Re: [RESEND][RFC][PATCH 2/7] implementation of LSM hooks
From: TÃrÃk Edwin
Date: Fri Apr 14 2006 - 16:02:49 EST
On Wednesday 12 April 2006 20:42, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On Fri, 2006-04-07 at 21:38 +0300, TÃrÃk Edwin wrote:
> > How could I write an SELinux policy that does this?
>
> I don't think you can without further changes to SELinux, as you are
> mutating object labels in response to events (aka floating labels).
Would there be a reason to implement floating labels in SELinux?
How can I substitute floating labels (i.e. what would be its closest
approximation)?
> But
> the real question is why do you want to, i.e. what is actual functional
> requirement,
Functional requirement:
- be able to control/know which programs have access to the internet
- be able to control/know which processes have access to a certain socket
- be able to control/know which processes share a socket, and which processes
are the only ones accessing a socket
I used the term 'control/know', because I don't actually want to restrict the
applications by using fireflier lsm, I just want it to provide information to
its userspace part.
-- plan for fireflier SELinux integration (fireflier target version 2.1)---
Possible approaches I thought of:
1) put programs needing to share a socket in the same domain, and match based
on the domain of the socket. But what happens if a program would need to be
in 2 or more domains (xinetd comes to mind)
But a problem remains: if there is a base policy that sets a context on a
program, and my module would try to set a domain for it too, won't they
conflict?
2) each program has its own domain, and xinetd is in a domain of its own, but
it has access to all the sockets of its childs (domains). The same for
postfix
Also run selinux in non-enforcing mode, with avc logging turned off. I only
need labeling, not restrictions.
3)Or should I assume, that if a user has a base policy set up, he has
configured that properly, and only those programs share sockets, that he
intends to?
In this case fireflier would need to do only this:
- if selinux is disabled, then run a policy generator, that generates a base
policy (not necessarely a module). fireflier will make sure user runs with
selinux enabled, avc logging off, enforcing off
- if selinux is enabled, fireflier won't do shared socket checks, assuming
that the policy will limit the sharing of sockets
Important question: can a file's context be set from the policy?
(without using setfiles, to relabel the file, the user might want to enable
selinux later, I don't want to mess up his labeling)
(this might sound silly: can a define a default auto-transition to a context?)
Looking at this now, it seems that 2+3 would be the best solution. Is there
anything I need to take care of, when starting to implement 2+3?
When (and if) (2+3) will be completed, fireflier lsm will make no sense, and
will be dropped. In the mean-time I'll try to make fireflier lsm usable.
----------------------------------------------------------
> not just how you have chosen to implement it.
>
> > diff -uprN null/hooks.c fireflier_lsm/hooks.c
> > --- null/hooks.c 1970-01-01 02:00:00.000000000 +0200
> > +++ fireflier_lsm/hooks.c 2006-04-07 17:43:37.000000000 +0300
> > + * This function might sleep.
> > + */
> > +static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
> > +{
> > + struct fireflier_task_security_struct *tsec;
> > +
> > + tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*tsec), GFP_ATOMIC);
>
> Why GFP_ATOMIC?
Oops, that should have been GFP_KERNEL
>
> > + if (!tsec)
> > + return -ENOMEM;
> > +
> > + tsec->magic = FIREFLIER_MAGIC;
>
> Drop the magic fields and tests; they are a relic of early LSM
> development and have been dropped from SELinux. Also you should
> naturally drop any fields you aren't using.
Good point.
>
> > + tsec_current = current->security;
> > + if(tsec_current) {
>
> Better if you can guarantee that all tasks have a security structure,
> either via early initialization
To have all tasks assigned a security structure, fireflier lsm needs to be
compiled into the kernel.
> or by processing them all during your
> own initialization.
I thought of this, see label_all_processes. Unfortunately I found no way of
actually doing this. I would need to iterate through the tasklist structure,
but the task_lock export is going to be removed from the kernel.
>
> > + return secondary_ops->task_alloc_security(tsk);
>
> Don't call a secondary module hook unless you truly need it and know
> that it can work. In particular, alloc_security hooks can't work
> properly without some mechanism for sharing the security field, so no
> point in doing this here.
Ok deleted most, except
bprm_set_security,bprm_apply_creds,bprm_post_apply_creds,socket_accept,file_receive,
socket_post_create
>
> > +static int fireflier_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> > +{
> > + struct fireflier_bprm_security_struct *bsec;
> > +
> > + bsec = bprm->security;
> > + if(unlikely(!bsec)) {
> > + printk(KERN_DEBUG "Fireflier: bprm->security not set\n");
>
> Shouldn't be possible since you are allocating one in the other hook,
> right, so don't test for such conditions. You don't gain anything, and
> you may hide or lose useful info that you would have gotten from the
> Oops if it did occur.
Ok
> Naturally the printks have to go for real use.
I know
> <snip>
>
> > +/**
> > + * inode_update_perm - update the group SID of this inode
> > + * @tsk - the task that has accesses the inode
> > + * @inode - the inode who's SID has to be updated
> > + * A task has accessed this file, add the task's SID to the group SID of
> > tasks
> > + * accessing the file
> > + * based on inode_has_perm
> > + */
> > +static void inode_update_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,struct inode
> > *inode) +{
> > + struct fireflier_task_security_struct *tsec;
> > + struct fireflier_inode_security_struct *isec;
> > +
> > + tsec = tsk->security;
> > + isec = inode->i_security;
> > + if(!isec)
> > + return;
> > +
> > + if(unlikely(!tsec))
> > + isec->sid =
> > compute_inode_sid(isec->sid,FIREFLIER_SID_UNLABELED); + else
> > + isec->sid = compute_inode_sid(isec->sid,tsec->sid);
> > + printk(KERN_DEBUG "computed inode
> > sid: %ld->%d\n",inode->i_ino,isec->sid);
> > +}
>
> Locking? You are mutating the inode's SID, but many different tasks may
> be accessing (in this case, inheriting/receiving a descriptor to) the
> inode simultaneously.
Locking added. I use a lock every time the inode's sid is modified.
> Not clear that SIDs are even the right primitive
> for what you are doing here, essentially aggregating a list of all
> subjects that have gained a descriptor to the socket.
The term 'SID' might not fit what I actually do here, true. Should I call it:
access_id, ?
>
> > +static inline void file_update_perm(struct task_struct *tsk, struct
> > file *file)
> > +{
> > +
> > + struct fireflier_task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
> > + struct fireflier_file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
> > + struct dentry *dentry = file->f_dentry;
> > + struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
> > +
> > + inode_update_perm(tsk, inode);
> > +
> > + if(!fsec)
> > + return;
> > + if(unlikely(!tsec))
> > + fsec->sid=compute_inode_sid(fsec->sid,FIREFLIER_SID_UNLABELED);
> > + else
> > + fsec->sid=compute_inode_sid(fsec->sid,tsec->sid);
>
> As before, locking required for safety. But also - where do you use
> this fsec->sid for anything (vs. the isec->sid)?
Thanks for noticing, I don't use that anywhere, inode security labels are
enough. Deleted now.
>
> > +static int fireflier_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char
> > *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err)
> > +{
>
> <snip>
>
> > + if (err > 0) {
> > + if ((len == err) && !(memcmp(context, buffer, len))) {
> > + /* Don't need to canonicalize value */
> > + rc = err;
> > + goto out_free;
> > + }
> > + memset(buffer, 0, size);
>
> IIUC, since you are dealing with sockets, this case is extraneous for
> you. In SELinux, it only exists for the case where you have an on-disk
> xattr that already matches the incore representation, and is actually
> eliminated in recent patches altogether.
Deleted. These are the disadvantages of not using a common code base, when
selinux gets updated, fireflier doesn't. It would be best if I could avoid
this situation. When (and if) I write the fireflier policy generator for
selinux, fireflier lsm won't be needed anymore.
> <snip>
P.S.: Thanks for taking time to provide detailed explanations. Sorry for my
late reply, I needed to think this over before replying.
I resend the hooks.c, and structures, with the modifications you suggested:
Cheers,
Edwin
---------
hooks.c | 631
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
structures.h | 62 +++++
2 files changed, 693 insertions(+)
diff -uprN null/hooks.c fireflier_lsm/hooks.c
--- null/hooks.c 1970-01-01 02:00:00.000000000 +0200
+++ fireflier_lsm/hooks.c 2006-04-14 22:53:40.000000000 +0300
@@ -0,0 +1,631 @@
+
+/*
+ * Fireflier security labeling module
+ *
+ *
+ * This file contains the Fireflier hook function implementations.
+ *
+ * Based on the SELinux hooks.c
+ *
+ * The Fireflier security module won't deny any operations
+ * Its sole purpose is to label processes, and files, so that the sk_filter
context match
+ * will be able to do context matching without selinux being active
+ *
+ * You shouldn't use SELinux and Fireflier LSM at the same time
+ * You can either have:
+ * - Having SELinux compiled in your kernel, and disabled at boot, and
fireflier enabled at boot /loaded as a module
+ * - Having SELinux compiled in your kernel, and enabled at boot, and
fireflier disabled on boot/not loaded.
+ *
+ * Currently you have to turn off the capability module
(capability.disable=1 on boot). See README for details
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2006 TÃrÃk Edwin <edwin@xxxxxxxxx>
+ *
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
+#include <net/sock.h>
+#include "fireflier_debug.h"
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "structures.h"
+#include "autolabel.h"
+
+//TODO: document all these functions here
+
+/* Original (dummy) security module. */
+static struct security_operations *original_ops = NULL;
+static struct security_operations *secondary_ops = NULL;
+static struct security_operations dummy_security_ops;
+
+
+#define XATTR_FIREFLIER_SUFFIX "fireflier"
+#define XATTR_NAME_FIREFLIER XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_FIREFLIER_SUFFIX
+
+
+/* module stacking operations */
+/**
+ * fireflier_register_security - register a stacked security module
+ * @name: the name of the secondary security module to register
+ * @ops: the stacked module's security_operations
+ */
+static int fireflier_register_security (const char *name, struct
security_operations *ops)
+{
+ if (secondary_ops != original_ops)
+ {
+ printk(KERN_INFO "%s: There is already a secondary
security "
+ "module registered.\n", __FUNCTION__);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ secondary_ops = ops;
+
+ printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Registering secondary module %s\n",
+ __FUNCTION__,
+ name);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * fireflier_unregister_security - unregister a stacked security
+ * @name: the name of the secondary security module to unregister
+ * @ops: the security_operations of the stacked module
+ */
+static int fireflier_unregister_security (const char *name, struct
security_operations *ops)
+{
+ if (ops != secondary_ops)
+ {
+ printk (KERN_INFO "%s: trying to unregister a security
module "
+ "that is not registered.\n", __FUNCTION__);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ secondary_ops = original_ops;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * task_alloc_security - allocate the security structure for a task
+ * @task: the task to allocate the security structure for
+ * Allocates and initializes the security structure of a task.
+ * Returns -ENOMEM in case of an allocation failure.
+ * This function might sleep.
+ */
+static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+ struct fireflier_task_security_struct *tsec;
+
+ tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*tsec), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tsec)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+
+ tsec->task = task;
+ tsec->osid = tsec->sid = tsec->ptrace_sid = FIREFLIER_SID_UNLABELED;
+ task->security = tsec;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * task_free_security - free the security structure of a task
+ */
+static void task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+ struct fireflier_task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
+
+ if (!tsec)
+ return;
+
+ task->security = NULL;
+ kfree(tsec);
+}
+
+/**
+ * fireflier_task_alloc_security - allocate & initialize the security
structure of tsk from current
+ * @tsk: the task who's security context needs to be initialized
+ * In case of allocation failure returns -ENOMEM
+ * otherwise calls secondary security module.
+ * Might sleep.
+ */
+static int fireflier_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+ struct fireflier_task_security_struct *tsec_current, *tsec_tsk;
+
+
+ int rc;
+ rc = task_alloc_security(tsk);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ tsec_current = current->security;
+ if(tsec_current) {
+ tsec_tsk = tsk->security;
+
+ tsec_tsk->sid = tsec_current->sid;
+ tsec_tsk->osid = tsec_current->osid;
+ /* Retain ptracer SID across fork, if any.
+ This will be reset by the ptrace hook upon any
+ subsequent ptrace_attach operations. */
+ tsec_tsk->ptrace_sid = tsec_current->ptrace_sid;
+ }
+ //else printk(KERN_DEBUG "current has no security info\n");
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * fireflier_bprm_alloc_security - allocate & initialize a linux_bprm
structure
+ * @bprm: the linux_bprm structure to initialize
+ * Returns -ENOMEM on allocation failure, otherwise calls stacked security
module.
+ * Might sleep.
+ */
+static int fireflier_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+ struct fireflier_bprm_security_struct *bsec;
+
+ bsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bsec), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!bsec)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+
+ bsec->bprm = bprm;
+ bsec->sid = FIREFLIER_SID_UNLABELED;
+ bsec->set = 0;
+
+ bprm->security = bsec;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * fireflier_bprm_set_security - Sets the SID of bprm
+ * @bprm: linux_bprm structure, its SID will be calculated here
+ * This is where the (autolabeling) sid generation function is called, i.e.
+ * this function is responsible for computing the SID of the process that is
going to be executed
+ * Calls secondary security module.
+ * Can this sleep?
+ */
+static int fireflier_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+ struct fireflier_bprm_security_struct *bsec;
+
+ bsec = bprm->security;
+ if (bsec->set)
+ return secondary_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm);
+
+ bsec->sid = get_or_generate_sid(bprm->file,0);
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "sid:%d\n",bsec->sid);
+ bsec->set = 1;
+ return secondary_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm);
+}
+
+/**
+ * fireflier_bprm_free_security - free the binbprm's security structure
+ * @bprm: linux_binprm structure, who's security structure is to be freed
+ */
+static void fireflier_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+ kfree(bprm->security);
+ bprm->security = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * fireflier_bprm_apply_creds - compute the sid of the current task based on
bprm
+ * @bprm: linux_binprm structure
+ * @unsafe: reasons why the transition might be unsafe
+ * Compute the sid of a process being transformed by an execve operation
+ */
+static void fireflier_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
+{
+ struct fireflier_task_security_struct *tsec;
+ struct fireflier_bprm_security_struct *bsec;
+ u32 sid;
+
+
+ secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
+
+ tsec = current->security;
+ bsec = bprm->security;
+ sid = bsec->sid;
+
+
+ bsec->unsafe = 0;
+ if (tsec->sid != sid) {
+ /* hmmm unsafe&ptrace stuff.... need to think over this a bit*/
+ if(unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE|LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP))
+ {
+
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "marking SID as unsafe\n");
+ bsec->unsafe=unsafe;
+ }
+
+ tsec->sid = sid;
+ }
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * inode_update_perm - update the group SID of this inode
+ * @tsk - the task that has accesses the inode
+ * @inode - the inode who's SID has to be updated
+ * A task has accessed this file, add the task's SID to the group SID of
tasks
+ * accessing the file
+ * based on inode_has_perm
+ */
+static void inode_update_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,struct inode *inode)
+{
+ struct fireflier_task_security_struct *tsec;
+ struct fireflier_inode_security_struct *isec;
+ u32 sid;
+
+ tsec = tsk->security;
+ isec = inode->i_security;
+ if(!isec)
+ return;
+
+ if(unlikely(!tsec))
+ sid = compute_inode_sid(isec->sid,FIREFLIER_SID_UNLABELED);
+ else
+ sid = compute_inode_sid(isec->sid,tsec->sid);
+ spin_lock(&isec->sid_lock);
+ isec->sid=sid;
+ spin_unlock(&isec->sid_lock);
+
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "computed inode sid: %ld->%d\n",inode->i_ino,isec->sid);
+}
+
+
+
+/**
+ * file_update_perm - update the group SID of this file
+ * @tsk - the task that has accessed the file
+ * @file - the file that has been accessed
+ * A task has accessed this file, add the task's SID to the group SID of
tasks
+ * accessing the file
+ * Based on file_has_perm
+ */
+static inline void file_update_perm(struct task_struct *tsk, struct file
*file)
+{
+ inode_update_perm(tsk, file->f_dentry->d_inode);
+}
+
+
+
+
+/**
+ * update_files_auth - update the group SID of the files
+ * @files - a files_struct containing all files of the forked process
+ * Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files.
+ * Should deal only with sockets
+ */
+static inline void update_files_auth(struct files_struct * files)
+{
+
+
+ struct file *file;
+ struct fdtable *fdt;
+ long j = -1;
+
+ /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
+ spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
+ for (;;)
+ {
+ unsigned long set, i;
+
+ j++;
+ i = j * __NFDBITS;
+ fdt = files_fdtable(files);
+ if (i >= fdt->max_fds || i >= fdt->max_fdset)
+ break;
+ set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
+ if (!set)
+ continue;
+ spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
+ for ( ; set ; i++,set >>= 1)
+ {
+ if (set & 1)
+ {
+ file = fget(i);
+ if (!file)
+ continue;
+ file_update_perm(current,file);
+ fput(file);
+ }
+ }
+ spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
+ }
+ spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * fireflier_bprm_post_apply_creds - updates files' SID
+ * @bprm - a linux_bprm structure
+ * update the security field of bprm
+ */
+static void fireflier_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+ struct fireflier_task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
+ struct fireflier_bprm_security_struct *bsec = bprm->security;
+ secondary_ops->bprm_post_apply_creds(bprm);
+
+ if(bsec->unsafe)
+ {
+
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "computing unsafe SID\n");
+ tsec->sid = get_or_generate_unsafe_sid(tsec->sid,bsec->unsafe);
+
+ }
+
+ ff_debug_map_pidsid(tsec->sid);
+ if (tsec->osid == tsec->sid)
+ return;
+ //SID changed, so update the files's SIDs, i.e. turn them into group SIDs
+ update_files_auth(current->files);
+}
+
+/**
+ * fireflier_inode_alloc_security - allocate the security structure of an
inode
+ * @inode - inode
+ * allocate the security field of inode
+ */
+static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
+{
+ struct fireflier_task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
+ struct fireflier_inode_security_struct *isec;
+
+ isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct fireflier_inode_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!isec)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ isec->inode = inode;
+ //isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
+ if (tsec)
+ isec->sid = tsec->sid;
+ else
+ isec->sid = FIREFLIER_SID_UNLABELED;
+ spin_lock_init(&isec->sid_lock);
+ inode->i_security = isec;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * fireflier_inode_free_security - free the security structure of the inode
+ * @inode - inode
+ * free the security field of inode
+ */
+static void fireflier_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
+{
+ struct fireflier_inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+// struct fireflier_superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
inode->i_sb->s_security;
+
+ if (!isec)// || !sbsec)
+ return;
+
+ inode->i_security = NULL;
+ kfree(isec);
+}
+
+static int fireflier_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket
*newsock)
+{
+ struct fireflier_inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
+ struct inode* newinode = SOCK_INODE(newsock);
+ struct fireflier_inode_security_struct *newisec;
+
+ inode_alloc_security(newinode);
+
+ newisec = newinode->i_security;
+ spin_lock(&isec->sid_lock);
+ newisec->sid = isec->sid;
+ spin_unlock(&isec->sid_lock);
+
+ return secondary_ops->socket_accept(sock,newsock);
+}
+
+/** fireflier_file_receive - file received (via SysV IPC?)
+ * update group SID of file
+ */
+
+static int fireflier_file_receive(struct file* file)
+{
+ file_update_perm(current,file);
+ return secondary_ops->file_receive(file);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Copy the in-core inode security context value to the user. If the
+ * getxattr() prior to this succeeded, check to see if we need to
+ * canonicalize the value to be finally returned to the user.
+ *
+ * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
+ */
+static int fireflier_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
void *buffer, size_t size, int err)
+{
+ struct fireflier_inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+ char *context=NULL;/* required!*/
+ unsigned len;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (strcmp(name, XATTR_FIREFLIER_SUFFIX) || !isec) {
+ rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ rc = fireflier_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Probe for required buffer size */
+ if (!buffer || !size) {
+ rc = len;
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+
+ if (size < len) {
+ rc = -ERANGE;
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(buffer, context, len);
+ rc = len;
+ out_free:
+ kfree(context);
+ out:
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int fireflier_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
size_t buffer_size)
+{
+ if(inode->i_security)
+ {
+
+ const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_FIREFLIER);
+ if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
+ memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_FIREFLIER, len);
+ return len;
+ }
+ else
+ return 0;
+
+
+}
+
+static void fireflier_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
+ int type, int protocol, int kern)
+{
+ struct fireflier_inode_security_struct *isec;
+ struct fireflier_task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
+ struct inode* inode=SOCK_INODE(sock);
+
+ secondary_ops->socket_post_create(sock,family,type,protocol,kern);
+
+ inode_alloc_security(inode);
+ isec = inode->i_security;
+
+ spin_lock(&isec->sid_lock);
+ isec->sid = kern ? FIREFLIER_SECINITSID_KERNEL : tsec->sid;
+ spin_unlock(&isec->sid_lock);
+
+ return;
+}
+
+/**
+ * fireflier_ops - our security_operations hooks
+ * Unused security hooks will be automatically redirected to the dummy
security module
+ * Does the dummy module call the secondary module? Maybe we should implement
all the hooks, and call
+ * the secondary module
+ */
+static struct security_operations fireflier_ops =
+{
+ .bprm_alloc_security = fireflier_bprm_alloc_security,
+ .bprm_free_security = fireflier_bprm_free_security,
+ .bprm_apply_creds = fireflier_bprm_apply_creds,
+ .bprm_post_apply_creds = fireflier_bprm_post_apply_creds,
+ .bprm_set_security = fireflier_bprm_set_security,
+ .inode_free_security = fireflier_inode_free_security,
+ .inode_getsecurity = fireflier_inode_getsecurity,
+ .inode_listsecurity = fireflier_inode_listsecurity,
+ .file_receive = fireflier_file_receive,
+ .task_alloc_security = fireflier_task_alloc_security,
+ .task_free_security = task_free_security,
+ .socket_post_create = fireflier_socket_post_create,
+ .socket_accept = fireflier_socket_accept,
+ .register_security = fireflier_register_security,
+ .unregister_security = fireflier_unregister_security,
+};
+
+/**
+ * stacked - is a secondary module registered
+ */
+static int stacked=0;
+
+/**
+ * label_all_processes - labels already running processes
+ * Can this be done at all? Or do we need to have fireflier loaded during
boot?
+ */
+static void label_all_processes(void)
+{
+ /* Labeling running processes without using the task_lock seems not possible
for now*/
+ /* TODO: label processes that are already running */
+ /* TODO: prevent processes from being spawned while we label the
running ones */
+ /* TODO Priority:Low, it works without this too */
+}
+
+/**
+ * fireflier_cleanup - Cleans up fireflier module
+ * Unregisters security module
+ */
+static void __exit fireflier_cleanup(void)
+{
+ if(stacked) {
+ if(mod_unreg_security("fireflier",&fireflier_ops))
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Fireflier: Error unregistering stacked security module.
\n");
+ }
+ else
+ if(unregister_security(&fireflier_ops))
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Fireflier: Error unregistering security module.\n");
+}
+
+int ff_debug;
+module_param(ff_debug,int,0);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(ff_debug,"Enable debug info dumping in debugfs");
+/**
+ * fireflier_init - module loading initialization
+ * Registers fireflier as primary or secondary security module
+ */
+static int __init fireflier_init(void)
+{
+ /*Register security_ops with kernel*/
+ int err;
+
+ original_ops = security_ops;
+ /* initialize dummy_security_ops to dummy ops */
+ register_security(&dummy_security_ops);
+ unregister_security(&dummy_security_ops);
+ secondary_ops = &dummy_security_ops;//avoid recursion with capability
module
+ if (!secondary_ops) {
+ printk (KERN_ERR "Fireflier: No initial security
operations\n");
+ return -EAGAIN;
+ }
+ if ((err=register_security (&fireflier_ops))) {
+ printk(KERN_INFO "Fireflier: Unable to register as primary
security module. Attempting to register as stacked security module\n");
+ stacked=1;
+ if((err=mod_reg_security("fireflier",&fireflier_ops))) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Fireflier: Unable to register with
kernel.\n");
+ return err;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ stacked=0;
+ /* Do initialization */
+ if((err=autolabel_init())) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "Fireflier: autolabeling initialization failed (OOM?)\n");
+ fireflier_cleanup();
+ return err;
+ }
+ label_all_processes();
+
+ /* Debugging stuff */
+ ff_debug_startup();
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+security_initcall(fireflier_init);
+module_exit(fireflier_cleanup);
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("TÃrÃk Edwin <edwin@xxxxxxxxx>");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Fireflier security module");
+MODULE_VERSION("0.01");
+
diff -uprN null/structures.h fireflier_lsm/structures.h
--- null/structures.h 1970-01-01 02:00:00.000000000 +0200
+++ fireflier_lsm/structures.h 2006-04-14 22:48:13.000000000 +0300
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+/*
+ * Fireflier security labeling module
+ *
+ *
+ * This file contains the Fireflier hook function implementations.
+ *
+ * Based on the SELinux hooks.c
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2006 TÃrÃk Edwin <edwin@xxxxxxxxx>
+ *
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+#ifndef _FF_STRUCTURES_H_
+#define _FF_STRUCTURES_H_
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include "constants.h"
+/* Structures copied from SELinux, and prefixed with fireflier_ to avoid
conflicts
+ * I don't want to use SELinux internal structures.
+ */
+
+
+struct fireflier_task_security_struct {
+ struct task_struct *task; /* back pointer to task object */
+ u32 sid; /* current SID */
+ u32 osid; /* SID prior to execve */
+ u32 ptrace_sid; /* SID of ptrace parent */
+};
+
+struct fireflier_inode_security_struct {
+ struct inode *inode; /* back pointer to inode object */
+ spinlock_t sid_lock;
+ u32 sid; /* SID of this object */
+};
+
+struct fireflier_bprm_security_struct {
+ struct linux_binprm *bprm; /* back pointer to bprm object */
+ u32 sid; /* SID for transformed process */
+ unsigned char set;
+
+ /*
+ * unsafe is used to share failure information from bprm_apply_creds()
+ * to bprm_post_apply_creds().
+ */
+ char unsafe;
+};
+/**
+ * getsid_safe - returns the SID, safe to be called with a NULL pointer
+ * @tsec: a task's security structure to get the SID from, it can be NULL
+ */
+static inline u32 getsid_safe(const struct fireflier_task_security_struct*
tsec)
+{
+ if(likely(tsec))
+ return tsec->sid;
+ else
+ return FIREFLIER_SID_UNLABELED;
+}
+
+#endif
-
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