Re: [PATCH 1/1] security: introduce fs caps

From: Serge E. Hallyn
Date: Fri Nov 03 2006 - 15:48:36 EST


Quoting Stephen Smalley (sds@xxxxxxxxxxxxx):
> On Fri, 2006-11-03 at 14:00 -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > Quoting chris friedhoff (chris@xxxxxxxxxxxxx):
> > > The patch applies cleanly , compiles and runs smoothly against 2.6.18.1.
> > >
> > > I'm running slackware-current with a 2.6.18.1 kernel on an ext3
> > > filesystem.
> > >
> > > Background why I use the patch:
> > > With 2.6.18 to create a tuntap interface CAP_NET_ADMIN is required.
> > > Qemu uses tuntap to create a tap interface as a virtual net interface.
> > > Instead now running qemu with root privileges to give it the right
> > > to create a tap interface, i granted qemu with the help of the patch and
> > > Kaigai Kohei's userspace tools the cap-net_admin capability. So qemu
> > > runs again without root privilege but has now the right to create the
> > > tap interface.
> > >
> > > Thanks for the patch. It reduces my the need of suid-bit progs.
> > > It should be given a spin in -mm.
> >
> > One question is, if this were to be tested in -mm, do we want to keep
> > this mutually exclusive from selinux through config, or should selinux
> > stack on top of this?
>
> Given that SELinux already stacks with capability and you aren't using
> the security fields (last I looked), it would seem trivial to enable
> stacking with fscaps (just add a few secondary_ops calls to the SELinux
> hooks, right?).

Yup, I just wasn't sure if there would be actual objections to the idea
of enabling both at once.

I'll send out a patch - just as soon as I figure out where I left the
src to begin with :)

thanks,
-serge
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