Re: [ 01/10] [Suspend2] kernel/power/modules.h

[Pavel Machek]

Hi!

> > > > In fedora kernel, userland suspend can be [miss]used to snapshot an
> > > > image, modify it, and write it back. Fortunately, this is going to
> > > > take *long* time so people will notice. [Interface changed on DaveJ's
> > > > request, now we have separate device, we no longer mess with
> > > > /dev/mem]. And similar problem exists in suspend2 -- malicious
> > > > graphical progress bar could probably modify memory image on disk.
> > >
> > > How? It's just an ordinary process with no special permissions or access
> > > to memory. The communication between the userspace process and the kernel
> > > is in the form of a netlink socket, with the only messages sent back and
> > > forth being what should be displayed or what actions the user requested.
> > > Everything related to preparing the image and performing the I/O is done
> > > in the kernel. There's no way I can see that a malicious userspace
> > > program could modify anything but its own memory.
> >
> > Fedora people have some "interesting" ideas about security. They want
> > to prevent userland to modify kernel memory, root or not. AFAICS
> > progress bar helper could access kernel memory  while it is on disk,
> > then wait for resume to pick up the modifications.
> 
> Hi again.
> 
> Maybe I'm just being thick, but I don't see what you mean by "progress bar 
> helper could access kernel memory while it is on disk". I suppose it could 
> potentially be given some means of writing directly to the disk that bypassed 
> filesystem code (remember that filesystems are frozen), but even if it could 
> overwrite a page of the image, most Suspend2 users compress the image, and 

...yep, I said that fedora people have ""interesting"" ideas about
security :-).
								Pavel
-- 
Thanks, Sharp!
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