Re: WINE + NX (No eXecute) support for x86, 2.6.7-rc2-bk2

[Jesse Pollard]

On Wednesday 09 June 2004 15:53, Robert White wrote:
> Which is why I, later in the same message, wrote:
>
> Architecturally the easy-application-accessible switch should be something
> more than a syscall to prevent a return-address-twiddle invoking the call
> directly.  I'd make it a /proc/self something, or put it in a separate
> include-only-if-used shared library or something.  If the minimal distance
> is opening and writing a normally-untouched file then you get a nice
> support matrix.  (e.g. no file means no feature, file plus action means
> executable stack, no action means system default (old can, new cannot),
> hacks would require a variable (fd) and executing arbitrary code to open
> and write that file, programs/programmers that want/need the old behavior
> can achieve it without having to know how to manipulate their ELF headers
> or tool-chains, etc.)
>
> Which is not susceptible to the 1-2 attack you mention below because the
> open and write cannot be done on a protected stack or heap, since it would
> then have to be (er... ) executed to perform the hack.
>
> Ahhhh, yes...

no. This only means the 1-2 attack must be done in two steps (maybe three).

1. create the file (first buffer overflow)
2. write? (second buffer overflow - depends on whether file must have value)
3. disable NX (third)
-
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/