Re: [RFC][PATCH] Make cryptoapi non-optional?

[David Wagner]

Jamie Lokier  wrote:
>It may be that an attacker knows about a systemic problem with our
>machine that we don't know about.  For example the attacker might know
>our pool state well enough shortly after boot time, to have a chance
>at matching a dictionary of 2^32 hashes.  The attacker might have had
>a chance to read our disk, which reseeding the pool at boot time does
>not protect against.
>
>With the right algorithm, we can protect against weaknesses of this kind.

How?  No matter what we do, the outputs are going to be a deterministic
function of the state of the pool.  If the attacker can guess the entire
state of our pool (or narrow it down to 2^32 possibilities), we're screwed,
no matter what.  Right?

I must be misunderstanding your point.  What am I missing?
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