Re: [PATCH] Filesystem linking protections

From: Chris Wright
Date: Mon Feb 07 2005 - 14:15:19 EST

* Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro (lorenzo@xxxxxxx) wrote:
> This patch adds two checks to do_follow_link() and sys_link(), for
> prevent users to follow (untrusted) symlinks owned by other users in
> world-writable +t directories (i.e. /tmp), unless the owner of the
> symlink is the owner of the directory, users will also not be able to
> hardlink to files they do not own.
> The direct advantage of this pretty simple patch is that /tmp races will
> be prevented.

The disadvantage is that it can break things and places policy in the

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