Re: [PATCH 12/19] CacheFiles: Permit a process's create SID to beoverridden

[Stephen Smalley]

On Tue, 2006-11-14 at 16:19 -0500, James Morris wrote:
> On Tue, 14 Nov 2006, David Howells wrote:
> 
> > +static u32 selinux_set_fscreate_secid(u32 secid)
> > +{
> > +	struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
> > +	u32 oldsid = tsec->create_sid;
> > +
> > +	tsec->create_sid = secid;
> > +	return oldsid;
> > +}
> 
> The ability to set this needs to be mediated via MAC policy.
> 
> See selinux_setprocattr()

That's different - selinux_set_fscreate_secid() is for internal use by a
kernel module that wishes to temporarily assume a particular fscreate
SID, whereas selinux_setprocattr() handles userspace writes
to /proc/self/attr nodes.  Imposing a permission check here makes no
sense.

-- 
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency

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