[PATCH 12/12] random pt4: Move other tcp/ip bits to net/
From: Matt Mackall
Date: Fri Jan 21 2005 - 17:31:37 EST
Move remaining TCP bits from random.c to networking land.
Signed-off-by: Matt Mackall <mpm@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Index: rnd2/include/net/tcp.h
===================================================================
--- rnd2.orig/include/net/tcp.h 2005-01-20 10:15:06.896220663 -0800
+++ rnd2/include/net/tcp.h 2005-01-20 10:16:59.315888375 -0800
@@ -2056,4 +2056,12 @@
return (cwnd != 0);
}
+
+/* from net/ipv4/random.c */
+
+extern u32 secure_tcp_port_ephemeral(__u32 saddr, __u32 daddr, __u16 dport);
+extern __u32 secure_tcp_sequence_number(__u32 saddr, __u32 daddr,
+ __u16 sport, __u16 dport);
+extern __u32 secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(__u32 *saddr, __u32 *daddr,
+ __u16 sport, __u16 dport);
#endif /* _TCP_H */
Index: rnd2/net/ipv4/Makefile
===================================================================
--- rnd2.orig/net/ipv4/Makefile 2005-01-20 10:15:06.896220663 -0800
+++ rnd2/net/ipv4/Makefile 2005-01-20 10:16:59.315888375 -0800
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
# Makefile for the Linux TCP/IP (INET) layer.
#
-obj-y := utils.o route.o inetpeer.o protocol.o \
+obj-y := utils.o random.o route.o inetpeer.o protocol.o \
ip_input.o ip_fragment.o ip_forward.o ip_options.o \
ip_output.o ip_sockglue.o \
tcp.o tcp_input.o tcp_output.o tcp_timer.o tcp_ipv4.o tcp_minisocks.o \
Index: rnd2/drivers/char/random.c
===================================================================
--- rnd2.orig/drivers/char/random.c 2005-01-20 10:16:43.345924372 -0800
+++ rnd2/drivers/char/random.c 2005-01-20 10:16:59.317888120 -0800
@@ -1287,288 +1287,3 @@
{ .ctl_name = 0 }
};
#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
-
-/********************************************************************
- *
- * Random funtions for networking
- *
- ********************************************************************/
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_INET
-/*
- * TCP initial sequence number picking. This uses the random number
- * generator to pick an initial secret value. This value is hashed
- * along with the TCP endpoint information to provide a unique
- * starting point for each pair of TCP endpoints. This defeats
- * attacks which rely on guessing the initial TCP sequence number.
- * This algorithm was suggested by Steve Bellovin.
- *
- * Using a very strong hash was taking an appreciable amount of the total
- * TCP connection establishment time, so this is a weaker hash,
- * compensated for by changing the secret periodically.
- */
-
-/* F, G and H are basic MD4 functions: selection, majority, parity */
-#define F(x, y, z) ((z) ^ ((x) & ((y) ^ (z))))
-#define G(x, y, z) (((x) & (y)) + (((x) ^ (y)) & (z)))
-#define H(x, y, z) ((x) ^ (y) ^ (z))
-
-/*
- * The generic round function. The application is so specific that
- * we don't bother protecting all the arguments with parens, as is generally
- * good macro practice, in favor of extra legibility.
- * Rotation is separate from addition to prevent recomputation
- */
-#define ROUND(f, a, b, c, d, x, s) \
- (a += f(b, c, d) + x, a = (a << s) | (a >> (32 - s)))
-#define K1 0
-#define K2 013240474631UL
-#define K3 015666365641UL
-
-#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
-
-static __u32 twothirdsMD4Transform (__u32 const buf[4], __u32 const in[12])
-{
- __u32 a = buf[0], b = buf[1], c = buf[2], d = buf[3];
-
- /* Round 1 */
- ROUND(F, a, b, c, d, in[ 0] + K1, 3);
- ROUND(F, d, a, b, c, in[ 1] + K1, 7);
- ROUND(F, c, d, a, b, in[ 2] + K1, 11);
- ROUND(F, b, c, d, a, in[ 3] + K1, 19);
- ROUND(F, a, b, c, d, in[ 4] + K1, 3);
- ROUND(F, d, a, b, c, in[ 5] + K1, 7);
- ROUND(F, c, d, a, b, in[ 6] + K1, 11);
- ROUND(F, b, c, d, a, in[ 7] + K1, 19);
- ROUND(F, a, b, c, d, in[ 8] + K1, 3);
- ROUND(F, d, a, b, c, in[ 9] + K1, 7);
- ROUND(F, c, d, a, b, in[10] + K1, 11);
- ROUND(F, b, c, d, a, in[11] + K1, 19);
-
- /* Round 2 */
- ROUND(G, a, b, c, d, in[ 1] + K2, 3);
- ROUND(G, d, a, b, c, in[ 3] + K2, 5);
- ROUND(G, c, d, a, b, in[ 5] + K2, 9);
- ROUND(G, b, c, d, a, in[ 7] + K2, 13);
- ROUND(G, a, b, c, d, in[ 9] + K2, 3);
- ROUND(G, d, a, b, c, in[11] + K2, 5);
- ROUND(G, c, d, a, b, in[ 0] + K2, 9);
- ROUND(G, b, c, d, a, in[ 2] + K2, 13);
- ROUND(G, a, b, c, d, in[ 4] + K2, 3);
- ROUND(G, d, a, b, c, in[ 6] + K2, 5);
- ROUND(G, c, d, a, b, in[ 8] + K2, 9);
- ROUND(G, b, c, d, a, in[10] + K2, 13);
-
- /* Round 3 */
- ROUND(H, a, b, c, d, in[ 3] + K3, 3);
- ROUND(H, d, a, b, c, in[ 7] + K3, 9);
- ROUND(H, c, d, a, b, in[11] + K3, 11);
- ROUND(H, b, c, d, a, in[ 2] + K3, 15);
- ROUND(H, a, b, c, d, in[ 6] + K3, 3);
- ROUND(H, d, a, b, c, in[10] + K3, 9);
- ROUND(H, c, d, a, b, in[ 1] + K3, 11);
- ROUND(H, b, c, d, a, in[ 5] + K3, 15);
- ROUND(H, a, b, c, d, in[ 9] + K3, 3);
- ROUND(H, d, a, b, c, in[ 0] + K3, 9);
- ROUND(H, c, d, a, b, in[ 4] + K3, 11);
- ROUND(H, b, c, d, a, in[ 8] + K3, 15);
-
- return buf[1] + b; /* "most hashed" word */
- /* Alternative: return sum of all words? */
-}
-#endif
-
-#undef ROUND
-#undef F
-#undef G
-#undef H
-#undef K1
-#undef K2
-#undef K3
-
-/* This should not be decreased so low that ISNs wrap too fast. */
-#define REKEY_INTERVAL (300 * HZ)
-/*
- * Bit layout of the tcp sequence numbers (before adding current time):
- * bit 24-31: increased after every key exchange
- * bit 0-23: hash(source,dest)
- *
- * The implementation is similar to the algorithm described
- * in the Appendix of RFC 1185, except that
- * - it uses a 1 MHz clock instead of a 250 kHz clock
- * - it performs a rekey every 5 minutes, which is equivalent
- * to a (source,dest) tulple dependent forward jump of the
- * clock by 0..2^(HASH_BITS+1)
- *
- * Thus the average ISN wraparound time is 68 minutes instead of
- * 4.55 hours.
- *
- * SMP cleanup and lock avoidance with poor man's RCU.
- * Manfred Spraul <manfred@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- *
- */
-#define COUNT_BITS 8
-#define COUNT_MASK ((1 << COUNT_BITS) - 1)
-#define HASH_BITS 24
-#define HASH_MASK ((1 << HASH_BITS) - 1)
-
-static struct keydata {
- __u32 count; /* already shifted to the final position */
- __u32 secret[12];
-} ____cacheline_aligned ip_keydata[2];
-
-static unsigned int ip_cnt;
-
-static void rekey_seq_generator(void *private_);
-
-static DECLARE_WORK(rekey_work, rekey_seq_generator, NULL);
-
-/*
- * Lock avoidance:
- * The ISN generation runs lockless - it's just a hash over random data.
- * State changes happen every 5 minutes when the random key is replaced.
- * Synchronization is performed by having two copies of the hash function
- * state and rekey_seq_generator always updates the inactive copy.
- * The copy is then activated by updating ip_cnt.
- * The implementation breaks down if someone blocks the thread
- * that processes SYN requests for more than 5 minutes. Should never
- * happen, and even if that happens only a not perfectly compliant
- * ISN is generated, nothing fatal.
- */
-static void rekey_seq_generator(void *private_)
-{
- struct keydata *keyptr = &ip_keydata[1 ^ (ip_cnt & 1)];
-
- get_random_bytes(keyptr->secret, sizeof(keyptr->secret));
- keyptr->count = (ip_cnt & COUNT_MASK) << HASH_BITS;
- smp_wmb();
- ip_cnt++;
- schedule_delayed_work(&rekey_work, REKEY_INTERVAL);
-}
-
-static inline struct keydata *get_keyptr(void)
-{
- struct keydata *keyptr = &ip_keydata[ip_cnt & 1];
-
- smp_rmb();
-
- return keyptr;
-}
-
-static __init int seqgen_init(void)
-{
- rekey_seq_generator(NULL);
- return 0;
-}
-late_initcall(seqgen_init);
-
-#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
-__u32 secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(__u32 *saddr, __u32 *daddr,
- __u16 sport, __u16 dport)
-{
- struct timeval tv;
- __u32 seq;
- __u32 hash[12];
- struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
-
- /* The procedure is the same as for IPv4, but addresses are longer.
- * Thus we must use twothirdsMD4Transform.
- */
-
- memcpy(hash, saddr, 16);
- hash[4]=(sport << 16) + dport;
- memcpy(&hash[5],keyptr->secret,sizeof(__u32) * 7);
-
- seq = twothirdsMD4Transform(daddr, hash) & HASH_MASK;
- seq += keyptr->count;
-
- do_gettimeofday(&tv);
- seq += tv.tv_usec + tv.tv_sec * 1000000;
-
- return seq;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_tcpv6_sequence_number);
-#endif
-
-__u32 secure_tcp_sequence_number(__u32 saddr, __u32 daddr,
- __u16 sport, __u16 dport)
-{
- struct timeval tv;
- __u32 seq;
- __u32 hash[4];
- struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
-
- /*
- * Pick a unique starting offset for each TCP connection endpoints
- * (saddr, daddr, sport, dport).
- * Note that the words are placed into the starting vector, which is
- * then mixed with a partial MD4 over random data.
- */
- hash[0]=saddr;
- hash[1]=daddr;
- hash[2]=(sport << 16) + dport;
- hash[3]=keyptr->secret[11];
-
- seq = half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret) & HASH_MASK;
- seq += keyptr->count;
- /*
- * As close as possible to RFC 793, which
- * suggests using a 250 kHz clock.
- * Further reading shows this assumes 2 Mb/s networks.
- * For 10 Mb/s Ethernet, a 1 MHz clock is appropriate.
- * That's funny, Linux has one built in! Use it!
- * (Networks are faster now - should this be increased?)
- */
- do_gettimeofday(&tv);
- seq += tv.tv_usec + tv.tv_sec * 1000000;
-#if 0
- printk("init_seq(%lx, %lx, %d, %d) = %d\n",
- saddr, daddr, sport, dport, seq);
-#endif
- return seq;
-}
-
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_tcp_sequence_number);
-
-/* The code below is shamelessly stolen from secure_tcp_sequence_number().
- * All blames to Andrey V. Savochkin <saw@xxxxxx>.
- */
-__u32 secure_ip_id(__u32 daddr)
-{
- struct keydata *keyptr;
- __u32 hash[4];
-
- keyptr = get_keyptr();
-
- /*
- * Pick a unique starting offset for each IP destination.
- * The dest ip address is placed in the starting vector,
- * which is then hashed with random data.
- */
- hash[0] = daddr;
- hash[1] = keyptr->secret[9];
- hash[2] = keyptr->secret[10];
- hash[3] = keyptr->secret[11];
-
- return half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret);
-}
-
-/* Generate secure starting point for ephemeral TCP port search */
-u32 secure_tcp_port_ephemeral(__u32 saddr, __u32 daddr, __u16 dport)
-{
- struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
- u32 hash[4];
-
- /*
- * Pick a unique starting offset for each ephemeral port search
- * (saddr, daddr, dport) and 48bits of random data.
- */
- hash[0] = saddr;
- hash[1] = daddr;
- hash[2] = dport ^ keyptr->secret[10];
- hash[3] = keyptr->secret[11];
-
- return half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret);
-}
-
-#endif /* CONFIG_INET */
Index: rnd2/include/net/ip.h
===================================================================
--- rnd2.orig/include/net/ip.h 2005-01-20 10:15:07.081197080 -0800
+++ rnd2/include/net/ip.h 2005-01-20 10:16:59.318887992 -0800
@@ -339,4 +339,8 @@
void __user *newval, size_t newlen,
void **context);
+/* from net/ipv4/random.c */
+
+extern __u32 secure_ip_id(__u32 daddr);
+
#endif /* _IP_H */
Index: rnd2/net/ipv4/inetpeer.c
===================================================================
--- rnd2.orig/net/ipv4/inetpeer.c 2005-01-20 10:15:06.895220790 -0800
+++ rnd2/net/ipv4/inetpeer.c 2005-01-20 10:16:59.319887865 -0800
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/net.h>
#include <net/inetpeer.h>
+#include <net/ip.h>
/*
* Theory of operations.
Index: rnd2/net/ipv4/random.c
===================================================================
--- /dev/null 1970-01-01 00:00:00.000000000 +0000
+++ rnd2/net/ipv4/random.c 2005-01-20 10:16:59.320887737 -0800
@@ -0,0 +1,275 @@
+/*
+ * TCP initial sequence number picking. This uses the random number
+ * generator to pick an initial secret value. This value is hashed
+ * along with the TCP endpoint information to provide a unique
+ * starting point for each pair of TCP endpoints. This defeats
+ * attacks which rely on guessing the initial TCP sequence number.
+ * This algorithm was suggested by Steve Bellovin.
+ *
+ * Using a very strong hash was taking an appreciable amount of the total
+ * TCP connection establishment time, so this is a weaker hash,
+ * compensated for by changing the secret periodically.
+ *
+ * Bit layout of the tcp sequence numbers (before adding current time):
+ * bit 24-31: increased after every key exchange
+ * bit 0-23: hash(source,dest)
+ *
+ * The implementation is similar to the algorithm described
+ * in the Appendix of RFC 1185, except that
+ * - it uses a 1 MHz clock instead of a 250 kHz clock
+ * - it performs a rekey every 5 minutes, which is equivalent
+ * to a (source,dest) tulple dependent forward jump of the
+ * clock by 0..2^(HASH_BITS+1)
+ *
+ * Thus the average ISN wraparound time is 68 minutes instead of
+ * 4.55 hours.
+ *
+ * SMP cleanup and lock avoidance with poor man's RCU.
+ * Manfred Spraul <manfred@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/workqueue.h>
+#include <linux/jiffies.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/cryptohash.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+
+#define COUNT_BITS 8
+#define COUNT_MASK ((1 << COUNT_BITS) - 1)
+#define HASH_BITS 24
+#define HASH_MASK ((1 << HASH_BITS) - 1)
+
+/* This should not be decreased so low that ISNs wrap too fast. */
+#define REKEY_INTERVAL (300 * HZ)
+static void rekey_seq_generator(void *private_);
+static DECLARE_WORK(rekey_work, rekey_seq_generator, NULL);
+
+/*
+ * Lock avoidance:
+ * The ISN generation runs lockless - it's just a hash over random data.
+ * State changes happen every 5 minutes when the random key is replaced.
+ * Synchronization is performed by having two copies of the hash function
+ * state and rekey_seq_generator always updates the inactive copy.
+ * The copy is then activated by updating ip_cnt.
+ * The implementation breaks down if someone blocks the thread
+ * that processes SYN requests for more than 5 minutes. Should never
+ * happen, and even if that happens only a not perfectly compliant
+ * ISN is generated, nothing fatal.
+ */
+
+static struct keydata {
+ __u32 count; /* already shifted to the final position */
+ __u32 secret[12];
+} ____cacheline_aligned ip_keydata[2];
+
+static unsigned int ip_cnt;
+
+static void rekey_seq_generator(void *private_)
+{
+ struct keydata *keyptr = &ip_keydata[1 ^ (ip_cnt & 1)];
+
+ get_random_bytes(keyptr->secret, sizeof(keyptr->secret));
+ keyptr->count = (ip_cnt & COUNT_MASK) << HASH_BITS;
+ smp_wmb();
+ ip_cnt++;
+ schedule_delayed_work(&rekey_work, REKEY_INTERVAL);
+}
+
+static __init int seqgen_init(void)
+{
+ rekey_seq_generator(NULL);
+ return 0;
+}
+late_initcall(seqgen_init);
+
+static struct keydata *get_keyptr(void)
+{
+ struct keydata *keyptr = &ip_keydata[ip_cnt & 1];
+
+ smp_rmb();
+
+ return keyptr;
+}
+
+__u32 secure_tcp_sequence_number(__u32 saddr, __u32 daddr,
+ __u16 sport, __u16 dport)
+{
+ struct timeval tv;
+ __u32 seq;
+ __u32 hash[4];
+ struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
+
+ /*
+ * Pick a unique starting offset for each TCP connection endpoints
+ * (saddr, daddr, sport, dport).
+ * Note that the words are placed into the starting vector, which is
+ * then mixed with a partial MD4 over random data.
+ */
+ hash[0]=saddr;
+ hash[1]=daddr;
+ hash[2]=(sport << 16) + dport;
+ hash[3]=keyptr->secret[11];
+
+ seq = half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret) & HASH_MASK;
+ seq += keyptr->count;
+ /*
+ * As close as possible to RFC 793, which
+ * suggests using a 250 kHz clock.
+ * Further reading shows this assumes 2 Mb/s networks.
+ * For 10 Mb/s Ethernet, a 1 MHz clock is appropriate.
+ * That's funny, Linux has one built in! Use it!
+ * (Networks are faster now - should this be increased?)
+ */
+ do_gettimeofday(&tv);
+ seq += tv.tv_usec + tv.tv_sec * 1000000;
+ return seq;
+}
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_tcp_sequence_number);
+
+/* The code below is shamelessly stolen from secure_tcp_sequence_number().
+ * All blames to Andrey V. Savochkin <saw@xxxxxx>.
+ */
+__u32 secure_ip_id(__u32 daddr)
+{
+ struct keydata *keyptr;
+ __u32 hash[4];
+
+ keyptr = get_keyptr();
+
+ /*
+ * Pick a unique starting offset for each IP destination.
+ * The dest ip address is placed in the starting vector,
+ * which is then hashed with random data.
+ */
+ hash[0] = daddr;
+ hash[1] = keyptr->secret[9];
+ hash[2] = keyptr->secret[10];
+ hash[3] = keyptr->secret[11];
+
+ return half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret);
+}
+
+/* Generate secure starting point for ephemeral TCP port search */
+u32 secure_tcp_port_ephemeral(__u32 saddr, __u32 daddr, __u16 dport)
+{
+ struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
+ u32 hash[4];
+
+ /*
+ * Pick a unique starting offset for each ephemeral port search
+ * (saddr, daddr, dport) and 48bits of random data.
+ */
+ hash[0] = saddr;
+ hash[1] = daddr;
+ hash[2] = dport ^ keyptr->secret[10];
+ hash[3] = keyptr->secret[11];
+
+ return half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret);
+}
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+
+/* F, G and H are basic MD4 functions: selection, majority, parity */
+#define F(x, y, z) ((z) ^ ((x) & ((y) ^ (z))))
+#define G(x, y, z) (((x) & (y)) + (((x) ^ (y)) & (z)))
+#define H(x, y, z) ((x) ^ (y) ^ (z))
+
+/*
+ * The generic round function. The application is so specific that
+ * we don't bother protecting all the arguments with parens, as is generally
+ * good macro practice, in favor of extra legibility.
+ * Rotation is separate from addition to prevent recomputation
+ */
+#define ROUND(f, a, b, c, d, x, s) \
+ (a += f(b, c, d) + x, a = (a << s) | (a >> (32 - s)))
+#define K1 0
+#define K2 013240474631UL
+#define K3 015666365641UL
+
+static __u32 twothirdsMD4Transform (__u32 const buf[4], __u32 const in[12])
+{
+ __u32 a = buf[0], b = buf[1], c = buf[2], d = buf[3];
+
+ /* Round 1 */
+ ROUND(F, a, b, c, d, in[ 0] + K1, 3);
+ ROUND(F, d, a, b, c, in[ 1] + K1, 7);
+ ROUND(F, c, d, a, b, in[ 2] + K1, 11);
+ ROUND(F, b, c, d, a, in[ 3] + K1, 19);
+ ROUND(F, a, b, c, d, in[ 4] + K1, 3);
+ ROUND(F, d, a, b, c, in[ 5] + K1, 7);
+ ROUND(F, c, d, a, b, in[ 6] + K1, 11);
+ ROUND(F, b, c, d, a, in[ 7] + K1, 19);
+ ROUND(F, a, b, c, d, in[ 8] + K1, 3);
+ ROUND(F, d, a, b, c, in[ 9] + K1, 7);
+ ROUND(F, c, d, a, b, in[10] + K1, 11);
+ ROUND(F, b, c, d, a, in[11] + K1, 19);
+
+ /* Round 2 */
+ ROUND(G, a, b, c, d, in[ 1] + K2, 3);
+ ROUND(G, d, a, b, c, in[ 3] + K2, 5);
+ ROUND(G, c, d, a, b, in[ 5] + K2, 9);
+ ROUND(G, b, c, d, a, in[ 7] + K2, 13);
+ ROUND(G, a, b, c, d, in[ 9] + K2, 3);
+ ROUND(G, d, a, b, c, in[11] + K2, 5);
+ ROUND(G, c, d, a, b, in[ 0] + K2, 9);
+ ROUND(G, b, c, d, a, in[ 2] + K2, 13);
+ ROUND(G, a, b, c, d, in[ 4] + K2, 3);
+ ROUND(G, d, a, b, c, in[ 6] + K2, 5);
+ ROUND(G, c, d, a, b, in[ 8] + K2, 9);
+ ROUND(G, b, c, d, a, in[10] + K2, 13);
+
+ /* Round 3 */
+ ROUND(H, a, b, c, d, in[ 3] + K3, 3);
+ ROUND(H, d, a, b, c, in[ 7] + K3, 9);
+ ROUND(H, c, d, a, b, in[11] + K3, 11);
+ ROUND(H, b, c, d, a, in[ 2] + K3, 15);
+ ROUND(H, a, b, c, d, in[ 6] + K3, 3);
+ ROUND(H, d, a, b, c, in[10] + K3, 9);
+ ROUND(H, c, d, a, b, in[ 1] + K3, 11);
+ ROUND(H, b, c, d, a, in[ 5] + K3, 15);
+ ROUND(H, a, b, c, d, in[ 9] + K3, 3);
+ ROUND(H, d, a, b, c, in[ 0] + K3, 9);
+ ROUND(H, c, d, a, b, in[ 4] + K3, 11);
+ ROUND(H, b, c, d, a, in[ 8] + K3, 15);
+
+ return buf[1] + b; /* "most hashed" word */
+ /* Alternative: return sum of all words? */
+}
+#undef ROUND
+#undef F
+#undef G
+#undef H
+#undef K1
+#undef K2
+#undef K3
+
+__u32 secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(__u32 *saddr, __u32 *daddr,
+ __u16 sport, __u16 dport)
+{
+ struct timeval tv;
+ __u32 seq;
+ __u32 hash[12];
+ struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
+
+ /* The procedure is the same as for IPv4, but addresses are longer.
+ * Thus we must use twothirdsMD4Transform.
+ */
+
+ memcpy(hash, saddr, 16);
+ hash[4]=(sport << 16) + dport;
+ memcpy(&hash[5],keyptr->secret,sizeof(__u32) * 7);
+
+ seq = twothirdsMD4Transform(daddr, hash) & HASH_MASK;
+ seq += keyptr->count;
+
+ do_gettimeofday(&tv);
+ seq += tv.tv_usec + tv.tv_sec * 1000000;
+
+ return seq;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_tcpv6_sequence_number);
+#endif
Index: rnd2/include/linux/random.h
===================================================================
--- rnd2.orig/include/linux/random.h 2005-01-20 10:16:24.202364968 -0800
+++ rnd2/include/linux/random.h 2005-01-20 10:16:59.321887610 -0800
@@ -51,13 +51,6 @@
extern void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
void generate_random_uuid(unsigned char uuid_out[16]);
-extern __u32 secure_ip_id(__u32 daddr);
-extern u32 secure_tcp_port_ephemeral(__u32 saddr, __u32 daddr, __u16 dport);
-extern __u32 secure_tcp_sequence_number(__u32 saddr, __u32 daddr,
- __u16 sport, __u16 dport);
-extern __u32 secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(__u32 *saddr, __u32 *daddr,
- __u16 sport, __u16 dport);
-
#ifndef MODULE
extern struct file_operations random_fops, urandom_fops;
#endif
-
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