Re: [patch] unprivileged mounts update
From: Serge E. Hallyn
Date: Wed Apr 25 2007 - 14:53:09 EST
Quoting Eric W. Biederman (ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx):
> "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@xxxxxxxxxx> writes:
> > Quoting Eric W. Biederman (ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx):
> >> Are there other permission checks that mount is doing that we
> >> care about.
> > Not mount itself, but in looking up /share/fa/root/home/fa,
> > user fa doesn't have the rights to read /share, and by setting
> > fsuid to fa and dropping CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH the mount action fails.
> Got it.
> I'm not certain this is actually a problem it may be a feature.
> But it does fly in the face of the general principle of just
> getting out of roots way so things can get done.
> I think we can solve your basic problem by simply doing like:
> chdir(/share); mount(.); To simply avoid the permission problem.
> The practical question is how much do we care.
> > But the solution you outlined in your previous post would work around
> > this perfectly.
> If we are not using usual permissions which user do we use current->uid?
> Or do we pass that user someplace?
Right, I figure if the normal action is to always do
mnt->user = current->fsuid, then for the special case we
pass a uid in someplace. Of course... do we not have a
place to do that? Would it be a no-no to use 'data' for
a non-fs-specific arg?
> >> > If it were really the equivalent then I could keep my capabilities :)
> >> > after changing it.
> >> We drop all capabilities after we change the euid.
> > Not if we've done prctl(PR_SET_KEEPCAPS, 1)
> Ah cap_clear doesn't do the obvious thing.
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