Re: [PATCH] race condition with drivers/char/vt.c (bug in vt_ioctl.c)

From: Antonino A. Daplas
Date: Mon Aug 22 2005 - 19:09:54 EST


There's a similar report in Kernel Bugzilla

http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4812

I was wondering what's the likelihood of tty->driver_data being NULL in
vt_ioctl but never had the time to do further exploration. Your patch
should fix that bug too.

Tony

Steven Rostedt wrote:
While debugging Ingo's RT patch, I came accross this race condition.
The mainline seems to be susceptible to this bug, although it may be 1
in a 1,000,000 to happen. But those are the nastiest races.

With debugging information in the RT patch, I was able to reproduce this
race several times. Enough to be able to debug it.

The race is with the tty->driver_data, tty->count and vt.c

Here's the scoop:

Process P1 opens a tty:
tty_open --> init_dev
sets tty->count to 1

P1 does what it needs to, and closes the tty.
tty_release (now showing locks)
(grabs BKL)
--> release_dev
--> tty->driver->close ==> con_close (vt.c)
(down tty_sem)
(aquire console_sem)
tty->driver_data = NULL

Now process P2 opens the console:
tty_open
(block on tty_sem)

back to P1
(release console_sem)
(up tty_sem)

back to P2
(down tty_sem)
--> init_dev
tty->count++ (tty->count now == 2)
(up tty_sem)
--> tty->driver->open ==> con_open (vt.c)
(aquire console_sem)
if (tty->count == 1) (which it does not)
allocate tty->driver_data
(which doesn't happen)
(release console_sem)
And P2 goes happily along with driver_data == NULL.

Now in something like vt_ioctl (which I first saw the bug)

int vt_ioctl(struct tty_struct *tty, struct file * file,
unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct vc_data *vc = (struct vc_data *)tty->driver_data;
struct console_font_op op; /* used in multiple places here */
struct kbd_struct * kbd;
unsigned int console;
unsigned char ucval;
void __user *up = (void __user *)arg;
int i, perm;

console = vc->vc_num;

Where here vc->vc_num could very well be (0)->vc_num.

I googled a little and found where this may have already happened in the
main line kernel:

http://seclists.org/lists/linux-kernel/2005/Aug/1603.html

So here's my proposal:

Instead of checking for tty->count == 1 in con_open, which we see is
not reliable. Just check for tty->driver_data == NULL.

This should work since it should always be NULL when we need to assign
it. If we switch the events of the race, so that the init_dev went
first, the driver_data would not be NULL and would not need to be
allocated, because after init_dev tty->count would be greater than 1
(this is assuming the case that it is already allocated) and the
con_close would not deallocate it. The tty_sem and console_sem and
order of events protect the tty->driver_data but not the tty->count.

Without the patch, I was able to get the system to BUG on bootup every
other time. With the patch applied, I was able to bootup 6 out of 6
times without a single crash.

-- Steve

Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@xxxxxxxxxxx>

--- linux-2.6.13-rc6-git10/drivers/char/vt.c.orig 2005-08-19 22:51:25.000000000 -0400
+++ linux-2.6.13-rc6-git10/drivers/char/vt.c 2005-08-19 22:52:22.000000000 -0400
@@ -2433,7 +2433,7 @@ static int con_open(struct tty_struct *t
int ret = 0;
acquire_console_sem();
- if (tty->count == 1) {
+ if (tty->driver_data == NULL) {
ret = vc_allocate(currcons);
if (ret == 0) {
struct vc_data *vc = vc_cons[currcons].d;


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