Re: Patch 0/6 virtual address space randomisation

[Julien TINNES]

> Yeah, if it came from PaX the randomization would actually be useful.
> Sorry, I've just woken up and already explained in another post.

Please, no hard feelings.

Speaking about implementation of the non executable pages semantics on 
IA32, PaX and Exec-Shield are very different (well not that much since 
2.6 in fact because PAGEEXEC is now "segmentation when I can").
But when it comes to ASLR it's pretty much the same thing.

The only difference may be the (very small) randomization of the brk() 
managed heap on ET_EXEC (which is probably the more "hackish" feature of 
PaX ASLR) but it seems that Arjan is even going to propose a patch for 
that (Is this in ES too ?).

I think it's a great opportunity here to get the same basis for ASLR in 
PaX and ES merged into the vanilla kernel.
If it's only a matter of changing the number of randomized bits in an 
additional PaX patch, it's no problem! It's more important to have a 
correct basis, focus on that.

--
Julien TINNES - & france telecom - R&D Division/MAPS/NSS
Research Engineer - Internet/Intranet Security
GPG: C050 EF1A 2919 FD87 57C4 DEDD E778 A9F0 14B9 C7D6
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