Re: [PATCH] capabilites, take 2
From: Chris Wright
Date: Fri May 14 2004 - 13:03:19 EST
* Stephen Smalley (sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx) wrote:
> On Fri, 2004-05-14 at 08:03, Albert Cahalan wrote:
> > This would be an excellent time to reconsider how capabilities
> > are assigned to bits. You're breaking things anyway; you might
> > as well do all the breaking at once. I want local-use bits so
> > that the print queue management access isn't by magic UID/GID.
> > We haven't escaped UID-as-priv if server apps and setuid apps
> > are still making UID-based access control decisions.
> Capabilities are a broken model for privilege management; try RBAC/TE
> instead. http://www.securecomputing.com/pdf/secureos.pdf has notes
> about the history and comparison of capabilities vs. TE.
> Instead of adding new capability bits, replace capable() calls with LSM
> hook calls that offer you finer granularity both in operation and in
> object-based decisions, and then use a security module like SELinux to
> map that to actual permission checks. SELinux provides a framework for
> defining security classes and permissions, including both definitions
> used by the kernel and definitions used by userspace policy enforcers
> (ala security-enhanced X).
Linux Security Modules http://lsm.immunix.org http://lsm.bkbits.net
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