[updated patch 6/7] BSD Secure Levels: trivial code and comment changes

From: Michael Halcrow
Date: Fri May 20 2005 - 10:18:19 EST


This patch is applies cleanly against the new printk() patch. It
makes several trivial changes to make the code and comments
consistent. (Note that Lindent causes a whitespace issue w/ the
struct seclvl_attribute {} code.)

Signed off by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@xxxxxxxxxx>

Index: linux-2.6.12-rc4-mm2-seclvl/security/seclvl.c
===================================================================
--- linux-2.6.12-rc4-mm2-seclvl.orig/security/seclvl.c 2005-05-20 09:09:13.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-2.6.12-rc4-mm2-seclvl/security/seclvl.c 2005-05-20 09:09:37.000000000 -0500
@@ -2,12 +2,12 @@
* BSD Secure Levels LSM
*
* Maintainers:
- * Michael A. Halcrow <mike@xxxxxxxxxx>
- * Serge Hallyn <hallyn@xxxxxxxxx>
+ * Michael A. Halcrow <mhalcrow@xxxxxxxxxx>
+ * Serge Hallyn <serue@xxxxxxxxxx>
*
* Copyright (c) 2001 WireX Communications, Inc <chris@xxxxxxxxx>
* Copyright (c) 2001 Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@xxxxxxxxx>
- * Copyright (c) 2002 International Business Machines <robb@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 International Business Machines <mhalcrow@xxxxxxxxxx>
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -31,9 +31,9 @@
#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
#include <linux/kobject.h>
#include <linux/crypto.h>
-#include <asm/scatterlist.h>
#include <linux/gfp.h>
#include <linux/sysfs.h>
+#include <asm/scatterlist.h>

#define SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE 20

@@ -53,7 +53,9 @@
module_param(initlvl, int, 0);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(initlvl, "Initial secure level (defaults to 1)");

-/* Module parameter that defines the verbosity level */
+/**
+ * Module parameter that defines the verbosity level.
+ */
static int verbosity;
module_param(verbosity, int, 0);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(verbosity, "Initial verbosity level (0 or 1; defaults to "
@@ -68,7 +70,6 @@
* not a good idea to use this parameter when loading seclvl from a
* script; use sha1_passwd instead.
*/
-
#define MAX_PASSWD_SIZE 32
static char passwd[MAX_PASSWD_SIZE];
module_param_string(passwd, passwd, sizeof(passwd), 0);
@@ -94,17 +95,16 @@
"sets seclvl=0 when plaintext password is written to "
"(sysfs mount point)/seclvl/passwd\n");

-static int hideHash = 1;
-module_param(hideHash, int, 0);
-MODULE_PARM_DESC(hideHash, "When set to 0, reading seclvl/passwd from sysfs "
+static int hide_hash = 1;
+module_param(hide_hash, int, 0);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(hide_hash, "When set to 0, reading seclvl/passwd from sysfs "
"will return the SHA1-hashed value of the password that "
"lowers the secure level to 0.\n");

#define MY_NAME "seclvl"

/**
- * This time-limits log writes to one per second for every message
- * type.
+ * This time-limits log writes.
*/
static void __seclvl_printk(int verb, const char *fmt, ...)
{
@@ -126,7 +126,6 @@
/**
* kobject stuff
*/
-
struct subsystem seclvl_subsys;

struct seclvl_obj {
@@ -173,7 +172,7 @@
}

/**
- * Callback function pointers for show and store
+ * Callback function pointers for show and store.
*/
static struct sysfs_ops seclvlfs_sysfs_ops = {
.show = seclvl_attr_show,
@@ -192,7 +191,7 @@
static int seclvl;

/**
- * flag to keep track of how we were registered
+ * Flag to keep track of how we were registered.
*/
static int secondary;

@@ -219,7 +218,7 @@

/**
* Called whenever the user reads the sysfs handle to this kernel
- * object
+ * object.
*/
static ssize_t seclvl_read_file(struct seclvl_obj *obj, char *buff)
{
@@ -227,7 +226,7 @@
}

/**
- * security level advancement rules:
+ * Security level advancement rules:
* Valid levels are -1 through 2, inclusive.
* From -1, stuck. [ in case compiled into kernel ]
* From 0 or above, can only increment.
@@ -279,28 +278,28 @@
return count;
}

-/* Generate sysfs_attr_seclvl */
+/**
+ * Generate sysfs_attr_seclvl.
+ */
static struct seclvl_attribute sysfs_attr_seclvl =
__ATTR(seclvl, (S_IFREG | S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR), seclvl_read_file,
seclvl_write_file);

-static unsigned char hashedPassword[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+static unsigned char hashed_password[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];

/**
* Called whenever the user reads the sysfs passwd handle.
*/
static ssize_t seclvl_read_passwd(struct seclvl_obj *obj, char *buff)
{
- /* So just how good *is* your password? :-) */
char tmp[3];
int i = 0;
buff[0] = '\0';
- if (hideHash) {
- /* Security through obscurity */
+ if (hide_hash) {
return 0;
}
while (i < SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE) {
- snprintf(tmp, 3, "%02x", hashedPassword[i]);
+ snprintf(tmp, 3, "%02x", hashed_password[i]);
strncat(buff, tmp, 2);
i++;
}
@@ -332,8 +331,8 @@
"Failed to load transform for SHA1\n");
return -ENOSYS;
}
- // Just get a new page; don't play around with page boundaries
- // and scatterlists.
+ /* Just get a new page; don't play around with page boundaries
+ * and scatterlists. */
pg_virt_addr = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!pg_virt_addr) {
seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Out of memory\n" );
@@ -385,7 +384,7 @@
return rc;
}
for (i = 0; i < SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE; i++) {
- if (hashedPassword[i] != tmp[i]) {
+ if (hashed_password[i] != tmp[i]) {
return -EPERM;
}
}
@@ -395,7 +394,9 @@
return count;
}

-/* Generate sysfs_attr_passwd */
+/**
+ * Generate sysfs_attr_passwd.
+ */
static struct seclvl_attribute sysfs_attr_passwd =
__ATTR(passwd, (S_IFREG | S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR), seclvl_read_passwd,
seclvl_write_passwd);
@@ -437,7 +438,7 @@
"and/or APPEND extended attribute set "
"denied in seclvl [%d]\n", seclvl);
return -EPERM;
- } else if (cap == CAP_SYS_RAWIO) { // Somewhat broad...
+ } else if (cap == CAP_SYS_RAWIO) { /* Somewhat broad */
seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Attempt to perform "
"raw I/O while in secure level [%d] "
"denied\n", seclvl);
@@ -646,7 +647,7 @@
}

/**
- * Cannot unmount in secure level 2
+ * Cannot unmount in secure level 2.
*/
static int seclvl_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
{
@@ -675,12 +676,12 @@
};

/**
- * Process the password-related module parameters
+ * Process the password-related module parameters.
*/
-static int processPassword(void)
+static int process_password(void)
{
int rc = 0;
- hashedPassword[0] = '\0';
+ hashed_password[0] = '\0';
if (*passwd) {
if (*sha1_passwd) {
seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Error: Both "
@@ -689,13 +690,13 @@
"exclusive.\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
- if ((rc = plaintext_to_sha1(hashedPassword, passwd,
+ if ((rc = plaintext_to_sha1(hashed_password, passwd,
strlen(passwd)))) {
seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Error: SHA1 support not "
"in kernel\n");
return rc;
}
- /* All static data goes to the BSS, which zero's the
+ /* All static data goes to the BSS, which wipes the
* plaintext password out for us. */
} else if (*sha1_passwd) { // Base 16
int i;
@@ -712,7 +713,7 @@
unsigned char tmp;
tmp = sha1_passwd[i + 2];
sha1_passwd[i + 2] = '\0';
- hashedPassword[i / 2] = (unsigned char)
+ hashed_password[i / 2] = (unsigned char)
simple_strtol(&sha1_passwd[i], NULL, 16);
sha1_passwd[i + 2] = tmp;
}
@@ -721,9 +722,9 @@
}

/**
- * Sysfs registrations
+ * Sysfs registrations.
*/
-static int doSysfsRegistrations(void)
+static int do_sysfs_registrations(void)
{
int rc = 0;
if ((rc = subsystem_register(&seclvl_subsys))) {
@@ -760,7 +761,7 @@
goto exit;
}
seclvl = initlvl;
- if ((rc = processPassword())) {
+ if ((rc = process_password())) {
seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Error processing the password "
"module parameter(s): rc = [%d]\n", rc);
goto exit;
@@ -777,10 +778,10 @@
"registering with primary security "
"module.\n");
goto exit;
- } /* if primary module registered */
+ } /* if primary module registered */
secondary = 1;
- } /* if we registered ourselves with the security framework */
- if ((rc = doSysfsRegistrations())) {
+ } /* if we registered ourselves with the security framework */
+ if ((rc = do_sysfs_registrations())) {
seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Error registering with sysfs\n");
goto exit;
}
@@ -816,6 +817,6 @@
module_init(seclvl_init);
module_exit(seclvl_exit);

-MODULE_AUTHOR("Michael A. Halcrow <mike@xxxxxxxxxx>");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Michael A. Halcrow <mhalcrow@xxxxxxxxxx>");
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("LSM implementation of the BSD Secure Levels");
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
-
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