Re: [PATCH] 5/5: LSM hooks rework

[James Morris]

On Sun, 13 Feb 2005, Kurt Garloff wrote:

>  /* Condition for invocation of non-default security_op */
>  #define COND_SECURITY(seop, def) 	\
> -	(likely(security_ops == &capability_security_ops))? def: security_ops->seop
> +	(unlikely(security_enabled))? security_ops->seop: def

So this will cause a false unlikely() for every single SELinux hook,
again.  This was rejected last year.  The thread you pointed to has some
discussion of dealing with the problematic ia64 case, although there's no
evidence in these patches that anything has progressed in that area since
then.


- James
-- 
James Morris
<jmorris@xxxxxxxxxx>



-
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/