[PATCH 3/4] eCryptfs: Open-code flag manipulation

From: Michael Halcrow
Date: Thu Aug 24 2006 - 14:17:44 EST


Open-code flag checking and manipulation.

Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@xxxxxxxxxx>

---

fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c | 37 +++++++++++++-------------------
fs/ecryptfs/debug.c | 10 ++++-----
fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h | 3 ---
fs/ecryptfs/file.c | 17 ++++++---------
fs/ecryptfs/inode.c | 14 +++++-------
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c | 48 +++++++++++++++++------------------------
fs/ecryptfs/main.c | 3 +--
fs/ecryptfs/mmap.c | 8 +++----
8 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 82 deletions(-)

6c21efe97f4e0c862a962f007349ee0e4b2aff6b
diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c b/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c
index 39d7ec0..112134a 100644
--- a/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c
+++ b/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ ecryptfs_init_crypt_stat(struct ecryptfs
mutex_init(&crypt_stat->cs_mutex);
mutex_init(&crypt_stat->cs_tfm_mutex);
mutex_init(&crypt_stat->cs_md5_tfm_mutex);
- ECRYPTFS_SET_FLAG(crypt_stat->flags, ECRYPTFS_STRUCT_INITIALIZED);
+ crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_STRUCT_INITIALIZED;
}

/**
@@ -272,8 +272,7 @@ static int encrypt_scatterlist(struct ec
int rc = 0;

BUG_ON(!crypt_stat || !crypt_stat->tfm
- || !ECRYPTFS_CHECK_FLAG(crypt_stat->flags,
- ECRYPTFS_STRUCT_INITIALIZED));
+ || !(crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_STRUCT_INITIALIZED));
if (unlikely(ecryptfs_verbosity > 0)) {
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Key size [%d]; key:\n",
crypt_stat->key_size);
@@ -452,7 +451,7 @@ #define ECRYPTFS_PAGE_STATE_WRITTEN 3
lower_inode = ecryptfs_inode_to_lower(ctx->page->mapping->host);
inode_info = ecryptfs_inode_to_private(ctx->page->mapping->host);
crypt_stat = &inode_info->crypt_stat;
- if (!ECRYPTFS_CHECK_FLAG(crypt_stat->flags, ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED)) {
+ if (!(crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED)) {
rc = ecryptfs_copy_page_to_lower(ctx->page, lower_inode,
ctx->param.lower_file);
if (rc)
@@ -584,7 +583,7 @@ int ecryptfs_decrypt_page(struct file *f
crypt_stat = &(ecryptfs_inode_to_private(
page->mapping->host)->crypt_stat);
lower_inode = ecryptfs_inode_to_lower(page->mapping->host);
- if (!ECRYPTFS_CHECK_FLAG(crypt_stat->flags, ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED)) {
+ if (!(crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED)) {
rc = ecryptfs_do_readpage(file, page, page->index);
if (rc)
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Error attempting to copy "
@@ -834,7 +833,7 @@ int ecryptfs_compute_root_iv(struct ecry

BUG_ON(crypt_stat->iv_bytes > MD5_DIGEST_SIZE);
BUG_ON(crypt_stat->iv_bytes <= 0);
- if (!ECRYPTFS_CHECK_FLAG(crypt_stat->flags, ECRYPTFS_KEY_VALID)) {
+ if (!(crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_KEY_VALID)) {
rc = -EINVAL;
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "Session key not valid; "
"cannot generate root IV\n");
@@ -851,8 +850,7 @@ int ecryptfs_compute_root_iv(struct ecry
out:
if (rc) {
memset(crypt_stat->root_iv, 0, crypt_stat->iv_bytes);
- ECRYPTFS_SET_FLAG(crypt_stat->flags,
- ECRYPTFS_SECURITY_WARNING);
+ crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_SECURITY_WARNING;
}
return rc;
}
@@ -860,7 +858,7 @@ out:
static void ecryptfs_generate_new_key(struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat)
{
get_random_bytes(crypt_stat->key, crypt_stat->key_size);
- ECRYPTFS_SET_FLAG(crypt_stat->flags, ECRYPTFS_KEY_VALID);
+ crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_KEY_VALID;
ecryptfs_compute_root_iv(crypt_stat);
if (unlikely(ecryptfs_verbosity > 0)) {
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Generated new session key:\n");
@@ -882,7 +880,7 @@ static void ecryptfs_set_default_crypt_s
ecryptfs_set_default_sizes(crypt_stat);
strcpy(crypt_stat->cipher, ECRYPTFS_DEFAULT_CIPHER);
crypt_stat->key_size = ECRYPTFS_DEFAULT_KEY_BYTES;
- ECRYPTFS_CLEAR_FLAG(crypt_stat->flags, ECRYPTFS_KEY_VALID);
+ crypt_stat->flags &= ~(ECRYPTFS_KEY_VALID);
crypt_stat->file_version = ECRYPTFS_FILE_VERSION;
crypt_stat->mount_crypt_stat = mount_crypt_stat;
}
@@ -922,8 +920,8 @@ int ecryptfs_new_file_context(struct den
if (mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok) {
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Initializing context for new "
"file using mount_crypt_stat\n");
- ECRYPTFS_SET_FLAG(crypt_stat->flags, ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED);
- ECRYPTFS_SET_FLAG(crypt_stat->flags, ECRYPTFS_KEY_VALID);
+ crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED;
+ crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_KEY_VALID;
memcpy(crypt_stat->keysigs[crypt_stat->num_keysigs++],
mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_sig,
ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX);
@@ -1005,11 +1003,9 @@ static int ecryptfs_process_flags(struct
for (i = 0; i < ((sizeof(ecryptfs_flag_map)
/ sizeof(struct ecryptfs_flag_map_elem))); i++)
if (flags & ecryptfs_flag_map[i].file_flag) {
- ECRYPTFS_SET_FLAG(crypt_stat->flags,
- ecryptfs_flag_map[i].local_flag);
+ crypt_stat->flags |= ecryptfs_flag_map[i].local_flag;
} else
- ECRYPTFS_CLEAR_FLAG(crypt_stat->flags,
- ecryptfs_flag_map[i].local_flag);
+ crypt_stat->flags &= ~(ecryptfs_flag_map[i].local_flag);
/* Version is in top 8 bits of the 32-bit flag vector */
crypt_stat->file_version = ((flags >> 24) & 0xFF);
(*bytes_read) = 4;
@@ -1046,8 +1042,7 @@ write_ecryptfs_flags(char *page_virt, st

for (i = 0; i < ((sizeof(ecryptfs_flag_map)
/ sizeof(struct ecryptfs_flag_map_elem))); i++)
- if (ECRYPTFS_CHECK_FLAG(crypt_stat->flags,
- ecryptfs_flag_map[i].local_flag))
+ if (crypt_stat->flags & ecryptfs_flag_map[i].local_flag)
flags |= ecryptfs_flag_map[i].file_flag;
/* Version is in top 8 bits of the 32-bit flag vector */
flags |= ((((u8)crypt_stat->file_version) << 24) & 0xFF000000);
@@ -1271,10 +1266,8 @@ int ecryptfs_write_headers(struct dentry

crypt_stat = &ecryptfs_inode_to_private(
ecryptfs_dentry->d_inode)->crypt_stat;
- if (likely(ECRYPTFS_CHECK_FLAG(crypt_stat->flags,
- ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED))) {
- if (!ECRYPTFS_CHECK_FLAG(crypt_stat->flags,
- ECRYPTFS_KEY_VALID)) {
+ if (likely(crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED)) {
+ if (!(crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_KEY_VALID)) {
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Key is "
"invalid; bailing out\n");
rc = -EINVAL;
diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/debug.c b/fs/ecryptfs/debug.c
index 2261945..9cae01d 100644
--- a/fs/ecryptfs/debug.c
+++ b/fs/ecryptfs/debug.c
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ void ecryptfs_dump_auth_tok(struct ecryp

ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Auth tok at mem loc [%p]:\n",
auth_tok);
- if (ECRYPTFS_CHECK_FLAG(auth_tok->flags, ECRYPTFS_PRIVATE_KEY)) {
+ if (auth_tok->flags & ECRYPTFS_PRIVATE_KEY) {
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, " * private key type\n");
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, " * (NO PRIVATE KEY SUPPORT "
"IN ECRYPTFS VERSION 0.1)\n");
@@ -46,8 +46,8 @@ void ecryptfs_dump_auth_tok(struct ecryp
ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE);
salt[ECRYPTFS_SALT_SIZE * 2] = '\0';
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, " * salt = [%s]\n", salt);
- if (ECRYPTFS_CHECK_FLAG(auth_tok->token.password.flags,
- ECRYPTFS_PERSISTENT_PASSWORD)) {
+ if (auth_tok->token.password.flags &
+ ECRYPTFS_PERSISTENT_PASSWORD) {
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, " * persistent\n");
}
memcpy(sig, auth_tok->token.password.signature,
@@ -55,12 +55,12 @@ void ecryptfs_dump_auth_tok(struct ecryp
sig[ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX] = '\0';
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, " * signature = [%s]\n", sig);
}
- if (ECRYPTFS_CHECK_FLAG(auth_tok->flags, ECRYPTFS_CONTAINS_SECRET)) {
+ if (auth_tok->flags & ECRYPTFS_CONTAINS_SECRET) {
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, " * contains secret value\n");
} else {
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, " * lacks secret value\n");
}
- if (ECRYPTFS_CHECK_FLAG(auth_tok->flags, ECRYPTFS_EXPIRED))
+ if (auth_tok->flags & ECRYPTFS_EXPIRED)
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, " * expired\n");
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, " * session_key.flags = [0x%x]\n",
auth_tok->session_key.flags);
diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h b/fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h
index 8d4e8ef..fcf6d8b 100644
--- a/fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h
+++ b/fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h
@@ -79,9 +79,6 @@ #define RFC2440_CIPHER_AES_256 0x09
#define RFC2440_CIPHER_TWOFISH 0x0a
#define RFC2440_CIPHER_CAST_6 0x0b

-#define ECRYPTFS_SET_FLAG(flag_bit_vector, flag) (flag_bit_vector |= (flag))
-#define ECRYPTFS_CLEAR_FLAG(flag_bit_vector, flag) (flag_bit_vector &= ~(flag))
-#define ECRYPTFS_CHECK_FLAG(flag_bit_vector, flag) (flag_bit_vector & (flag))
#define RFC2440_CIPHER_RSA 0x01

/**
diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/file.c b/fs/ecryptfs/file.c
index b707a99..6da9363 100644
--- a/fs/ecryptfs/file.c
+++ b/fs/ecryptfs/file.c
@@ -233,11 +233,11 @@ static int ecryptfs_open(struct inode *i
lower_dentry = ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower(ecryptfs_dentry);
crypt_stat = &ecryptfs_inode_to_private(inode)->crypt_stat;
mutex_lock(&crypt_stat->cs_mutex);
- if (!ECRYPTFS_CHECK_FLAG(crypt_stat->flags, ECRYPTFS_POLICY_APPLIED)) {
+ if (!(crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_POLICY_APPLIED)) {
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Setting flags for stat...\n");
/* Policy code enabled in future release */
- ECRYPTFS_SET_FLAG(crypt_stat->flags, ECRYPTFS_POLICY_APPLIED);
- ECRYPTFS_SET_FLAG(crypt_stat->flags, ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED);
+ crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_POLICY_APPLIED;
+ crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED;
}
mutex_unlock(&crypt_stat->cs_mutex);
/* This mntget & dget is undone via fput when the file is released */
@@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ static int ecryptfs_open(struct inode *i
lower_inode = lower_dentry->d_inode;
if (S_ISDIR(ecryptfs_dentry->d_inode->i_mode)) {
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "This is a directory\n");
- ECRYPTFS_CLEAR_FLAG(crypt_stat->flags, ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED);
+ crypt_stat->flags &= ~(ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED);
rc = 0;
goto out;
}
@@ -272,16 +272,13 @@ static int ecryptfs_open(struct inode *i
rc = -ENOENT;
mutex_unlock(&crypt_stat->cs_mutex);
goto out_puts;
- } else if (!ECRYPTFS_CHECK_FLAG(crypt_stat->flags,
- ECRYPTFS_POLICY_APPLIED)
- || !ECRYPTFS_CHECK_FLAG(crypt_stat->flags,
- ECRYPTFS_KEY_VALID)) {
+ } else if (!(crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_POLICY_APPLIED)
+ || !(crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_KEY_VALID)) {
rc = ecryptfs_read_headers(ecryptfs_dentry, lower_file);
if (rc) {
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG,
"Valid headers not found\n");
- ECRYPTFS_CLEAR_FLAG(crypt_stat->flags,
- ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED);
+ crypt_stat->flags &= ~(ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED);
/* At this point, we could just move on and
* have the encrypted data passed through
* as-is to userspace. For release 0.1, we are
diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/inode.c b/fs/ecryptfs/inode.c
index d8659ff..bfc7f41 100644
--- a/fs/ecryptfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/ecryptfs/inode.c
@@ -202,17 +202,15 @@ static int grow_file(struct dentry *ecry
ecryptfs_set_file_lower(&fake_file, lower_file);
rc = ecryptfs_fill_zeros(&fake_file, 1);
if (rc) {
- ECRYPTFS_SET_FLAG(
- ecryptfs_inode_to_private(inode)->crypt_stat.flags,
- ECRYPTFS_SECURITY_WARNING);
+ ecryptfs_inode_to_private(inode)->crypt_stat.flags |=
+ ECRYPTFS_SECURITY_WARNING;
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "Error attempting to fill zeros "
"in file; rc = [%d]\n", rc);
goto out;
}
i_size_write(inode, 0);
ecryptfs_write_inode_size_to_header(lower_file, lower_inode, inode);
- ECRYPTFS_SET_FLAG(ecryptfs_inode_to_private(inode)->crypt_stat.flags,
- ECRYPTFS_NEW_FILE);
+ ecryptfs_inode_to_private(inode)->crypt_stat.flags |= ECRYPTFS_NEW_FILE;
out:
return rc;
}
@@ -267,10 +265,10 @@ #endif
lower_inode = tlower_dentry->d_inode;
if (S_ISDIR(ecryptfs_dentry->d_inode->i_mode)) {
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "This is a directory\n");
- ECRYPTFS_CLEAR_FLAG(crypt_stat->flags, ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED);
+ crypt_stat->flags &= ~(ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED);
goto out_fput;
}
- ECRYPTFS_SET_FLAG(crypt_stat->flags, ECRYPTFS_NEW_FILE);
+ crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_NEW_FILE;
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Initializing crypto context\n");
rc = ecryptfs_new_file_context(ecryptfs_dentry);
if (rc) {
@@ -427,7 +425,7 @@ static struct dentry *ecryptfs_lookup(st
memset(page_virt, 0, PAGE_CACHE_SIZE);
rc = ecryptfs_read_header_region(page_virt, tlower_dentry, nd->mnt);
crypt_stat = &ecryptfs_inode_to_private(dentry->d_inode)->crypt_stat;
- if (!ECRYPTFS_CHECK_FLAG(crypt_stat->flags, ECRYPTFS_POLICY_APPLIED))
+ if (!(crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_POLICY_APPLIED))
ecryptfs_set_default_sizes(crypt_stat);
if (rc) {
rc = 0;
diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c b/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c
index f171bed..f8b0841 100644
--- a/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c
+++ b/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c
@@ -608,13 +608,13 @@ parse_tag_1_packet(struct ecryptfs_crypt
ECRYPTFS_CONTAINS_ENCRYPTED_KEY;
/* TODO: Use the keyring */
(*new_auth_tok)->uid = current->uid;
- ECRYPTFS_SET_FLAG((*new_auth_tok)->flags, ECRYPTFS_PRIVATE_KEY);
+ (*new_auth_tok)->flags |= ECRYPTFS_PRIVATE_KEY;
/* TODO: Why are we setting this flag here? Don't we want the
* userspace to decrypt the session key? */
- ECRYPTFS_CLEAR_FLAG((*new_auth_tok)->session_key.flags,
- ECRYPTFS_USERSPACE_SHOULD_TRY_TO_DECRYPT);
- ECRYPTFS_CLEAR_FLAG((*new_auth_tok)->session_key.flags,
- ECRYPTFS_USERSPACE_SHOULD_TRY_TO_ENCRYPT);
+ (*new_auth_tok)->session_key.flags &=
+ ~(ECRYPTFS_USERSPACE_SHOULD_TRY_TO_DECRYPT);
+ (*new_auth_tok)->session_key.flags &=
+ ~(ECRYPTFS_USERSPACE_SHOULD_TRY_TO_ENCRYPT);
list_add(&auth_tok_list_item->list, auth_tok_list);
goto out;
out_free:
@@ -795,13 +795,13 @@ parse_tag_3_packet(struct ecryptfs_crypt
}
/* TODO: Use the keyring */
(*new_auth_tok)->uid = current->uid;
- ECRYPTFS_SET_FLAG((*new_auth_tok)->flags, ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD);
+ (*new_auth_tok)->flags |= ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD;
/* TODO: Parametarize; we might actually want userspace to
* decrypt the session key. */
- ECRYPTFS_CLEAR_FLAG((*new_auth_tok)->session_key.flags,
- ECRYPTFS_USERSPACE_SHOULD_TRY_TO_DECRYPT);
- ECRYPTFS_CLEAR_FLAG((*new_auth_tok)->session_key.flags,
- ECRYPTFS_USERSPACE_SHOULD_TRY_TO_ENCRYPT);
+ (*new_auth_tok)->session_key.flags &=
+ ~(ECRYPTFS_USERSPACE_SHOULD_TRY_TO_DECRYPT);
+ (*new_auth_tok)->session_key.flags &=
+ ~(ECRYPTFS_USERSPACE_SHOULD_TRY_TO_ENCRYPT);
list_add(&auth_tok_list_item->list, auth_tok_list);
goto out;
out_free:
@@ -944,8 +944,7 @@ static int decrypt_session_key(struct ec
int rc = 0;

password_s_ptr = &auth_tok->token.password;
- if (ECRYPTFS_CHECK_FLAG(password_s_ptr->flags,
- ECRYPTFS_SESSION_KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY_SET))
+ if (password_s_ptr->flags & ECRYPTFS_SESSION_KEY_ENCRYPTION_KEY_SET)
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Session key encryption key "
"set; skipping key generation\n");
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Session key encryption key (size [%d])"
@@ -1017,7 +1016,7 @@ static int decrypt_session_key(struct ec
auth_tok->session_key.flags |= ECRYPTFS_CONTAINS_DECRYPTED_KEY;
memcpy(crypt_stat->key, auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key,
auth_tok->session_key.decrypted_key_size);
- ECRYPTFS_SET_FLAG(crypt_stat->flags, ECRYPTFS_KEY_VALID);
+ crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_KEY_VALID;
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Decrypted session key:\n");
if (ecryptfs_verbosity > 0)
ecryptfs_dump_hex(crypt_stat->key,
@@ -1119,8 +1118,7 @@ int ecryptfs_parse_packet_set(struct ecr
sig_tmp_space, tag_11_contents_size);
new_auth_tok->token.password.signature[
ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD_SIG_SIZE] = '\0';
- ECRYPTFS_SET_FLAG(crypt_stat->flags,
- ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED);
+ crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED;
break;
case ECRYPTFS_TAG_1_PACKET_TYPE:
rc = parse_tag_1_packet(crypt_stat,
@@ -1134,8 +1132,7 @@ int ecryptfs_parse_packet_set(struct ecr
goto out_wipe_list;
}
i += packet_size;
- ECRYPTFS_SET_FLAG(crypt_stat->flags,
- ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED);
+ crypt_stat->flags |= ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED;
break;
case ECRYPTFS_TAG_11_PACKET_TYPE:
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_WARNING, "Invalid packet set "
@@ -1177,8 +1174,7 @@ int ecryptfs_parse_packet_set(struct ecr
ecryptfs_dump_auth_tok(candidate_auth_tok);
}
/* TODO: Replace ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX w/ dynamic value */
- if ((ECRYPTFS_CHECK_FLAG(candidate_auth_tok->flags,
- ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD))
+ if ((candidate_auth_tok->flags & ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD)
&& !strncmp(candidate_auth_tok->token.password.signature,
sig, ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX)) {
found_auth_tok = 1;
@@ -1186,8 +1182,7 @@ int ecryptfs_parse_packet_set(struct ecr
/* TODO: Transfer the common salt into the
* crypt_stat salt */
}
- else if ((ECRYPTFS_CHECK_FLAG(candidate_auth_tok->flags,
- ECRYPTFS_PRIVATE_KEY))
+ else if ((candidate_auth_tok->flags & ECRYPTFS_PRIVATE_KEY)
&& !strncmp(candidate_auth_tok->token.private_key.signature,
sig, ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX)) {
found_auth_tok = 1;
@@ -1202,16 +1197,14 @@ int ecryptfs_parse_packet_set(struct ecr
goto out_wipe_list;
}
leave_list:
- if ((ECRYPTFS_CHECK_FLAG(candidate_auth_tok->flags,
- ECRYPTFS_PRIVATE_KEY))) {
+ if (candidate_auth_tok->flags & ECRYPTFS_PRIVATE_KEY) {
memcpy(&(candidate_auth_tok->token.private_key),
&(chosen_auth_tok->token.private_key),
sizeof(struct ecryptfs_private_key));
rc = decrypt_pki_encrypted_session_key(mount_crypt_stat,
candidate_auth_tok,
crypt_stat);
- } else if ((ECRYPTFS_CHECK_FLAG(candidate_auth_tok->flags,
- ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD))) {
+ } else if (candidate_auth_tok->flags & ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD) {
memcpy(&(candidate_auth_tok->token.password),
&(chosen_auth_tok->token.password),
sizeof(struct ecryptfs_password));
@@ -1651,7 +1644,7 @@ ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set(char *d
(*len) = 0;
if (mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok) {
auth_tok = mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok;
- if (ECRYPTFS_CHECK_FLAG(auth_tok->flags, ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD)) {
+ if (auth_tok->flags & ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD) {
rc = write_tag_3_packet((dest_base + (*len)),
max, auth_tok,
crypt_stat, &key_rec,
@@ -1673,8 +1666,7 @@ ecryptfs_generate_key_packet_set(char *d
goto out;
}
(*len) += written;
- } else if (ECRYPTFS_CHECK_FLAG(auth_tok->flags,
- ECRYPTFS_PRIVATE_KEY)) {
+ } else if (auth_tok->flags & ECRYPTFS_PRIVATE_KEY) {
rc = write_tag_1_packet(dest_base + (*len),
max, auth_tok,
crypt_stat,mount_crypt_stat,
diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/main.c b/fs/ecryptfs/main.c
index 9aacb75..b45ee2c 100644
--- a/fs/ecryptfs/main.c
+++ b/fs/ecryptfs/main.c
@@ -392,8 +392,7 @@ static int ecryptfs_parse_options(struct
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
- if (!ECRYPTFS_CHECK_FLAG(auth_tok->flags,
- (ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD | ECRYPTFS_PRIVATE_KEY))) {
+ if (!(auth_tok->flags & (ECRYPTFS_PASSWORD | ECRYPTFS_PRIVATE_KEY))) {
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_ERR, "Invalid auth_tok structure "
"returned from key\n");
rc = -EINVAL;
diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/mmap.c b/fs/ecryptfs/mmap.c
index 02f8ca1..5be06ac 100644
--- a/fs/ecryptfs/mmap.c
+++ b/fs/ecryptfs/mmap.c
@@ -279,8 +279,8 @@ static int ecryptfs_readpage(struct file
crypt_stat =
&ecryptfs_inode_to_private(file->f_dentry->d_inode)->crypt_stat;
if (!crypt_stat
- || !ECRYPTFS_CHECK_FLAG(crypt_stat->flags, ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED)
- || ECRYPTFS_CHECK_FLAG(crypt_stat->flags, ECRYPTFS_NEW_FILE)) {
+ || !(crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_ENCRYPTED)
+ || (crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_NEW_FILE)) {
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG,
"Passing through unencrypted page\n");
rc = ecryptfs_do_readpage(file, page, page->index);
@@ -556,10 +556,10 @@ static int ecryptfs_commit_write(struct
mutex_lock(&lower_inode->i_mutex);
crypt_stat =
&ecryptfs_inode_to_private(file->f_dentry->d_inode)->crypt_stat;
- if (ECRYPTFS_CHECK_FLAG(crypt_stat->flags, ECRYPTFS_NEW_FILE)) {
+ if (crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_NEW_FILE) {
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "ECRYPTFS_NEW_FILE flag set in "
"crypt_stat at memory location [%p]\n", crypt_stat);
- ECRYPTFS_CLEAR_FLAG(crypt_stat->flags, ECRYPTFS_NEW_FILE);
+ crypt_stat->flags &= ~(ECRYPTFS_NEW_FILE);
} else
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Not a new file\n");
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Calling fill_zeros_to_end_of_page"
--
1.3.3

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