Re: [PATCH] Delete cryptoloop

[James Morris]

On Mon, 2 Aug 2004, David Wagner wrote:

> The point I was making is that there are other scenarios where Cryptoloop
> falls apart in much more devastating ways.  For instance, if the attacker
> can modify the ciphertexts stored on your hard disk and you continue
> using the hard disk afterwards, then really nasty attacks become possible.
> Other attacks become possible if the attacker can observe the ciphertexts
> stored on your hard disk at multiple points in time.  The question I was
> asking is this: Does anyone care about these latter types of scenarios?

I think the common threat scenarios out of the above are:

1) Attacker can observe ciphertexts at multiple points in time.
2) Attacker steals disk/computer and disappears with it.


- James
-- 
James Morris
<jmorris@xxxxxxxxxx>


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