Re: [PATCH 6/13] KVM: memory slot management

From: Avi Kivity
Date: Sun Oct 29 2006 - 04:18:28 EST


Arnd Bergmann wrote:
It can shoot not only its foot, but anything the monitor's uid has access to. Host files, the host network, other guests belonging to the user, etc.

Yes, that's what I meant. It's obviously nicer if the guest can't do that,
but it's a tradeoff of the potential security impact against on how hard
it is to implement hiding the addresses you don't want your guest to see.
To put it into other words, do you want the optimal performance, or the
optimal security?


Well, isolation is one of the most significant features of full virtualization, both for security and reliability. I don't think we can compromise that.


It's worse than I thouht: tlb entries generated by guest accesses are tagged with the guest virtual address, to if you remove a guest physical/host virtual page you need to invalidate the entire guest tlb.

Ok, so it's the HW's fault. They either copied bad or decided doing the
s390 approach was too expensive.

x86 tradition is to make all possible mistakes before getting a working solution.

--
error compiling committee.c: too many arguments to function

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