Re: "Enhanced" MD code avaible for review
From: Jeff Garzik
Date: Tue Mar 30 2004 - 12:20:22 EST
Justin T. Gibbs wrote:
The dm-raid1 module also appears to intrinsicly trust its mapping and the
contents of its meta-data (simple magic number check). It seems to me that
the kernel should validate all of its inputs regardless of whether the
ioctls that are used to present them are only supposed to be used by a
The kernel should not be validating -trusted- userland inputs. Root is
allowed to scrag the disk, violate limits, and/or crash his own machine.
A simple example is requiring userland, when submitting ATA taskfiles
via an ioctl, to specify the data phase (pio read, dma write, no-data,
etc.). If the data phase is specified incorrectly, you kill the OS
driver's ATA host state machine, and the results are very unpredictable.
Since this is a trusted operation, requiring CAP_RAW_IO, it's up to
userland to get the required details right (just like following a spec).
I honestly don't care if the final solution is EMD, DM, or XYZ so long
as that solution is correct, supportable, and covers all of the scenarios
required for robust RAID support. That is the crux of the argument, not
"please love my code".
hehe. I think we all agree here...
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