asm/semaphore.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
@@ -1170,8 +1171,7 @@
return -EACCES;
if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return -EINVAL;
- error = security_ops->file_lock(filp, arg);
- if (error)
+ if ((error = security_file_lock(filp, arg)))
return error;
lock_kernel();
@@ -1284,8 +1284,7 @@
if (error)
goto out_putf;
- error = security_ops->file_lock(filp, cmd);
- if (error)
+ if ((error = security_file_lock(filp, cmd)))
goto out_free;
for (;;) {
@@ -1434,8 +1433,7 @@
goto out;
}
- error = security_ops->file_lock(filp, file_lock->fl_type);
- if (error)
+ if ((error = security_file_lock(filp, file_lock->fl_type)))
goto out;
if (filp->f_op && filp->f_op->lock != NULL) {
@@ -1574,8 +1572,7 @@
goto out;
}
- error = security_ops->file_lock(filp, file_lock->fl_type);
- if (error)
+ if ((error = security_file_lock(filp, file_lock->fl_type)))
goto out;
if (filp->f_op && filp->f_op->lock != NULL) {
===== fs/namei.c 1.56 vs edited =====
--- 1.56/fs/namei.c Tue Sep 17 12:52:27 2002
+++ edited/fs/namei.c Tue Oct 15 23:47:28 2002
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@
if (retval)
return retval;
- return security_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask);
+ return security_inode_permission(inode, mask);
}
/*
@@ -340,7 +340,7 @@
return -EACCES;
ok:
- return security_ops->inode_permission_lite(inode, MAY_EXEC);
+ return security_inode_permission_lite(inode, MAY_EXEC);
}
/*
@@ -374,7 +374,7 @@
dput(dentry);
else {
result = dentry;
- security_ops->inode_post_lookup(dir, result);
+ security_inode_post_lookup(dir, result);
}
}
up(&dir->i_sem);
@@ -413,8 +413,7 @@
current->state = TASK_RUNNING;
schedule();
}
- err = security_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry, nd);
- if (err)
+ if ((err = security_inode_follow_link(dentry, nd)))
goto loop;
current->link_count++;
current->total_link_count++;
@@ -918,7 +917,7 @@
dentry = inode->i_op->lookup(inode, new);
if (!dentry) {
dentry = new;
- security_ops->inode_post_lookup(inode, dentry);
+ security_inode_post_lookup(inode, dentry);
} else
dput(new);
}
@@ -1125,14 +1124,13 @@
return -EACCES; /* shouldn't it be ENOSYS? */
mode &= S_IALLUGO;
mode |= S_IFREG;
- error = security_ops->inode_create(dir, dentry, mode);
- if (error)
+ if ((error = security_inode_create(dir, dentry, mode)))
return error;
DQUOT_INIT(dir);
error = dir->i_op->create(dir, dentry, mode);
if (!error) {
inode_dir_notify(dir, DN_CREATE);
- security_ops->inode_post_create(dir, dentry, mode);
+ security_inode_post_create(dir, dentry, mode);
}
return error;
}
@@ -1344,8 +1342,7 @@
* stored in nd->last.name and we will have to putname() it when we
* are done. Procfs-like symlinks just set LAST_BIND.
*/
- error = security_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry, nd);
- if (error)
+ if ((error = security_inode_follow_link(dentry, nd)))
goto exit_dput;
UPDATE_ATIME(dentry->d_inode);
error = dentry->d_inode->i_op->follow_link(dentry, nd);
@@ -1410,15 +1407,14 @@
if (!dir->i_op || !dir->i_op->mknod)
return -EPERM;
- error = security_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
- if (error)
+ if ((error = security_inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev)))
return error;
DQUOT_INIT(dir);
error = dir->i_op->mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
if (!error) {
inode_dir_notify(dir, DN_CREATE);
- security_ops->inode_post_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
+ security_inode_post_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
}
return error;
}
@@ -1478,15 +1474,14 @@
return -EPERM;
mode &= (S_IRWXUGO|S_ISVTX);
- error = security_ops->inode_mkdir(dir, dentry, mode);
- if (error)
+ if ((error = security_inode_mkdir(dir, dentry, mode)))
return error;
DQUOT_INIT(dir);
error = dir->i_op->mkdir(dir, dentry, mode);
if (!error) {
inode_dir_notify(dir, DN_CREATE);
- security_ops->inode_post_mkdir(dir,dentry, mode);
+ security_inode_post_mkdir(dir,dentry, mode);
}
return error;
}
@@ -1570,8 +1565,7 @@
if (d_mountpoint(dentry))
error = -EBUSY;
else {
- error = security_ops->inode_rmdir(dir, dentry);
- if (!error) {
+ if (!(error = security_inode_rmdir(dir, dentry))) {
error = dir->i_op->rmdir(dir, dentry);
if (!error)
dentry->d_inode->i_flags |= S_DEAD;
@@ -1644,10 +1638,8 @@
if (d_mountpoint(dentry))
error = -EBUSY;
else {
- error = security_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
- if (!error) {
+ if (!(error = security_inode_unlink(dir, dentry)))
error = dir->i_op->unlink(dir, dentry);
- }
}
up(&dentry->d_inode->i_sem);
if (!error) {
@@ -1709,15 +1701,14 @@
if (!dir->i_op || !dir->i_op->symlink)
return -EPERM;
- error = security_ops->inode_symlink(dir, dentry, oldname);
- if (error)
+ if ((error = security_inode_symlink(dir, dentry, oldname)))
return error;
DQUOT_INIT(dir);
error = dir->i_op->symlink(dir, dentry, oldname);
if (!error) {
inode_dir_notify(dir, DN_CREATE);
- security_ops->inode_post_symlink(dir, dentry, oldname);
+ security_inode_post_symlink(dir, dentry, oldname);
}
return error;
}
@@ -1780,8 +1771,7 @@
if (S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode))
return -EPERM;
- error = security_ops->inode_link(old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
- if (error)
+ if ((error = security_inode_link(old_dentry, dir, new_dentry)))
return error;
down(&old_dentry->d_inode->i_sem);
@@ -1790,7 +1780,7 @@
up(&old_dentry->d_inode->i_sem);
if (!error) {
inode_dir_notify(dir, DN_CREATE);
- security_ops->inode_post_link(old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
+ security_inode_post_link(old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
}
return error;
}
@@ -1889,8 +1879,7 @@
return error;
}
- error = security_ops->inode_rename(old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry);
- if (error)
+ if ((error = security_inode_rename(old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry)))
return error;
target = new_dentry->d_inode;
@@ -1912,8 +1901,8 @@
}
if (!error) {
d_move(old_dentry,new_dentry);
- security_ops->inode_post_rename(old_dir, old_dentry,
- new_dir, new_dentry);
+ security_inode_post_rename(old_dir, old_dentry,
+ new_dir, new_dentry);
}
return error;
}
@@ -1924,8 +1913,7 @@
struct inode *target;
int error;
- error = security_ops->inode_rename(old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry);
- if (error)
+ if ((error = security_inode_rename(old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry)))
return error;
dget(new_dentry);
@@ -1940,7 +1928,7 @@
/* The following d_move() should become unconditional */
if (!(old_dir->i_sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_ODD_RENAME))
d_move(old_dentry, new_dentry);
- security_ops->inode_post_rename(old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry);
+ security_inode_post_rename(old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry);
}
if (target)
up(&target->i_sem);
===== fs/namespace.c 1.29 vs edited =====
--- 1.29/fs/namespace.c Tue Sep 17 12:52:27 2002
+++ edited/fs/namespace.c Tue Oct 15 23:17:32 2002
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include <linux/namespace.h>
#include <linux/namei.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
@@ -288,8 +289,7 @@
struct super_block * sb = mnt->mnt_sb;
int retval = 0;
- retval = security_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
- if (retval)
+ if ((retval = security_sb_umount(mnt, flags)))
return retval;
/*
@@ -341,7 +341,7 @@
DQUOT_OFF(sb);
acct_auto_close(sb);
unlock_kernel();
- security_ops->sb_umount_close(mnt);
+ security_sb_umount_close(mnt);
spin_lock(&dcache_lock);
}
retval = -EBUSY;
@@ -352,7 +352,7 @@
}
spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);
if (retval)
- security_ops->sb_umount_busy(mnt);
+ security_sb_umount_busy(mnt);
up_write(¤t->namespace->sem);
return retval;
}
@@ -470,8 +470,7 @@
if (IS_DEADDIR(nd->dentry->d_inode))
goto out_unlock;
- err = security_ops->sb_check_sb(mnt, nd);
- if (err)
+ if ((err = security_sb_check_sb(mnt, nd)))
goto out_unlock;
spin_lock(&dcache_lock);
@@ -487,7 +486,7 @@
out_unlock:
up(&nd->dentry->d_inode->i_sem);
if (!err)
- security_ops->sb_post_addmount(mnt, nd);
+ security_sb_post_addmount(mnt, nd);
return err;
}
@@ -558,7 +557,7 @@
nd->mnt->mnt_flags=mnt_flags;
up_write(&sb->s_umount);
if (!err)
- security_ops->sb_post_remount(nd->mnt, flags, data);
+ security_sb_post_remount(nd->mnt, flags, data);
return err;
}
@@ -741,8 +740,7 @@
if (retval)
return retval;
- retval = security_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, &nd, type_page, flags, data_page);
- if (retval)
+ if ((retval = security_sb_mount(dev_name, &nd, type_page, flags, data_page)))
goto dput_out;
if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
@@ -939,8 +937,7 @@
if (error)
goto out1;
- error = security_ops->sb_pivotroot(&old_nd, &new_nd);
- if (error) {
+ if ((error = security_sb_pivotroot(&old_nd, &new_nd))) {
path_release(&old_nd);
goto out1;
}
@@ -989,7 +986,7 @@
attach_mnt(new_nd.mnt, &root_parent);
spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);
chroot_fs_refs(&user_nd, &new_nd);
- security_ops->sb_post_pivotroot(&user_nd, &new_nd);
+ security_sb_post_pivotroot(&user_nd, &new_nd);
error = 0;
path_release(&root_parent);
path_release(&parent_nd);
===== fs/open.c 1.28 vs edited =====
--- 1.28/fs/open.c Sun Oct 13 08:39:40 2002
+++ edited/fs/open.c Tue Oct 15 23:19:46 2002
@@ -30,8 +30,7 @@
retval = -ENOSYS;
if (sb->s_op && sb->s_op->statfs) {
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(struct statfs));
- retval = security_ops->sb_statfs(sb);
- if (retval)
+ if ((retval = security_sb_statfs(sb)))
return retval;
retval = sb->s_op->statfs(sb, buf);
}
===== fs/quota.c 1.8 vs edited =====
--- 1.8/fs/quota.c Mon Jul 22 03:12:48 2002
+++ edited/fs/quota.c Tue Oct 15 22:54:46 2002
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
- return security_ops->quotactl (cmd, type, id, sb);
+ return security_quotactl (cmd, type, id, sb);
}
/* Resolve device pathname to superblock */
===== fs/read_write.c 1.19 vs edited =====
--- 1.19/fs/read_write.c Thu Oct 10 14:36:26 2002
+++ edited/fs/read_write.c Wed Oct 16 00:08:14 2002
@@ -121,8 +121,7 @@
if (!file)
goto bad;
- retval = security_ops->file_llseek(file);
- if (retval) {
+ if ((retval = security_file_llseek(file))) {
fput(file);
goto bad;
}
@@ -153,8 +152,7 @@
if (!file)
goto bad;
- retval = security_ops->file_llseek(file);
- if (retval)
+ if ((retval = security_file_llseek(file)))
goto out_putf;
retval = -EINVAL;
@@ -203,8 +201,7 @@
ret = locks_verify_area(FLOCK_VERIFY_READ, inode, file, *pos, count);
if (!ret) {
- ret = security_ops->file_permission (file, MAY_READ);
- if (!ret) {
+ if (!(ret = security_file_permission (file, MAY_READ))) {
if (file->f_op->read)
ret = file->f_op->read(file, buf, count, pos);
else
@@ -243,8 +240,7 @@
ret = locks_verify_area(FLOCK_VERIFY_WRITE, inode, file, *pos, count);
if (!ret) {
- ret = security_ops->file_permission (file, MAY_WRITE);
- if (!ret) {
+ if (!(ret = security_file_permission (file, MAY_WRITE))) {
if (file->f_op->write)
ret = file->f_op->write(file, buf, count, pos);
else
@@ -475,8 +471,7 @@
goto bad_file;
if (file->f_op && (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) &&
(file->f_op->readv || file->f_op->read)) {
- ret = security_ops->file_permission (file, MAY_READ);
- if (!ret)
+ if (!(ret = security_file_permission (file, MAY_READ)))
ret = do_readv_writev(READ, file, vector, nr_segs);
}
fput(file);
@@ -498,8 +493,7 @@
goto bad_file;
if (file->f_op && (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) &&
(file->f_op->writev || file->f_op->write)) {
- ret = security_ops->file_permission (file, MAY_WRITE);
- if (!ret)
+ if (!(ret = security_file_permission (file, MAY_WRITE)))
ret = do_readv_writev(WRITE, file, vector, nr_segs);
}
fput(file);
===== fs/readdir.c 1.9 vs edited =====
--- 1.9/fs/readdir.c Mon Jul 22 03:12:48 2002
+++ edited/fs/readdir.c Wed Oct 16 00:06:40 2002
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
@@ -21,8 +22,7 @@
if (!file->f_op || !file->f_op->readdir)
goto out;
- res = security_ops->file_permission(file, MAY_READ);
- if (res)
+ if ((res = security_file_permission(file, MAY_READ)))
goto out;
down(&inode->i_sem);
===== fs/stat.c 1.13 vs edited =====
--- 1.13/fs/stat.c Mon Jul 22 03:12:48 2002
+++ edited/fs/stat.c Tue Oct 15 23:49:19 2002
@@ -39,8 +39,7 @@
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
int retval;
- retval = security_ops->inode_getattr(mnt, dentry);
- if (retval)
+ if ((retval = security_inode_getattr(mnt, dentry)))
return retval;
if (inode->i_op->getattr)
@@ -238,8 +237,7 @@
error = -EINVAL;
if (inode->i_op && inode->i_op->readlink) {
- error = security_ops->inode_readlink(nd.dentry);
- if (!error) {
+ if (!(error = security_inode_readlink(nd.dentry))) {
UPDATE_ATIME(inode);
error = inode->i_op->readlink(nd.dentry, buf, bufsiz);
}
===== fs/super.c 1.83 vs edited =====
--- 1.83/fs/super.c Mon Sep 9 14:00:57 2002
+++ edited/fs/super.c Tue Oct 15 23:18:44 2002
@@ -29,9 +29,9 @@
#include <linux/quotaops.h>
#include <linux/namei.h>
#include <linux/buffer_head.h> /* for fsync_super() */
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
-#include <linux/security.h>
void get_filesystem(struct file_system_type *fs);
void put_filesystem(struct file_system_type *fs);
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@
struct super_block *s = kmalloc(sizeof(struct super_block), GFP_USER);
if (s) {
memset(s, 0, sizeof(struct super_block));
- if (security_ops->sb_alloc_security(s)) {
+ if (security_sb_alloc(s)) {
kfree(s);
s = NULL;
goto out;
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@
*/
static inline void destroy_super(struct super_block *s)
{
- security_ops->sb_free_security(s);
+ security_sb_free(s);
kfree(s);
}
===== fs/xattr.c 1.7 vs edited =====
--- 1.7/fs/xattr.c Mon Jul 22 03:12:48 2002
+++ edited/fs/xattr.c Tue Oct 15 23:51:34 2002
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/xattr.h>
#include <linux/namei.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
/*
@@ -85,9 +86,7 @@
error = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (d->d_inode->i_op && d->d_inode->i_op->setxattr) {
- error = security_ops->inode_setxattr(d, kname, kvalue,
- size, flags);
- if (error)
+ if ((error = security_inode_setxattr(d, kname, kvalue, size, flags)))
goto out;
down(&d->d_inode->i_sem);
error = d->d_inode->i_op->setxattr(d, kname, kvalue, size, flags);
@@ -163,8 +162,7 @@
error = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (d->d_inode->i_op && d->d_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
- error = security_ops->inode_getxattr(d, kname);
- if (error)
+ if ((error = security_inode_getxattr(d, kname)))
goto out;
down(&d->d_inode->i_sem);
error = d->d_inode->i_op->getxattr(d, kname, kvalue, size);
@@ -236,8 +234,7 @@
error = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (d->d_inode->i_op && d->d_inode->i_op->listxattr) {
- error = security_ops->inode_listxattr(d);
- if (error)
+ if ((error = security_inode_listxattr(d)))
goto out;
down(&d->d_inode->i_sem);
error = d->d_inode->i_op->listxattr(d, klist, size);
@@ -311,8 +308,7 @@
error = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (d->d_inode->i_op && d->d_inode->i_op->removexattr) {
- error = security_ops->inode_removexattr(d, kname);
- if (error)
+ if ((error = security_inode_removexattr(d, kname)))
goto out;
down(&d->d_inode->i_sem);
error = d->d_inode->i_op->removexattr(d, kname);
===== fs/proc/base.c 1.31 vs edited =====
--- 1.31/fs/proc/base.c Sat Sep 28 08:36:29 2002
+++ edited/fs/proc/base.c Tue Oct 15 23:22:02 2002
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
#include <linux/namespace.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
/*
* For hysterical raisins we keep the same inumbers as in the old procfs.
@@ -394,7 +395,7 @@
};
#define MAY_PTRACE(p) \
-(p==current||(p->parent==current&&(p->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)&&p->state==TASK_STOPPED&&security_ops->ptrace(current,p)==0))
+(p==current||(p->parent==current&&(p->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)&&p->state==TASK_STOPPED&&security_ptrace(current,p)==0))
static int mem_open(struct inode* inode, struct file* file)
===== include/linux/sched.h 1.107 vs edited =====
--- 1.107/include/linux/sched.h Tue Oct 15 15:32:40 2002
+++ edited/include/linux/sched.h Tue Oct 15 22:24:46 2002
@@ -596,9 +596,11 @@
unsigned long, const char *, void *);
extern void free_irq(unsigned int, void *);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
/* capable prototype and code moved to security.[hc] */
#include <linux/security.h>
-#if 0
+#else
static inline int capable(int cap)
{
if (cap_raised(current->cap_effective, cap)) {
@@ -607,7 +609,7 @@
}
return 0;
}
-#endif /* if 0 */
+#endif
/*
* Routines for handling mm_structs
===== include/linux/security.h 1.4 vs edited =====
--- 1.4/include/linux/security.h Tue Oct 8 02:20:18 2002
+++ edited/include/linux/security.h Wed Oct 16 01:03:50 2002
@@ -22,8 +22,6 @@
#ifndef __LINUX_SECURITY_H
#define __LINUX_SECURITY_H
-#ifdef __KERNEL__
-
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/binfmts.h>
#include <linux/signal.h>
@@ -33,6 +31,7 @@
#include <linux/shm.h>
#include <linux/msg.h>
+
/*
* Values used in the task_security_ops calls
*/
@@ -848,6 +847,533 @@
struct security_operations *ops);
};
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+
+/* global variables */
+extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
+
+/* inline stuff */
+static inline int security_ptrace (struct task_struct * parent, struct task_struct * child)
+{
+ return security_ops->ptrace (parent, child);
+}
+
+static inline int security_capget (struct task_struct *target,
+ kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+ kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+{
+ return security_ops->capget (target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
+}
+
+static inline int security_capset_check (struct task_struct *target,
+ kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+ kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+{
+ return security_ops->capset_check (target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
+}
+
+static inline void security_capset_set (struct task_struct *target,
+ kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+ kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+{
+ security_ops->capset_set (target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
+}
+
+static inline int security_acct (struct file *file)
+{
+ return security_ops->acct (file);
+}
+
+static inline int security_quotactl (int cmds, int type, int id,
+ struct super_block *sb)
+{
+ return security_ops->quotactl (cmds, type, id, sb);
+}
+
+static inline int security_quota_on (struct file * file)
+{
+ return security_ops->quota_on (file);
+}
+
+static inline int security_bprm_alloc (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+ return security_ops->bprm_alloc_security (bprm);
+}
+static inline void security_bprm_free (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+ security_ops->bprm_free_security (bprm);
+}
+static inline void security_bprm_compute_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+ security_ops->bprm_compute_creds (bprm);
+}
+static inline int security_bprm_set (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+ return security_ops->bprm_set_security (bprm);
+}
+static inline int security_bprm_check (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+ return security_ops->bprm_check_security (bprm);
+}
+
+static inline int security_sb_alloc (struct super_block *sb)
+{
+ return security_ops->sb_alloc_security (sb);
+}
+
+static inline void security_sb_free (struct super_block *sb)
+{
+ security_ops->sb_free_security (sb);
+}
+
+static inline int security_sb_statfs (struct super_block *sb)
+{
+ return security_ops->sb_statfs (sb);
+}
+
+static inline int security_sb_mount (char *dev_name, struct nameidata *nd,
+ char *type, unsigned long flags,
+ void *data)
+{
+ return security_ops->sb_mount (dev_name, nd, type, flags, data);
+}
+
+static inline int security_sb_check_sb (struct vfsmount *mnt,
+ struct nameidata *nd)
+{
+ return security_ops->sb_check_sb (mnt, nd);
+}
+
+static inline int security_sb_umount (struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
+{
+ return security_ops->sb_umount (mnt, flags);
+}
+
+static inline void security_sb_umount_close (struct vfsmount *mnt)
+{
+ security_ops->sb_umount_close (mnt);
+}
+
+static inline void security_sb_umount_busy (struct vfsmount *mnt)
+{
+ security_ops->sb_umount_busy (mnt);
+}
+
+static inline void security_sb_post_remount (struct vfsmount *mnt,
+ unsigned long flags, void *data)
+{
+ security_ops->sb_post_remount (mnt, flags, data);
+}
+
+static inline void security_sb_post_mountroot (void)
+{
+ security_ops->sb_post_mountroot ();
+}
+
+static inline void security_sb_post_addmount (struct vfsmount *mnt,
+ struct nameidata *mountpoint_nd)
+{
+ security_ops->sb_post_addmount (mnt, mountpoint_nd);
+}
+
+static inline int security_sb_pivotroot (struct nameidata *old_nd,
+ struct nameidata *new_nd)
+{
+ return security_ops->sb_pivotroot (old_nd, new_nd);
+}
+
+static inline void security_sb_post_pivotroot (struct nameidata *old_nd,
+ struct nameidata *new_nd)
+{
+ security_ops->sb_post_pivotroot (old_nd, new_nd);
+}
+
+static inline int security_inode_alloc (struct inode *inode)
+{
+ return security_ops->inode_alloc_security (inode);
+}
+
+static inline void security_inode_free (struct inode *inode)
+{
+ security_ops->inode_free_security (inode);
+}
+
+static inline int security_inode_create (struct inode *dir,
+ struct dentry *dentry,
+ int mode)
+{
+ return security_ops->inode_create (dir, dentry, mode);
+}
+
+static inline void security_inode_post_create (struct inode *dir,
+ struct dentry *dentry,
+ int mode)
+{
+ security_ops->inode_post_create (dir, dentry, mode);
+}
+
+static inline int security_inode_link (struct dentry *old_dentry,
+ struct inode *dir,
+ struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+ return security_ops->inode_link (old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
+}
+
+static inline void security_inode_post_link (struct dentry *old_dentry,
+ struct inode *dir,
+ struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+ security_ops->inode_post_link (old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
+}
+
+static inline int security_inode_unlink (struct inode *dir,
+ struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ return security_ops->inode_unlink (dir, dentry);
+}
+
+static inline int security_inode_symlink (struct inode *dir,
+ struct dentry *dentry,
+ const char *old_name)
+{
+ return security_ops->inode_symlink (dir, dentry, old_name);
+}
+
+static inline void security_inode_post_symlink (struct inode *dir,
+ struct dentry *dentry,
+ const char *old_name)
+{
+ security_ops->inode_post_symlink (dir, dentry, old_name);
+}
+
+static inline int security_inode_mkdir (struct inode *dir,
+ struct dentry *dentry,
+ int mode)
+{
+ return security_ops->inode_mkdir (dir, dentry, mode);
+}
+
+static inline void security_inode_post_mkdir (struct inode *dir,
+ struct dentry *dentry,
+ int mode)
+{
+ security_ops->inode_post_mkdir (dir, dentry, mode);
+}
+
+static inline int security_inode_rmdir (struct inode *dir,
+ struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ return security_ops->inode_rmdir (dir, dentry);
+}
+
+static inline int security_inode_mknod (struct inode *dir,
+ struct dentry *dentry,
+ int mode, dev_t dev)
+{
+ return security_ops->inode_mknod (dir, dentry, mode, dev);
+}
+
+static inline void security_inode_post_mknod (struct inode *dir,
+ struct dentry *dentry,
+ int mode, dev_t dev)
+{
+ security_ops->inode_post_mknod (dir, dentry, mode, dev);
+}
+
+static inline int security_inode_rename (struct inode *old_dir,
+ struct dentry *old_dentry,
+ struct inode *new_dir,
+ struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+ return security_ops->inode_rename (old_dir, old_dentry,
+ new_dir, new_dentry);
+}
+
+static inline void security_inode_post_rename (struct inode *old_dir,
+ struct dentry *old_dentry,
+ struct inode *new_dir,
+ struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+ security_ops->inode_post_rename (old_dir, old_dentry,
+ new_dir, new_dentry);
+}
+
+static inline int security_inode_readlink (struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ return security_ops->inode_readlink (dentry);
+}
+
+static inline int security_inode_follow_link (struct dentry *dentry,
+ struct nameidata *nd)
+{
+ return security_ops->inode_follow_link (dentry, nd);
+}
+
+static inline int security_inode_permission (struct inode *inode, int mask)
+{
+ return security_ops->inode_permission (inode, mask);
+}
+
+static inline int security_inode_permission_lite (struct inode *inode,
+ int mask)
+{
+ return security_ops->inode_permission_lite (inode, mask);
+}
+
+static inline int security_inode_setattr (struct dentry *dentry,
+ struct iattr *attr)
+{
+ return security_ops->inode_setattr (dentry, attr);
+}
+
+static inline int security_inode_getattr (struct vfsmount *mnt,
+ struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ return security_ops->inode_getattr (mnt, dentry);
+}
+
+static inline void security_inode_post_lookup (struct inode *inode,
+ struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ security_ops->inode_post_lookup (inode, dentry);
+}
+
+static inline void security_inode_delete (struct inode *inode)
+{
+ security_ops->inode_delete (inode);
+}
+
+static inline int security_inode_setxattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name,
+ void *value, size_t size, int flags)
+{
+ return security_ops->inode_setxattr (dentry, name, value, size, flags);
+}
+
+static inline int security_inode_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
+{
+ return security_ops->inode_getxattr (dentry, name);
+}
+
+static inline int security_inode_listxattr (struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ return security_ops->inode_listxattr (dentry);
+}
+
+static inline int security_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
+{
+ return security_ops->inode_removexattr (dentry, name);
+}
+
+static inline int security_file_permission (struct file *file, int mask)
+{
+ return security_ops->file_permission (file, mask);
+}
+
+static inline int security_file_alloc (struct file *file)
+{
+ return security_ops->file_alloc_security (file);
+}
+
+static inline void security_file_free (struct file *file)
+{
+ security_ops->file_free_security (file);
+}
+
+static inline int security_file_llseek (struct file *file)
+{
+ return security_ops->file_llseek (file);
+}
+
+static inline int security_file_ioctl (struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+ unsigned long arg)
+{
+ return security_ops->file_ioctl (file, cmd, arg);
+}
+
+static inline int security_file_mmap (struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
+ unsigned long flags)
+{
+ return security_ops->file_mmap (file, prot, flags);
+}
+
+static inline int security_file_mprotect (struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+ unsigned long prot)
+{
+ return security_ops->file_mprotect (vma, prot);
+}
+
+static inline int security_file_lock (struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
+{
+ return security_ops->file_lock (file, cmd);
+}
+
+static inline int security_file_fcntl (struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+ unsigned long arg)
+{
+ return security_ops->file_fcntl (file, cmd, arg);
+}
+
+static inline int security_file_set_fowner (struct file *file)
+{
+ return security_ops->file_set_fowner (file);
+}
+
+static inline int security_file_send_sigiotask (struct task_struct *tsk,
+ struct fown_struct *fown,
+ int fd, int reason)
+{
+ return security_ops->file_send_sigiotask (tsk, fown, fd, reason);
+}
+
+static inline int security_file_receive (struct file *file)
+{
+ return security_ops->file_receive (file);
+}
+
+static inline int security_task_create (unsigned long clone_flags)
+{
+ return security_ops->task_create (clone_flags);
+}
+
+static inline int security_task_alloc (struct task_struct *p)
+{
+ return security_ops->task_alloc_security (p);
+}
+
+static inline void security_task_free (struct task_struct *p)
+{
+ security_ops->task_free_security (p);
+}
+
+static inline int security_task_setuid (uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2,
+ int flags)
+{
+ return security_ops->task_setuid (id0, id1, id2, flags);
+}
+
+static inline int security_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid,
+ uid_t old_suid, int flags)
+{
+ return security_ops->task_post_setuid (old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid, flags);
+}
+
+static inline int security_task_setgid (gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2,
+ int flags)
+{
+ return security_ops->task_setgid (id0, id1, id2, flags);
+}
+
+static inline int security_task_setpgid (struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
+{
+ return security_ops->task_setpgid (p, pgid);
+}
+
+static inline int security_task_getpgid (struct task_struct *p)
+{
+ return security_ops->task_getpgid (p);
+}
+
+static inline int security_task_getsid (struct task_struct *p)
+{
+ return security_ops->task_getsid (p);
+}
+
+static inline int security_task_setgroups (int gidsetsize, gid_t *grouplist)
+{
+ return security_ops->task_setgroups (gidsetsize, grouplist);
+}
+
+static inline int security_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
+{
+ return security_ops->task_setnice (p, nice);
+}
+
+static inline int security_task_setrlimit (unsigned int resource,
+ struct rlimit *new_rlim)
+{
+ return security_ops->task_setrlimit (resource, new_rlim);
+}
+
+static inline int security_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p,
+ int policy,
+ struct sched_param *lp)
+{
+ return security_ops->task_setscheduler (p, policy, lp);
+}
+
+static inline int security_task_getscheduler (struct task_struct *p)
+{
+ return security_ops->task_getscheduler (p);
+}
+
+static inline int security_task_kill (struct task_struct *p,
+ struct siginfo *info, int sig)
+{
+ return security_ops->task_kill (p, info, sig);
+}
+
+static inline int security_task_wait (struct task_struct *p)
+{
+ return security_ops->task_wait (p);
+}
+
+static inline int security_task_prctl (int option, unsigned long arg2,
+ unsigned long arg3,
+ unsigned long arg4,
+ unsigned long arg5)
+{
+ return security_ops->task_prctl (option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
+}
+
+static inline void security_task_kmod_set_label (void)
+{
+ security_ops->task_kmod_set_label ();
+}
+
+static inline void security_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p)
+{
+ security_ops->task_reparent_to_init (p);
+}
+
+static inline int security_ipc_permission (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
+ short flag)
+{
+ return security_ops->ipc_permission (ipcp, flag);
+}
+
+static inline int security_msg_queue_alloc (struct msg_queue *msq)
+{
+ return security_ops->msg_queue_alloc_security (msq);
+}
+
+static inline void security_msg_queue_free (struct msg_queue *msq)
+{
+ security_ops->msg_queue_free_security (msq);
+}
+
+static inline int security_shm_alloc (struct shmid_kernel *shp)
+{
+ return security_ops->shm_alloc_security (shp);
+}
+
+static inline void security_shm_free (struct shmid_kernel *shp)
+{
+ security_ops->shm_free_security (shp);
+}
+
+static inline int security_sem_alloc (struct sem_array *sma)
+{
+ return security_ops->sem_alloc_security (sma);
+}
+
+static inline void security_sem_free (struct sem_array *sma)
+{
+ security_ops->sem_free_security (sma);
+}
+
/* prototypes */
extern int security_scaffolding_startup (void);
@@ -857,11 +1383,481 @@
extern int mod_unreg_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops);
extern int capable (int cap);
-/* global variables */
-extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
+#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
+
+static inline int security_scaffolding_startup (void) { return 0; }
+
+static inline int security_ptrace (struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct * child)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_capget (struct task_struct *target,
+ kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+ kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_capset_check (struct task_struct *target,
+ kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+ kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void security_capset_set (struct task_struct *target,
+ kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+ kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+{ }
+
+static inline int security_acct (struct file *file)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_quotactl (int cmds, int type, int id,
+ struct super_block * sb)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_quota_on (struct file * file)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_bprm_alloc (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+static inline void security_bprm_free (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{ }
+static inline void security_bprm_compute_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{ }
+static inline int security_bprm_set (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+static inline int security_bprm_check (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_sb_alloc (struct super_block *sb)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void security_sb_free (struct super_block *sb)
+{ }
+
+static inline int security_sb_statfs (struct super_block *sb)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_sb_mount (char *dev_name, struct nameidata *nd,
+ char *type, unsigned long flags,
+ void *data)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_sb_check_sb (struct vfsmount *mnt,
+ struct nameidata *nd)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_sb_umount (struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void security_sb_umount_close (struct vfsmount *mnt)
+{ }
+
+static inline void security_sb_umount_busy (struct vfsmount *mnt)
+{ }
+
+static inline void security_sb_post_remount (struct vfsmount *mnt,
+ unsigned long flags, void *data)
+{ }
+
+static inline void security_sb_post_mountroot (void)
+{ }
+
+static inline void security_sb_post_addmount (struct vfsmount *mnt,
+ struct nameidata *mountpoint_nd)
+{ }
+
+static inline int security_sb_pivotroot (struct nameidata *old_nd,
+ struct nameidata *new_nd)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void security_sb_post_pivotroot (struct nameidata *old_nd,
+ struct nameidata *new_nd)
+{ }
+
+static inline int security_inode_alloc (struct inode *inode)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void security_inode_free (struct inode *inode)
+{ }
+
+static inline int security_inode_create (struct inode *dir,
+ struct dentry *dentry,
+ int mode)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void security_inode_post_create (struct inode *dir,
+ struct dentry *dentry,
+ int mode)
+{ }
+
+static inline int security_inode_link (struct dentry *old_dentry,
+ struct inode *dir,
+ struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void security_inode_post_link (struct dentry *old_dentry,
+ struct inode *dir,
+ struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{ }
+
+static inline int security_inode_unlink (struct inode *dir,
+ struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_inode_symlink (struct inode *dir,
+ struct dentry *dentry,
+ const char *old_name)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void security_inode_post_symlink (struct inode *dir,
+ struct dentry *dentry,
+ const char *old_name)
+{ }
+
+static inline int security_inode_mkdir (struct inode *dir,
+ struct dentry *dentry,
+ int mode)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void security_inode_post_mkdir (struct inode *dir,
+ struct dentry *dentry,
+ int mode)
+{ }
+
+static inline int security_inode_rmdir (struct inode *dir,
+ struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_inode_mknod (struct inode *dir,
+ struct dentry *dentry,
+ int mode, dev_t dev)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void security_inode_post_mknod (struct inode *dir,
+ struct dentry *dentry,
+ int mode, dev_t dev)
+{ }
+
+static inline int security_inode_rename (struct inode *old_dir,
+ struct dentry *old_dentry,
+ struct inode *new_dir,
+ struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void security_inode_post_rename (struct inode *old_dir,
+ struct dentry *old_dentry,
+ struct inode *new_dir,
+ struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{ }
+
+static inline int security_inode_readlink (struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_inode_follow_link (struct dentry *dentry,
+ struct nameidata *nd)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_inode_permission (struct inode *inode, int mask)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_inode_permission_lite (struct inode *inode,
+ int mask)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_inode_setattr (struct dentry *dentry,
+ struct iattr *attr)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_inode_getattr (struct vfsmount *mnt,
+ struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void security_inode_post_lookup (struct inode *inode,
+ struct dentry *dentry)
+{ }
+
+static inline void security_inode_delete (struct inode *inode)
+{ }
+
+static inline int security_inode_setxattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name,
+ void *value, size_t size, int flags)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_inode_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_inode_listxattr (struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_file_permission (struct file *file, int mask)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_file_alloc (struct file *file)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void security_file_free (struct file *file)
+{ }
+
+static inline int security_file_llseek (struct file *file)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_file_ioctl (struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+ unsigned long arg)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_file_mmap (struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
+ unsigned long flags)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_file_mprotect (struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+ unsigned long prot)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_file_lock (struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_file_fcntl (struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+ unsigned long arg)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_file_set_fowner (struct file *file)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_file_send_sigiotask (struct task_struct *tsk,
+ struct fown_struct *fown,
+ int fd, int reason)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_file_receive (struct file *file)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_task_create (unsigned long clone_flags)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_task_alloc (struct task_struct *p)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void security_task_free (struct task_struct *p)
+{ }
+
+static inline int security_task_setuid (uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2,
+ int flags)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid,
+ uid_t old_suid, int flags)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_task_setgid (gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2,
+ int flags)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_task_setpgid (struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_task_getpgid (struct task_struct *p)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_task_getsid (struct task_struct *p)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_task_setgroups (int gidsetsize, gid_t *grouplist)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_task_setrlimit (unsigned int resource,
+ struct rlimit *new_rlim)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p,
+ int policy,
+ struct sched_param *lp)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_task_getscheduler (struct task_struct *p)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_task_kill (struct task_struct *p,
+ struct siginfo *info, int sig)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_task_wait (struct task_struct *p)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_task_prctl (int option, unsigned long arg2,
+ unsigned long arg3,
+ unsigned long arg4,
+ unsigned long arg5)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void security_task_kmod_set_label (void)
+{ }
+
+static inline void security_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p)
+{ }
+
+static inline int security_ipc_permission (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
+ short flag)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_msg_queue_alloc (struct msg_queue *msq)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void security_msg_queue_free (struct msg_queue *msq)
+{ }
+
+static inline int security_shm_alloc (struct shmid_kernel *shp)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void security_shm_free (struct shmid_kernel *shp)
+{ }
+
+static inline int security_sem_alloc (struct sem_array *sma)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void security_sem_free (struct sem_array *sma)
+{ }
+
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
-#endif /* __KERNEL__ */
#endif /* ! __LINUX_SECURITY_H */
===== init/do_mounts.c 1.25 vs edited =====
--- 1.25/init/do_mounts.c Fri Oct 4 13:51:37 2002
+++ edited/init/do_mounts.c Wed Oct 16 00:36:15 2002
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/suspend.h>
#include <linux/root_dev.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/nfs_fs.h>
#include <linux/nfs_fs_sb.h>
@@ -799,7 +800,7 @@
sys_umount("/dev", 0);
sys_mount(".", "/", NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL);
sys_chroot(".");
- security_ops->sb_post_mountroot();
+ security_sb_post_mountroot();
mount_devfs_fs ();
}
===== ipc/msg.c 1.7 vs edited =====
--- 1.7/ipc/msg.c Tue Oct 8 02:20:42 2002
+++ edited/ipc/msg.c Wed Oct 16 00:37:48 2002
@@ -101,15 +101,14 @@
msq->q_perm.key = key;
msq->q_perm.security = NULL;
- retval = security_ops->msg_queue_alloc_security(msq);
- if (retval) {
+ if ((retval = security_msg_queue_alloc(msq))) {
kfree(msq);
return retval;
}
id = ipc_addid(&msg_ids, &msq->q_perm, msg_ctlmni);
if(id == -1) {
- security_ops->msg_queue_free_security(msq);
+ security_msg_queue_free(msq);
kfree(msq);
return -ENOSPC;
}
@@ -281,7 +280,7 @@
free_msg(msg);
}
atomic_sub(msq->q_cbytes, &msg_bytes);
- security_ops->msg_queue_free_security(msq);
+ security_msg_queue_free(msq);
kfree(msq);
}
===== ipc/sem.c 1.12 vs edited =====
--- 1.12/ipc/sem.c Tue Oct 8 02:20:46 2002
+++ edited/ipc/sem.c Wed Oct 16 00:38:28 2002
@@ -136,15 +136,14 @@
sma->sem_perm.key = key;
sma->sem_perm.security = NULL;
- retval = security_ops->sem_alloc_security(sma);
- if (retval) {
+ if ((retval = security_sem_alloc(sma))) {
ipc_free(sma, size);
return retval;
}
id = ipc_addid(&sem_ids, &sma->sem_perm, sc_semmni);
if(id == -1) {
- security_ops->sem_free_security(sma);
+ security_sem_free(sma);
ipc_free(sma, size);
return -ENOSPC;
}
@@ -427,7 +426,7 @@
used_sems -= sma->sem_nsems;
size = sizeof (*sma) + sma->sem_nsems * sizeof (struct sem);
- security_ops->sem_free_security(sma);
+ security_sem_free(sma);
ipc_free(sma, size);
}
===== ipc/shm.c 1.18 vs edited =====
--- 1.18/ipc/shm.c Tue Oct 8 02:29:20 2002
+++ edited/ipc/shm.c Wed Oct 16 00:39:00 2002
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@
shm_unlock(shp->id);
shmem_lock(shp->shm_file, 0);
fput (shp->shm_file);
- security_ops->shm_free_security(shp);
+ security_shm_free(shp);
kfree (shp);
}
@@ -188,8 +188,7 @@
shp->shm_flags = (shmflg & S_IRWXUGO);
shp->shm_perm.security = NULL;
- error = security_ops->shm_alloc_security(shp);
- if (error) {
+ if ((error = security_shm_alloc(shp))) {
kfree(shp);
return error;
}
@@ -222,7 +221,7 @@
no_id:
fput(file);
no_file:
- security_ops->shm_free_security(shp);
+ security_shm_free(shp);
kfree(shp);
return error;
}
===== ipc/util.c 1.6 vs edited =====
--- 1.6/ipc/util.c Tue Oct 8 02:01:30 2002
+++ edited/ipc/util.c Wed Oct 16 00:39:12 2002
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@
!capable(CAP_IPC_OWNER))
return -1;
- return security_ops->ipc_permission(ipcp, flag);
+ return security_ipc_permission(ipcp, flag);
}
/*
===== kernel/acct.c 1.12 vs edited =====
--- 1.12/kernel/acct.c Mon Jul 22 03:12:48 2002
+++ edited/kernel/acct.c Tue Oct 15 22:53:28 2002
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@
#include <linux/acct.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/tty.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
/*
@@ -222,8 +223,7 @@
}
}
- error = security_ops->acct(file);
- if (error)
+ if ((error = security_acct(file)))
return error;
spin_lock(&acct_globals.lock);
===== kernel/capability.c 1.6 vs edited =====
--- 1.6/kernel/capability.c Sat Sep 14 06:18:49 2002
+++ edited/kernel/capability.c Tue Oct 15 22:34:12 2002
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
*/
#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
unsigned securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT; /* systemwide security settings */
@@ -63,7 +64,7 @@
data.permitted = cap_t(target->cap_permitted);
data.inheritable = cap_t(target->cap_inheritable);
data.effective = cap_t(target->cap_effective);
- ret = security_ops->capget(target, &data.effective, &data.inheritable, &data.permitted);
+ ret = security_capget(target, &data.effective, &data.inheritable, &data.permitted);
out:
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
@@ -88,7 +89,7 @@
do_each_thread(g, target) {
if (target->pgrp != pgrp)
continue;
- security_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
+ security_capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
} while_each_thread(g, target);
}
@@ -105,7 +106,7 @@
do_each_thread(g, target) {
if (target == current || target->pid == 1)
continue;
- security_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
+ security_capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
} while_each_thread(g, target);
}
@@ -163,7 +164,7 @@
ret = -EPERM;
- if (security_ops->capset_check(target, &effective, &inheritable, &permitted))
+ if (security_capset_check(target, &effective, &inheritable, &permitted))
goto out;
if (!cap_issubset(inheritable, cap_combine(target->cap_inheritable,
@@ -190,7 +191,7 @@
else /* all procs in process group */
cap_set_pg(-pid, &effective, &inheritable, &permitted);
} else {
- security_ops->capset_set(target, &effective, &inheritable, &permitted);
+ security_capset_set(target, &effective, &inheritable, &permitted);
}
out:
===== kernel/exit.c 1.72 vs edited =====
--- 1.72/kernel/exit.c Tue Oct 15 15:08:06 2002
+++ edited/kernel/exit.c Wed Oct 16 00:35:10 2002
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@
wait_task_inactive(p);
atomic_dec(&p->user->processes);
- security_ops->task_free_security(p);
+ security_task_free(p);
free_uid(p->user);
write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
if (unlikely(p->ptrace))
@@ -248,7 +248,7 @@
/* cpus_allowed? */
/* rt_priority? */
/* signals? */
- security_ops->task_reparent_to_init(current);
+ security_task_reparent_to_init(current);
memcpy(current->rlim, init_task.rlim, sizeof(*(current->rlim)));
current->user = INIT_USER;
@@ -774,7 +774,7 @@
if (current->tgid != p->tgid && delay_group_leader(p))
return 2;
- if (security_ops->task_wait(p))
+ if (security_task_wait(p))
return 0;
return 1;
===== kernel/fork.c 1.87 vs edited =====
--- 1.87/kernel/fork.c Mon Oct 7 15:17:19 2002
+++ edited/kernel/fork.c Wed Oct 16 00:28:30 2002
@@ -682,8 +682,7 @@
if ((clone_flags & CLONE_DETACHED) && !(clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
- retval = security_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
- if (retval)
+ if ((retval = security_task_create(clone_flags)))
goto fork_out;
retval = -ENOMEM;
@@ -772,7 +771,7 @@
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&p->local_pages);
retval = -ENOMEM;
- if (security_ops->task_alloc_security(p))
+ if (security_task_alloc(p))
goto bad_fork_cleanup;
/* copy all the process information */
if (copy_semundo(clone_flags, p))
@@ -922,7 +921,7 @@
bad_fork_cleanup_semundo:
exit_semundo(p);
bad_fork_cleanup_security:
- security_ops->task_free_security(p);
+ security_task_free(p);
bad_fork_cleanup:
if (p->pid > 0)
free_pidmap(p->pid);
===== kernel/kmod.c 1.15 vs edited =====
--- 1.15/kernel/kmod.c Tue Oct 1 01:54:49 2002
+++ edited/kernel/kmod.c Wed Oct 16 00:28:59 2002
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
#include <linux/completion.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/workqueue.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
@@ -134,7 +135,7 @@
/* Give kmod all effective privileges.. */
curtask->euid = curtask->fsuid = 0;
curtask->egid = curtask->fsgid = 0;
- security_ops->task_kmod_set_label();
+ security_task_kmod_set_label();
/* Allow execve args to be in kernel space. */
set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
===== kernel/ptrace.c 1.18 vs edited =====
--- 1.18/kernel/ptrace.c Sun Sep 15 19:57:15 2002
+++ edited/kernel/ptrace.c Wed Oct 16 00:11:10 2002
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
@@ -100,8 +101,7 @@
/* the same process cannot be attached many times */
if (task->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)
goto bad;
- retval = security_ops->ptrace(current, task);
- if (retval)
+ if ((retval = security_ptrace(current, task)))
goto bad;
/* Go */
===== kernel/sched.c 1.140 vs edited =====
--- 1.140/kernel/sched.c Mon Oct 14 05:30:06 2002
+++ edited/kernel/sched.c Wed Oct 16 00:29:50 2002
@@ -1329,8 +1329,7 @@
if (nice > 19)
nice = 19;
- retval = security_ops->task_setnice(current, nice);
- if (retval)
+ if ((retval = security_task_setnice(current, nice)))
return retval;
set_user_nice(current, nice);
@@ -1451,8 +1450,7 @@
!capable(CAP_SYS_NICE))
goto out_unlock;
- retval = security_ops->task_setscheduler(p, policy, &lp);
- if (retval)
+ if ((retval = security_task_setscheduler(p, policy, &lp)))
goto out_unlock;
array = p->array;
@@ -1515,8 +1513,7 @@
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
p = find_process_by_pid(pid);
if (p) {
- retval = security_ops->task_getscheduler(p);
- if (!retval)
+ if (!(retval = security_task_getscheduler(p)))
retval = p->policy;
}
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
@@ -1545,8 +1542,7 @@
if (!p)
goto out_unlock;
- retval = security_ops->task_getscheduler(p);
- if (retval)
+ if ((retval = security_task_getscheduler(p)))
goto out_unlock;
lp.sched_priority = p->rt_priority;
@@ -1778,8 +1774,7 @@
if (!p)
goto out_unlock;
- retval = security_ops->task_getscheduler(p);
- if (retval)
+ if ((retval = security_task_getscheduler(p)))
goto out_unlock;
jiffies_to_timespec(p->policy & SCHED_FIFO ?
===== kernel/signal.c 1.48 vs edited =====
--- 1.48/kernel/signal.c Thu Oct 3 02:26:00 2002
+++ edited/kernel/signal.c Wed Oct 16 00:30:19 2002
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/tty.h>
#include <linux/binfmts.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <asm/param.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/siginfo.h>
@@ -706,8 +707,7 @@
ret = -EPERM;
if (bad_signal(sig, info, t))
goto out;
- ret = security_ops->task_kill(t, info, sig);
- if (ret)
+ if ((ret = security_task_kill(t, info, sig)))
goto out;
/* The null signal is a permissions and process existence probe.
===== kernel/sys.c 1.30 vs edited =====
--- 1.30/kernel/sys.c Tue Oct 15 14:45:52 2002
+++ edited/kernel/sys.c Wed Oct 16 00:33:50 2002
@@ -204,6 +204,7 @@
cond_syscall(sys_quotactl)
cond_syscall(sys_acct)
cond_syscall(sys_lookup_dcookie)
+cond_syscall(sys_security)
static int set_one_prio(struct task_struct *p, int niceval, int error)
{
@@ -479,8 +480,7 @@
int new_egid = old_egid;
int retval;
- retval = security_ops->task_setgid(rgid, egid, (gid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_RE);
- if (retval)
+ if ((retval = security_task_setgid(rgid, egid, (gid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_RE)))
return retval;
if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) {
@@ -525,8 +525,7 @@
int old_egid = current->egid;
int retval;
- retval = security_ops->task_setgid(gid, (gid_t)-1, (gid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_ID);
- if (retval)
+ if ((retval = security_task_setgid(gid, (gid_t)-1, (gid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_ID)))
return retval;
if (capable(CAP_SETGID))
@@ -599,8 +598,7 @@
int old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid, new_ruid, new_euid;
int retval;
- retval = security_ops->task_setuid(ruid, euid, (uid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_RE);
- if (retval)
+ if ((retval = security_task_setuid(ruid, euid, (uid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_RE)))
return retval;
new_ruid = old_ruid = current->uid;
@@ -638,7 +636,7 @@
current->suid = current->euid;
current->fsuid = current->euid;
- return security_ops->task_post_setuid(old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid, LSM_SETID_RE);
+ return security_task_post_setuid(old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid, LSM_SETID_RE);
}
@@ -660,8 +658,7 @@
int old_ruid, old_suid, new_ruid, new_suid;
int retval;
- retval = security_ops->task_setuid(uid, (uid_t)-1, (uid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_ID);
- if (retval)
+ if ((retval = security_task_setuid(uid, (uid_t)-1, (uid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_ID)))
return retval;
old_ruid = new_ruid = current->uid;
@@ -683,7 +680,7 @@
current->fsuid = current->euid = uid;
current->suid = new_suid;
- return security_ops->task_post_setuid(old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid, LSM_SETID_ID);
+ return security_task_post_setuid(old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid, LSM_SETID_ID);
}
@@ -698,8 +695,7 @@
int old_suid = current->suid;
int retval;
- retval = security_ops->task_setuid(ruid, euid, suid, LSM_SETID_RES);
- if (retval)
+ if ((retval = security_task_setuid(ruid, euid, suid, LSM_SETID_RES)))
return retval;
if (!capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
@@ -729,7 +725,7 @@
if (suid != (uid_t) -1)
current->suid = suid;
- return security_ops->task_post_setuid(old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid, LSM_SETID_RES);
+ return security_task_post_setuid(old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid, LSM_SETID_RES);
}
asmlinkage long sys_getresuid(uid_t *ruid, uid_t *euid, uid_t *suid)
@@ -750,8 +746,7 @@
{
int retval;
- retval = security_ops->task_setgid(rgid, egid, sgid, LSM_SETID_RES);
- if (retval)
+ if ((retval = security_task_setgid(rgid, egid, sgid, LSM_SETID_RES)))
return retval;
if (!capable(CAP_SETGID)) {
@@ -804,8 +799,7 @@
int old_fsuid;
int retval;
- retval = security_ops->task_setuid(uid, (uid_t)-1, (uid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_FS);
- if (retval)
+ if ((retval = security_task_setuid(uid, (uid_t)-1, (uid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_FS)))
return retval;
old_fsuid = current->fsuid;
@@ -821,8 +815,7 @@
current->fsuid = uid;
}
- retval = security_ops->task_post_setuid(old_fsuid, (uid_t)-1, (uid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_FS);
- if (retval)
+ if ((retval = security_task_post_setuid(old_fsuid, (uid_t)-1, (uid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_FS)))
return retval;
return old_fsuid;
@@ -836,8 +829,7 @@
int old_fsgid;
int retval;
- retval = security_ops->task_setgid(gid, (gid_t)-1, (gid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_FS);
- if (retval)
+ if ((retval = security_task_setgid(gid, (gid_t)-1, (gid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_FS)))
return retval;
old_fsgid = current->fsgid;
@@ -962,8 +954,7 @@
retval = -ESRCH;
if (p) {
- retval = security_ops->task_getpgid(p);
- if (!retval)
+ if (!(retval = security_task_getpgid(p)))
retval = p->pgrp;
}
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
@@ -990,8 +981,7 @@
retval = -ESRCH;
if(p) {
- retval = security_ops->task_getsid(p);
- if (!retval)
+ if (!(retval = security_task_getsid(p)))
retval = p->session;
}
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
@@ -1072,8 +1062,7 @@
return -EINVAL;
if(copy_from_user(groups, grouplist, gidsetsize * sizeof(gid_t)))
return -EFAULT;
- retval = security_ops->task_setgroups(gidsetsize, groups);
- if (retval)
+ if ((retval = security_task_setgroups(gidsetsize, groups)))
return retval;
memcpy(current->groups, groups, gidsetsize * sizeof(gid_t));
current->ngroups = gidsetsize;
@@ -1236,8 +1225,7 @@
return -EPERM;
}
- retval = security_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, &new_rlim);
- if (retval)
+ if ((retval = security_task_setrlimit(resource, &new_rlim)))
return retval;
*old_rlim = new_rlim;
@@ -1311,8 +1299,7 @@
int error = 0;
int sig;
- error = security_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
- if (error)
+ if ((error = security_task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5)))
return error;
switch (option) {
===== kernel/uid16.c 1.2 vs edited =====
--- 1.2/kernel/uid16.c Fri Jul 19 16:00:55 2002
+++ edited/kernel/uid16.c Wed Oct 16 00:30:43 2002
@@ -140,8 +140,7 @@
return -EFAULT;
for (i = 0 ; i < gidsetsize ; i++)
new_groups[i] = (gid_t)groups[i];
- i = security_ops->task_setgroups(gidsetsize, new_groups);
- if (i)
+ if ((i = security_task_setgroups(gidsetsize, new_groups)))
return i;
memcpy(current->groups, new_groups, gidsetsize * sizeof(gid_t));
current->ngroups = gidsetsize;
===== mm/mmap.c 1.53 vs edited =====
--- 1.53/mm/mmap.c Tue Oct 15 15:08:06 2002
+++ edited/mm/mmap.c Wed Oct 16 00:36:48 2002
@@ -498,8 +498,7 @@
}
}
- error = security_ops->file_mmap(file, prot, flags);
- if (error)
+ if ((error = security_file_mmap(file, prot, flags)))
return error;
/* Clear old maps */
===== mm/mprotect.c 1.19 vs edited =====
--- 1.19/mm/mprotect.c Tue Oct 1 16:43:14 2002
+++ edited/mm/mprotect.c Wed Oct 16 00:36:58 2002
@@ -262,8 +262,7 @@
goto out;
}
- error = security_ops->file_mprotect(vma, prot);
- if (error)
+ if ((error = security_file_mprotect(vma, prot)))
goto out;
if (vma->vm_end > end) {
===== net/core/scm.c 1.3 vs edited =====
--- 1.3/net/core/scm.c Mon Jul 22 03:12:48 2002
+++ edited/net/core/scm.c Wed Oct 16 00:41:37 2002
@@ -217,8 +217,7 @@
for (i=0, cmfptr=(int*)CMSG_DATA(cm); i<fdmax; i++, cmfptr++)
{
int new_fd;
- err = security_ops->file_receive(fp[i]);
- if (err)
+ if ((err = security_file_receive(fp[i])))
break;
err = get_unused_fd();
if (err < 0)
===== net/decnet/af_decnet.c 1.18 vs edited =====
--- 1.18/net/decnet/af_decnet.c Tue Oct 8 07:02:41 2002
+++ edited/net/decnet/af_decnet.c Wed Oct 16 00:42:30 2002
@@ -113,6 +113,7 @@
#include <linux/inet.h>
#include <linux/route.h>
#include <linux/netfilter.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
#include <net/tcp.h>
#include <asm/system.h>
@@ -794,7 +795,7 @@
* dn_prot_sock ? Would be nice if the capable call would go there
* too.
*/
- if (security_ops->dn_prot_sock(saddr) &&
+ if (security_dn_prot_sock(saddr) &&
!capable(CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE) ||
saddr->sdn_objnum || (saddr->sdn_flags & SDF_WILD))
return -EACCES;
===== security/Config.in 1.3 vs edited =====
--- 1.3/security/Config.in Sat Jul 20 12:05:09 2002
+++ edited/security/Config.in Tue Oct 15 22:24:46 2002
@@ -3,5 +3,8 @@
#
mainmenu_option next_comment
comment 'Security options'
-define_bool CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES y
+bool 'Enable different security models' CONFIG_SECURITY
+if [ "$CONFIG_SECURITY" = "y" ]; then
+ dep_tristate ' Default Linux Capabilities' CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES $CONFIG_SECURITY
+fi
endmenu
===== security/Makefile 1.1 vs edited =====
--- 1.1/security/Makefile Fri Jul 19 15:55:56 2002
+++ edited/security/Makefile Tue Oct 15 22:26:19 2002
@@ -6,8 +6,7 @@
export-objs := security.o
# Object file lists
-obj-y := security.o dummy.o
-
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY) += security.o dummy.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES) += capability.o
include $(TOPDIR)/Rules.make
-
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This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Wed Oct 23 2002 - 22:00:27 EST