[PATCH] Version2 Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel

[Casey Schaufler]

From: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>

Smack is the Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel.

Smack implements mandatory access control (MAC) using labels
attached to tasks and data containers, including files, SVIPC,
and other tasks. Smack is a kernel based scheme that requires
an absolute minimum of application support and a very small
amount of configuration data.

Smack is implemented as a clean LSM. It requires no external
code changes and the patch modifies only the Kconfig and Makefile
in the security directory. Smack uses extended attributes and
provides a set of general mount options, borrowing technics used
elsewhere. Smack uses netlabel for CIPSO labeling. Smack provides
a pseudo-filesystem smackfs that is used for manipulation of
system Smack attributes.

The patch, patches for ls and sshd, a README, a startup script,
and x86 binaries for ls and sshd are also available on

    http:/www.schaufler-ca.com

The patch has been tested with 2.6.22, 2.6.23-rc3, and
2.6.23-rc3-mm1. Development has been done using Fedora Core 7
in a virtual machine environment.

Smack provides mandatory access controls based on the label attached
to a task and the label attached to the object it is attempting to
access. Smack labels are deliberately short (1-7 characters) text
strings. Single character labels using special characters are reserved
for system use. The only operation applied to Smack labels is equality
comparison. No wildcards or expressions, regular or otherwise, are
used.

A file always gets the Smack label of the task that created it.

Smack defines and uses these labels:

    "*" - pronounced "star"
    "_" - pronounced "floor"
    "^" - pronounced "hat"
    "?" - pronounced "huh"

The access rules enforced by Smack are, in order:

1. Any access requested by a task labeled "*" is denied.
2. A read or execute access requested by a task labeled "^"
   is permitted.
3. A read or execute access requested on an object labeled "_"
   is permitted.
4. Any access requested on an object labeled "*" is permitted.
5. Any access requested by a task on an object with the same
   label is permitted.
6. Any access requested that is explicitly defined in the loaded
   rule set is permitted.
7. Any other access is denied.

Rules may be explicitly defined by writing subject,object,access
triples to /smack/load.

Smack rule sets can be easily defined that describe Bell&LaPadula
sensitivity, Biba integrity, and a variety of interesting
configurations. Smack rule sets can be modified on the fly to
accomodate changes in the operating environment or even the time
of day.

Some practical use cases:

Hierarchical levels. The less common of the two usual uses
for MLS systems is to define hierarchical levels, often
unclassified, confidential, secret, and so on. To set up smack
to support this, these rules could be defined:

   C        Unclass rx
   S        C       rx
   S        Unclass rx
   TS       S       rx
   TS       C       rx
   TS       Unclass rx

A TS process can read S, C, and Unclass data, but cannot write it.
An S process can read C and Unclass. Note that specifying that
TS can read S and S can read C does not imply TS can read C, it
has to be explicitly stated.

Non-hierarchical categories. This is the more common of the
usual uses for an MLS system. Since the default rule is that a
subject cannot access an object with a different label no
access rules are required to implement compartmentalization.

A case that the Bell & LaPadula policy does not allow is demonstrated
with this Smack access rule:

A case that Bell&LaPadula does not allow that Smack does:

    ESPN    ABC   r
    ABC     ESPN  r

On my portable video device I have two applications, one that
shows ABC programming and the other ESPN programming. ESPN wants
to show me sport stories that show up as news, and ABC will
only provide minimal information about a sports story if ESPN
is covering it. Each side can look at the other's info, neither
can change the other. Neither can see what FOX is up to, which
is just as well all things considered.

Another case that I especially like:

    SatData Guard   w
    Guard   Publish w

A program running with the Guard label opens a UDP socket and
accepts messages sent by a program running with a SatData label.
The Guard program inspects the message to ensure it is wholesome
and if it is sends it to a program running with the Publish label.
This program then puts the information passed in an appropriate
place. Note that the Guard program cannot write to a Publish
file system object because file system semanitic require read as
well as write.

The four cases (categories, levels, mutual read, guardbox) here
are all quite real, and problems I've been asked to solve over
the years. The first two are easy to do with traditonal MLS systems
while the last two you can't without invoking privilege, at least
for a while.


Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>

---
 security/Kconfig              |    1
 security/Makefile             |    2
 security/smack/Kconfig        |   10
 security/smack/Makefile       |    9
 security/smack/smack.h        |  232 ++
 security/smack/smack_access.c |  310 +++
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c    | 2618 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/smack/smackfs.c      | 1206 ++++++++++++++
 8 files changed, 4388 insertions(+)

Changes since the previous version:

- The model for storing Smack labels has been changed to help
  resolve some locking issues. Instead of allocating Smack labels
  as needed and then throwing them away they are allocated once
  and stored on a master list. The security blobs don't have their
  own copies, they point to elements in the list. Blob changes are
  atomic pointer assignments now.

- The optional CIPSO mapping table has been merged into the master
  label list. That required some locking work, too.

- The label list includes an entry for a secid in support of future
  audit integration.

- Added bunches of header comments.

- Fixed errors in key handling.

- A process can only change it's own smack label, it can not change
  the label of another process. Privilege is still required.

diff -uprN -X linux-2.6.22-base/Documentation/dontdiff linux-2.6.22-base/security/Kconfig linux-2.6.22-smack/security/Kconfig
--- linux-2.6.22-base/security/Kconfig	2007-07-08 16:32:17.000000000 -0700
+++ linux-2.6.22-smack/security/Kconfig	2007-08-22 02:18:55.000000000 -0700
@@ -94,6 +94,7 @@ config SECURITY_ROOTPLUG
 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
 
 source security/selinux/Kconfig
+source security/smack/Kconfig
 
 endmenu
 
diff -uprN -X linux-2.6.22-base/Documentation/dontdiff linux-2.6.22-base/security/Makefile linux-2.6.22-smack/security/Makefile
--- linux-2.6.22-base/security/Makefile	2007-07-08 16:32:17.000000000 -0700
+++ linux-2.6.22-smack/security/Makefile	2007-08-22 02:18:55.000000000 -0700
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_KEYS)			+= keys/
 subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)	+= selinux
+subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)		+= smack
 
 # if we don't select a security model, use the default capabilities
 ifneq ($(CONFIG_SECURITY),y)
@@ -14,5 +15,6 @@ endif
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY)			+= security.o dummy.o inode.o
 # Must precede capability.o in order to stack properly.
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)		+= selinux/built-in.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)		+= commoncap.o smack/built-in.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES)	+= commoncap.o capability.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_ROOTPLUG)		+= commoncap.o root_plug.o
diff -uprN -X linux-2.6.22-base/Documentation/dontdiff linux-2.6.22-base/security/smack/Kconfig linux-2.6.22-smack/security/smack/Kconfig
--- linux-2.6.22-base/security/smack/Kconfig	1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
+++ linux-2.6.22-smack/security/smack/Kconfig	2007-08-22 02:18:55.000000000 -0700
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+config SECURITY_SMACK
+	bool "Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Support"
+	depends on NETLABEL && SECURITY_NETWORK
+	default n
+	help
+	  This selects the Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel.
+	  Smack is useful for sensitivity, integrity, and a variety
+	  of other mandatory security schemes.
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
diff -uprN -X linux-2.6.22-base/Documentation/dontdiff linux-2.6.22-base/security/smack/Makefile linux-2.6.22-smack/security/smack/Makefile
--- linux-2.6.22-base/security/smack/Makefile	1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
+++ linux-2.6.22-smack/security/smack/Makefile	2007-08-22 02:23:32.000000000 -0700
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+#
+# Makefile for the SMACK LSM
+#
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) := smack.o
+
+smack-y := smack_lsm.o smack_access.o smackfs.o
+
+EXTRA_CFLAGS += -Inet/netlabel
diff -uprN -X linux-2.6.22-base/Documentation/dontdiff linux-2.6.22-base/security/smack/smack_access.c linux-2.6.22-smack/security/smack/smack_access.c
--- linux-2.6.22-base/security/smack/smack_access.c	1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
+++ linux-2.6.22-smack/security/smack/smack_access.c	2007-08-24 15:12:58.000000000 -0700
@@ -0,0 +1,310 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2007 Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
+ *
+ *      This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *      it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *      the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
+ *
+ * Author:
+ *      Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include "smack.h"
+
+extern struct smk_list_entry *smack_list;
+
+/**
+ * smk_access - determine if a subject has a specific access to an object
+ * @subject_label: a pointer to the subject's Smack label
+ * @object_label: a pointer to the object's Smack label
+ * @request: the access requested, in "MAY" format
+ *
+ * This function looks up the subject/object pair in the
+ * access rule list and returns 0 if the access is permitted,
+ * non zero otherwise.
+ *
+ * Even though Smack labels are usually shared on smack_list
+ * labels that come in off the network can't be imported
+ * and added to the list for locking reasons.
+ *
+ * Therefore, it is necessary to check the contents of the labels,
+ * not just the pointer values. Of course, in most cases the labels
+ * will be on the list, so checking the pointers may be a worthwhile
+ * optimization.
+ */
+int smk_access(smack_t *subject_label, smack_t *object_label, int request)
+{
+	u32 may = MAY_NOT;
+	struct smk_list_entry *sp;
+
+	/*
+	 * Hardcoded comparisons.
+	 *
+	 * A star subject can't access any object.
+	 */
+	if (*subject_label == SMK_STAR)
+		return -EACCES;
+	/*
+	 * A star object can be accessed by any subject.
+	 */
+	if (*object_label == SMK_STAR)
+		return 0;
+	/*
+	 * An object can be accessed in any way by a subject
+	 * with the same label.
+	 */
+	if (*subject_label == *object_label)
+		return 0;
+	/*
+	 * A hat subject can read any object.
+	 * A floor object can be read by any subject.
+	 */
+	if (*subject_label == SMK_HAT && (request & MAY_ANYREAD) == request)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (*object_label == SMK_FLOOR && (request & MAY_ANYREAD) == request)
+		return 0;
+	/*
+	 * Beyond here an explicit relationship is required.
+	 * If the requested access is contained in the available
+	 * access (e.g. read is included in readwrite) it's
+	 * good.
+	 */
+	for (sp = smack_list; sp != NULL; sp = sp->smk_next) {
+		if (*sp->smk_rule.smk_subject == *subject_label &&
+		    *sp->smk_rule.smk_object == *object_label) {
+			may = sp->smk_rule.smk_access;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Yes, that is supposed to be a single ampersand.
+	 */
+	if ((request & may) == request)
+		return 0;
+
+	return -EACCES;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_curacc - determine if current has a specific access to an object
+ * @object_label: a pointer to the object's Smack label
+ * @request: the access requested, in "MAY" format
+ *
+ * This function checks the current subject label/object label pair
+ * in the access rule list and returns 0 if the access is permitted,
+ * non zero otherwise. It allows that current my have the capability
+ * to override the rules.
+ */
+int smk_curacc(smack_t *obj_label, u32 mode)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = smk_access(current->security, obj_label, mode);
+	if (rc == 0)
+		return 0;
+	
+	if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+		return 0;
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+struct smack_known smack_known_unset = {
+	.smk_next	= NULL,
+	.smk_known	= SMK_UNSET,
+	.smk_secid	= 1,
+	.smk_cipso	= NULL,
+};
+
+struct smack_known smack_known_huh = {
+	.smk_next	= &smack_known_unset,
+	.smk_known	= SMK_HUH,
+	.smk_secid	= 2,
+	.smk_cipso	= NULL,
+};
+
+struct smack_known smack_known_hat = {
+	.smk_next	= &smack_known_huh,
+	.smk_known	= SMK_HAT,
+	.smk_secid	= 3,
+	.smk_cipso	= NULL,
+};
+
+struct smack_known smack_known_star = {
+	.smk_next	= &smack_known_hat,
+	.smk_known	= SMK_STAR,
+	.smk_secid	= 4,
+	.smk_cipso	= NULL,
+};
+
+struct smack_known smack_known_floor = {
+	.smk_next	= &smack_known_star,
+	.smk_known	= SMK_FLOOR,
+	.smk_secid	= 5,
+	.smk_cipso	= NULL,
+};
+
+struct smack_known smack_known_invalid = {
+	.smk_next	= &smack_known_floor,
+	.smk_known	= SMK_INVALID,
+	.smk_secid	= 6,
+	.smk_cipso	= NULL,
+};
+
+struct smack_known *smack_known = &smack_known_invalid;
+/*
+ * The initial value needs to be bigger than any of the
+ * known values above.
+ */
+static u32 smack_next_secid = 10;
+
+extern struct mutex smack_known_lock;
+
+/**
+ * smk_import - determine if current has a specific access to an object
+ * @string: a text string that might be a Smack label
+ * @len: the maximum size, or zero if it is NULL terminated.
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the label in the label list that
+ * matches the passed string, adding it if necessary. If
+ * the string passed in is invalid return a pointer to the
+ * invalid label from the table.
+ */
+smack_t *smk_import(const char *string, int len)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	smack_t smack;
+	char *to = (char *)&smack;
+	int found;
+	int i;
+
+	if (len <= 0 || len > sizeof(smack_t))
+		len = sizeof(smack_t);
+
+	for (i = 0, found = 0; i < sizeof(smack_t); i++) {
+		if (found)
+			to[i] = '\0';
+		else if (i >= len || string[i] > '~' || string[i] <= ' ') {
+			to[i] = '\0';
+			found = 1;
+		}
+		else
+			to[i] = string[i];
+	}
+
+	if (to[0] == '\0')
+		return &smack_known_invalid.smk_known;
+
+	mutex_lock(&smack_known_lock);
+
+	for (skp = smack_known; skp != NULL; skp = skp->smk_next)
+		if (skp->smk_known == smack)
+			break;
+
+	if (skp == NULL) {
+		skp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_known), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (skp == NULL)
+			skp = &smack_known_invalid;
+		else {
+			skp->smk_next = smack_known;
+			skp->smk_known = smack;
+			skp->smk_secid = smack_next_secid++;
+			skp->smk_cipso = NULL;
+			spin_lock_init(&skp->smk_cipsolock);
+			smack_known = skp;
+		}
+	}
+
+	mutex_unlock(&smack_known_lock);
+
+	return &skp->smk_known;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_from_secid - find the Smack label associated with a secid
+ * @secid: an integer that might be associated with a Smack label
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the appropraite Smack label if there is one,
+ * otherwise a pointer to the invalid Smack label.
+ */
+smack_t *smack_from_secid(const u32 secid)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+
+	for (skp = smack_known; skp != NULL; skp = skp->smk_next)
+		if (skp->smk_secid == secid)
+			return &skp->smk_known;
+
+	/*
+	 * If we got this far someone asked for the translation
+	 * of a secid that is not on the list.
+	 */
+	return &smack_known_invalid.smk_known;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_from_cipso - find the Smack label associated with a CIPSO option
+ * @level: Bell & LaPadula level from the network
+ * @catset: Bell & LaPadula categories from the network
+ * @result: where to put the Smack value
+ *
+ * This is a simple lookup in the label table.
+ *
+ * This is an odd duck as far as smack handling goes in that
+ * it sends back a copy of the smack label rather than a pointer
+ * to the master list. This is done because it is possible for
+ * a foreign host to send a smack label that is new to this
+ * machine and hence not on the list. That would not be an
+ * issue except that adding an entry to the master list can't
+ * be done at that point.
+ */
+void smack_from_cipso(u32 level, smack_t *catset, smack_t *result)
+{
+	struct smack_known *kp;
+	smack_t *final = NULL;
+
+	for (kp = smack_known; final == NULL && kp != NULL; kp = kp->smk_next) {
+		if (kp->smk_cipso == NULL)
+			continue;
+
+		spin_lock_bh(&kp->smk_cipsolock);
+
+		if (kp->smk_cipso->smk_level == level &&
+		    kp->smk_cipso->smk_catset == *catset)
+			final = &kp->smk_known;
+
+		spin_unlock_bh(&kp->smk_cipsolock);
+	}
+	if (final == NULL)
+		*result = smack_known_huh.smk_known;
+	else
+		*result = *final;
+	return;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_to_cipso - find the CIPSO option to go with a Smack label
+ * @smack: a pointer to the smack label in question
+ * @cp: where to put the result
+ *
+ * Returns zero if a value is available, non-zero otherwise.
+ */
+int smack_to_cipso(const smack_t *smack, struct smack_cipso *cp)
+{
+        struct smack_known *kp;
+
+	for (kp = smack_known; kp != NULL; kp = kp->smk_next)
+		if (kp->smk_known == *smack)
+			break;
+
+	if (kp == NULL || kp->smk_cipso == NULL)
+		return -ENOENT;
+	
+	*cp = *kp->smk_cipso;
+	return 0;
+}
diff -uprN -X linux-2.6.22-base/Documentation/dontdiff linux-2.6.22-base/security/smack/smackfs.c linux-2.6.22-smack/security/smack/smackfs.c
--- linux-2.6.22-base/security/smack/smackfs.c	1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
+++ linux-2.6.22-smack/security/smack/smackfs.c	2007-08-24 15:58:37.000000000 -0700
@@ -0,0 +1,1206 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2007 Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
+ *
+ *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *  	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *	the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
+ *
+ * Author:
+ * 	Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
+ * 
+ * Special thanks to the authors of selinuxfs.
+ * 
+ *	Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@xxxxxxxxxx>
+ *	James Morris <jmorris@xxxxxxxxxx>
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <net/netlabel.h>
+/*
+ * This include could get changed when the internal
+ * netlabel interface for initializing a netlabel domain
+ * has been worked out.
+ */
+#include "netlabel_domainhash.h"
+#include <net/cipso_ipv4.h>
+#include "smack.h"
+
+extern struct mutex smack_list_lock;
+extern struct smack_known smack_known_floor;
+extern struct smack_known smack_known_star;
+extern struct smack_known *smack_known;
+
+/*
+ * smackfs pseudo filesystem.
+ */
+
+enum smk_inos {
+	SMK_ROOT_INO	= 2,
+	SMK_LOAD	= 3,	/* load policy */
+	SMK_LINKS	= 4,	/* symlinks */
+	SMK_CIPSO	= 5,	/* load label -> CIPSO mapping */
+	SMK_DOI		= 6,	/* CIPSO DOI */
+	SMK_DIRECT	= 7,	/* CIPSO level indicating direct label */
+	SMK_AMBIENT	= 8,	/* internet ambient label */
+	SMK_NLTYPE	= 9,	/* label scheme to use by default */
+	SMK_TMP		= 100,	/* MUST BE LAST! /smack/tmp */
+};
+
+/*
+ * This is the "ambient" label for network traffic.
+ * If it isn't somehow marked, use this.
+ * It can be reset via smackfs/ambient
+ */
+smack_t *smack_net_ambient = &smack_known_floor.smk_known;
+
+/*
+ * This is the default packet marking scheme for network traffic.
+ * It can be reset via smackfs/nltype
+ */
+int smack_net_nltype = NETLBL_NLTYPE_CIPSOV4;
+
+/*
+ * This is the level in a CIPSO header that indicates a
+ * smack label is contained directly in the category set.
+ * It can be reset via smackfs/direct
+ */
+int smack_cipso_direct = SMACK_CIPSO_DIRECT_DEFAULT;
+
+static int smk_cipso_doi_value = SMACK_CIPSO_DOI_DEFAULT;
+static int smack_list_count;
+struct smk_list_entry *smack_list;
+
+/*
+ * 'ssssssss oooooooo mmmm\n\0' 
+ */
+#define SMACK_RULE_LINE_SIZE (2 * (sizeof(smack_t) + 1) + 6)
+
+/**
+ * smk_read_load - read() for /smack/load
+ * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to put the result
+ * @count: maximum to send along
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_read_load(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+			     size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	ssize_t bytes;
+	struct smk_list_entry *slp = smack_list;
+	struct smack_rule *srp;
+	char *result;
+	char *cp;
+	int realbytes = 0;
+	
+	bytes = SMACK_RULE_LINE_SIZE * smack_list_count;
+	if (bytes == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	result = kzalloc(bytes, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (result == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	for (cp = result; slp != NULL; slp = slp->smk_next) {
+		srp = &slp->smk_rule;
+		sprintf(cp, "%-8s %-8s",
+			(char *)srp->smk_subject, (char *)srp->smk_object);
+		cp += strlen(cp);
+		if (srp->smk_access != 0) 
+			*cp++ = ' ';
+		if ((srp->smk_access & MAY_READ) != 0)
+			*cp++ = 'r';
+		if ((srp->smk_access & MAY_WRITE) != 0)
+			*cp++ = 'w';
+		if ((srp->smk_access & MAY_EXEC) != 0)
+			*cp++ = 'x';
+		if ((srp->smk_access & MAY_APPEND) != 0)
+			*cp++ = 'a';
+		*cp++ = '\n';
+	}
+	*cp++ = '\0';
+	realbytes = strlen(result);
+
+	bytes = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, result, realbytes);
+	
+	kfree(result);
+
+	return bytes;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_set_access - add a rule to the rule list
+ * @srp: the new rule to add
+ *
+ * Looks through the current subject/object/access list for
+ * the subject/object pair and replaces the access that was
+ * there. If the pair isn't found add it with the specified
+ * access.
+ */
+static void smk_set_access(struct smack_rule *srp)
+{
+	struct smk_list_entry *sp;
+	struct smk_list_entry *newp;
+
+	mutex_lock(&smack_list_lock);
+
+	for (sp = smack_list; sp != NULL; sp = sp->smk_next)
+		if (sp->smk_rule.smk_subject == srp->smk_subject &&
+		    sp->smk_rule.smk_object == srp->smk_object) {
+			sp->smk_rule.smk_access = srp->smk_access;
+			break;
+		}
+
+	if (sp == NULL) {
+		newp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smk_list_entry), GFP_KERNEL);
+		newp->smk_rule = *srp;
+		newp->smk_next = smack_list;
+		smack_list = newp;
+		smack_list_count++;
+	}
+
+	mutex_unlock(&smack_list_lock);
+
+	return;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_load - write() for /smack/load
+ * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+			      size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct smack_rule rule;
+	ssize_t rc = count;
+	char *data = NULL;
+	char subjectstr[sizeof(smack_t)];
+	char objectstr[sizeof(smack_t)];
+	char modestr[8];
+	char *cp;
+
+
+	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+		return -EPERM;
+	/*
+	 * No partial writes.
+	 */
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/*
+	 * 80 characters per line ought to be enough.
+	 */
+	if (count > SMACK_LIST_MAX * 80)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	data = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (data == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) {
+		kfree(data);
+		return -EFAULT;
+	}
+
+	*(data + count) = '\0';
+
+	for (cp = data - 1; cp != NULL; cp = strchr(cp + 1, '\n')) {
+		if (*++cp == '\0')
+			break;
+		if (sscanf(cp, "%7s %7s %7s\n", subjectstr, objectstr,
+			   modestr) != 3) {
+			printk("%s:%d bad scan\n", __func__, __LINE__);
+			break;
+		}
+		rule.smk_subject = smk_import(subjectstr, 0);
+		if (*rule.smk_subject == SMK_INVALID)
+			break;
+		rule.smk_object = smk_import(objectstr, 0);
+		if (*rule.smk_object == SMK_INVALID)
+			break;
+		rule.smk_access = 0;
+		if (strpbrk(modestr, "rR") != NULL)
+			rule.smk_access |= MAY_READ;
+		if (strpbrk(modestr, "wW") != NULL)
+			rule.smk_access |= MAY_WRITE;
+		if (strpbrk(modestr, "xX") != NULL)
+			rule.smk_access |= MAY_EXEC;
+		if (strpbrk(modestr, "aA") != NULL)
+			rule.smk_access |= MAY_APPEND;
+		smk_set_access(&rule);
+		printk("%s:%d rule %s %s 0x%x\n", __func__, __LINE__,
+			(char *)rule.smk_subject, (char *)rule.smk_object,
+			rule.smk_access);
+	}
+
+	kfree(data);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_load_ops = {
+	.read		= smk_read_load,
+	.write		= smk_write_load,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_digit - return a pointer to the next digit
+ * @cp: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the next digit in the string, or NULL
+ */
+static inline char *smk_digit(const char *cp)
+{
+	return strpbrk(cp, "0123456789");
+}
+
+static unsigned int smk_cipso_doied;
+static unsigned int smk_cipso_written;
+
+/**
+ * smk_cipso_doi - initialize the CIPSO domain
+ *
+ * This code reaches too deeply into netlabel internals
+ * for comfort, however there is no netlabel KAPI that
+ * allows for kernel based initialization of a CIPSO DOI.
+ * Until Paul and Casey can work out an appropriate
+ * interface Smack will do it this way.
+ */
+static void smk_cipso_doi(void)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct cipso_v4_doi *doip;
+	struct netlbl_dom_map *ndmp;
+	struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
+
+	if (smk_cipso_doied != 0)
+		return;
+	smk_cipso_doied = 1;
+
+	doip = kmalloc(sizeof(struct cipso_v4_doi), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (doip == NULL)
+		panic("smack:  Failed to initialize cipso DOI.\n");
+	doip->map.std = NULL;
+
+	ndmp = kmalloc(sizeof(struct netlbl_dom_map), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (ndmp == NULL)
+		panic("smack:  Failed to initialize cipso ndmp.\n");
+
+	doip->doi = smk_cipso_doi_value;
+	doip->type = CIPSO_V4_MAP_PASS;
+	doip->tags[0] = CIPSO_V4_TAG_RBITMAP;
+	for (rc = 1; rc < CIPSO_V4_TAG_MAXCNT; rc++)
+		doip->tags[rc] = CIPSO_V4_TAG_INVALID;
+
+	rc = cipso_v4_doi_add(doip);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		printk("%s:%d add doi rc = %d\n", __func__, __LINE__, rc);
+
+	ndmp->domain = NULL;
+	ndmp->type = NETLBL_NLTYPE_CIPSOV4;
+	ndmp->type_def.cipsov4 = doip;
+
+	rc = netlbl_domhsh_remove_default(&audit_info);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		printk("%s:%d remove rc = %d\n", __func__, __LINE__, rc);
+
+	rc = netlbl_domhsh_add_default(ndmp, &audit_info);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		printk("%s:%d add rc = %d\n", __func__, __LINE__, rc);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_read_cipso - read() for /smack/cipso
+ * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to put the result
+ * @count: maximum to send along
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate
+ *
+ * label level[/cat[,cat]]
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_read_cipso(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+			      size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	struct smack_cipso *scp;
+	ssize_t bytes;
+	char sep;
+	char *result;
+	char *cp;
+	char *cbp;
+	int realbytes = 0;
+	int cat = -1;
+	int i;
+	unsigned char m;
+
+	smk_cipso_doi();
+
+	result = kzalloc(smk_cipso_written, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (result == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	cp = result;
+
+	for (skp = smack_known; skp != NULL; skp = skp->smk_next) {
+		if (skp->smk_cipso == NULL)
+			continue;
+		scp = skp->smk_cipso;
+		cp += sprintf(cp, "%-8s %3d",
+			(char *)&skp->smk_known, scp->smk_level);
+		cat = 1;
+		sep = '/';
+		cbp = (char *)&scp->smk_catset;
+		for (i = 0; i < sizeof(scp->smk_catset); i++) {
+			for (m = 0x80; m != 0; m >>= 1) {
+				if ((m & cbp[i]) != 0) {
+					cp += sprintf(cp, "%c%d", sep, cat);
+					sep = ',';
+				}
+				cat++;
+			}
+		}
+		*cp++ = '\n';
+	}
+	*cp++ = '\0';
+	realbytes = strlen(result);
+
+	bytes = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, result, realbytes);
+	
+	kfree(result);
+
+	return bytes;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_cipso - write() for /smack/cipso
+ * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_cipso(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+			       size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	struct smack_cipso *scp;
+	smack_t *mapsmack;
+	smack_t mapcatset;
+	int maplevel;
+	ssize_t rc = count;
+	char *data = NULL;
+	char *cp;
+	char *eolp;
+	char *linep;
+	int cat;
+	int i;
+
+	smk_cipso_doi();
+
+	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+		return -EPERM;
+	/*
+	 * No partial writes.
+	 */
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	/*
+	 * 80 characters per line ought to be enough.
+	 */
+	if (count > SMACK_LIST_MAX * 80)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	data = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (data == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) {
+		kfree(data);
+		return -EFAULT;
+	}
+
+	*(data + count) = '\0';
+	smk_cipso_written += count;
+
+	for (eolp = strchr(data, '\n'), linep = data;
+		eolp != NULL && rc >= 0;
+		linep = eolp + 1, eolp = strchr(linep, '\n')) {
+
+		if (eolp == linep)
+			continue;
+		*eolp = '\0';
+
+		mapcatset = 0;
+		mapsmack = smk_import(linep, 0);
+		if (*mapsmack == SMK_INVALID)
+			continue;
+		skp = container_of(mapsmack, struct smack_known, smk_known);
+
+		cp = smk_digit(linep + strlen((char *)mapsmack));
+		if (cp == NULL)
+			continue;
+
+		i = sscanf(cp, "%d", &maplevel);
+		if (i != 1)
+			continue;
+
+		cp = strchr(cp, '/');
+		if (cp != NULL) {
+			cp = smk_digit(cp);
+			if (cp == NULL)
+				continue;
+
+			do {
+				i = sscanf(cp, "%d", &cat);
+				if (i != 1)
+					break;
+				if (cat > SMACK_CIPSO_MAXCAT) {
+					i = 0;
+					break;
+				}
+				smack_catset_bit(cat, &mapcatset);
+
+				cp = strchr(cp, ',');
+				if (cp != NULL)
+					cp = smk_digit(cp);
+			} while (cp != NULL);
+		}
+
+		if (i != 1)
+			continue;
+
+
+		if (skp->smk_cipso == NULL) {
+			scp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_cipso), GFP_KERNEL);
+			if (scp == NULL) {
+				rc = -ENOMEM;
+				break;
+			}
+		} else
+			scp = NULL;
+
+		spin_lock_bh(&skp->smk_cipsolock);
+		if (skp->smk_cipso == NULL) {
+			skp->smk_cipso = scp;
+			scp = NULL;
+		}
+		skp->smk_cipso->smk_level = maplevel;
+		skp->smk_cipso->smk_catset = mapcatset;
+		spin_unlock_bh(&skp->smk_cipsolock);
+
+		/*
+		 * The only way this could be true is for there
+		 * to have been two attempts to update the cipso
+		 * list at the same time. One of the two will have
+		 * won cleanly, but there remains cleanup to do.
+		 */
+		if (scp != NULL) {
+			printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: CIPSO collision for \"%s\"\n",
+				__func__, (char *)&skp->smk_known);
+			kfree(scp);
+		}
+		/*
+		 * Add this to ensure that there are
+		 * enough bytes for the regurgitation
+		 */
+		smk_cipso_written += sizeof(smack_t);
+	}
+
+	kfree(data);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_cipso_ops = {
+	.read		= smk_read_cipso,
+	.write		= smk_write_cipso,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_read_doi - read() for /smack/doi
+ * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to put the result
+ * @count: maximum to send along
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_read_doi(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+			        size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char temp[80];
+	ssize_t rc;
+
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	sprintf(temp, "%d", smk_cipso_doi_value);
+	rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, temp, strlen(temp));
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_doi - write() for /smack/doi
+ * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_doi(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+			         size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char temp[80];
+	int i;
+
+	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (count > sizeof(temp))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(temp, buf, count) != 0)
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	if (sscanf(temp, "%d", &i) != 1)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	smk_cipso_doi_value = i;
+
+	return count;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_doi_ops = {
+	.read		= smk_read_doi,
+	.write		= smk_write_doi,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_read_direct - read() for /smack/direct
+ * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to put the result
+ * @count: maximum to send along
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_read_direct(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+			        size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char temp[80];
+	ssize_t rc;
+
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	sprintf(temp, "%d", smack_cipso_direct);
+	rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, temp, strlen(temp));
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_direct - write() for /smack/direct
+ * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_direct(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+			         size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char temp[80];
+	int i;
+
+	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (count > sizeof(temp))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(temp, buf, count) != 0)
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	if (sscanf(temp, "%d", &i) != 1)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	smack_cipso_direct = i;
+
+	return count;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_direct_ops = {
+	.read		= smk_read_direct,
+	.write		= smk_write_direct,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_read_ambient - read() for /smack/ambient
+ * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to put the result
+ * @count: maximum to send along
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_read_ambient(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+			        size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	ssize_t rc;
+
+	if (count < sizeof(smack_t))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, smack_net_ambient,
+		strlen((char *)smack_net_ambient) + 1);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_ambient - write() for /smack/ambient
+ * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_ambient(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+			         size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char in[sizeof(smack_t)];
+	smack_t *smack;
+
+	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (count >= sizeof(smack_t))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(in, buf, count) != 0)
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	smack = smk_import(in, count);
+	if (*smack == SMK_INVALID)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	/*
+	 * Better check to be sure this is OK.
+	 */
+	smack_net_ambient = smack;
+
+	return count;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_ambient_ops = {
+	.read		= smk_read_ambient,
+	.write		= smk_write_ambient,
+};
+
+struct option_names {
+	int	o_number;
+	char	*o_name;
+	char	*o_alias;
+};
+
+static struct option_names netlbl_choices[] = {
+	{ NETLBL_NLTYPE_RIPSO,
+		NETLBL_NLTYPE_RIPSO_NAME,	"ripso" },
+	{ NETLBL_NLTYPE_CIPSOV4,
+		NETLBL_NLTYPE_CIPSOV4_NAME,	"cipsov4" },
+	{ NETLBL_NLTYPE_CIPSOV4,
+		NETLBL_NLTYPE_CIPSOV4_NAME,	"cipso" },
+	{ NETLBL_NLTYPE_CIPSOV6,
+		NETLBL_NLTYPE_CIPSOV6_NAME,	"cipsov6" },
+	{ NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED,
+		NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED_NAME,	"unlabeled" },
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_read_nltype - read() for /smack/nltype
+ * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to put the result
+ * @count: maximum to send along
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_read_nltype(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+			       size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char bound[40];
+	ssize_t rc;
+	int i;
+
+	if (count < sizeof(smack_t))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	sprintf(bound, "unknown");
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(netlbl_choices); i++)
+		if (smack_net_nltype == netlbl_choices[i].o_number) {
+			sprintf(bound, "%s", netlbl_choices[i].o_name);
+			break;
+		}
+
+	rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, bound, strlen(bound));
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_nltype - write() for /smack/nltype
+ * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_nltype(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+			        size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char bound[40];
+	char *cp;
+	int i;
+
+	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (count >= 40)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(bound, buf, count) != 0)
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	bound[count] = '\0';
+	cp = strchr(bound, ' ');
+	if (cp != NULL)
+		*cp = '\0';
+	cp = strchr(bound, '\n');
+	if (cp != NULL)
+		*cp = '\0';
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(netlbl_choices); i++)
+		if (strcmp(bound, netlbl_choices[i].o_name) == 0 ||
+		    strcmp(bound, netlbl_choices[i].o_alias) == 0) {
+			smack_net_nltype = netlbl_choices[i].o_number;
+			return count;
+		}
+	/*
+	 * Not a valid choice.
+	 */
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_nltype_ops = {
+	.read		= smk_read_nltype,
+	.write		= smk_write_nltype,
+};
+
+/*
+ * mapping for symlinks
+ */
+#define SMK_TMPPATH_SIZE        32
+#define SMK_TMPPATH_ROOT        "/moldy/"
+
+struct smk_link {
+	struct smk_link	*sl_next;
+	int		sl_inum;
+	char		sl_name[SMK_TMPPATH_SIZE];
+	char		sl_target[SMK_TMPPATH_SIZE];
+};
+
+static struct super_block *smk_sb = NULL;
+static struct smk_link *smk_links = NULL;
+static int smk_links_count = 0;
+
+/**
+ * smackfs_follow_link - follow a smackfs symlink
+ * @dentry: name cache entry
+ * @nd: name entry
+ *
+ * A symlink on smackfs has unusual semantics.
+ *
+ * The Smack value of the task is appended to the link string.
+ * Thus, if a task labeled "Gentoo" does chdir("/smack/tmp")
+ * it will use "/moldy/Gentoo".
+ *
+ * The expected usage is the /tmp is a symlink to /smack/tmp
+ * which is itself a symlink to /moldy. /moldy should have a
+ * directory for each label in use to accomodate the value
+ * appended on the redirection.
+ *
+ * An interesting addition would be a file system that automatically
+ * creates directories as needed, at the appropriate label.
+ */
+static void *smackfs_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd)
+{
+	smack_t *sp = current->security;
+	char *cp;
+	int inum = dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
+	struct smk_link *slp;
+
+	for (slp = smk_links; slp != NULL; slp = slp->sl_next)
+		if (slp->sl_inum == inum)
+			break;
+
+	if (slp == NULL) {
+		printk("%s:%d failed\n", __func__, __LINE__);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	cp = kzalloc(SMK_TMPPATH_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (cp == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+
+	strcpy(cp, slp->sl_target);
+	strcat(cp, (char *)sp);
+	nd_set_link(nd, cp);
+	/*
+	 * Unlike the readlink below, hang on to the memory allocated
+	 * because nd_set_link passes it along.
+	 */
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smackfs_readlink - read a smackfs symlink
+ * @dentry: name cache entry
+ * @buffer: where the result goes
+ * @buflen: buffer size
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, an error code otherwise
+ *
+ * Supports the same semantics as the follow code.
+ */
+static int smackfs_readlink(struct dentry *dentry, char __user *buffer, int buflen)
+{
+	smack_t *csp = current->security;
+	char *cp;
+	int len;
+	int inum = dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
+	struct smk_link *slp;
+
+	for (slp = smk_links; slp != NULL; slp = slp->sl_next)
+		if (slp->sl_inum == inum)
+			break;
+
+	if (slp == NULL) {
+		printk("%s:%d failed\n", __func__, __LINE__);
+		return -EACCES;
+	}
+
+	cp = kzalloc(SMK_TMPPATH_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (cp == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	strcpy(cp, slp->sl_target);
+	strcat(cp, (char *)csp);
+	len = strlen(cp);
+	len = (len > buflen) ? buflen : len;
+
+	if (copy_to_user(buffer, cp, len) != 0)
+		len = -EFAULT;
+
+	kfree(cp);
+	return len;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smackfs_follow_link - follow a smackfs symlink
+ * @dentry: unused
+ * @nd: name entry
+ * @ptr: unused
+ *
+ * free the buffer used in following the link.
+ */
+static void smackfs_put_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd, void *ptr)
+{
+	kfree(nd_get_link(nd));
+}
+
+static struct inode_operations smackfs_symlink_inode_operations = {
+	.readlink	= smackfs_readlink,
+	.follow_link	= smackfs_follow_link,
+	.put_link	= smackfs_put_link,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_add_symlink - follow a smackfs symlink
+ * @name: the name of the synlink
+ * @target: where it points to
+ *
+ * Add a smackfs symlink
+ */
+static void smk_add_symlink(char *name, char *target)
+{
+	static int inum = SMK_TMP;
+	struct inode *inode;
+	struct dentry *dentry;
+	struct smk_link *slp;
+
+	for (slp = smk_links; slp != NULL; slp = slp->sl_next) {
+		if (strcmp(slp->sl_name, name) != 0)
+			continue;
+		strcpy(slp->sl_target, target);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	slp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smk_link), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (slp == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	dentry = d_alloc_name(smk_sb->s_root, name);
+	if (dentry == NULL) {
+		printk("%s:%d link dentry failed\n", __func__, __LINE__);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	inode = new_inode(smk_sb);
+	if (inode == NULL) {
+		printk("%s:%d link inode failed\n", __func__, __LINE__);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	inode->i_mode = S_IFLNK | S_IRWXUGO;
+	inode->i_uid = 0;
+	inode->i_gid = 0;
+	inode->i_blocks = 0;
+	inode->i_atime = CURRENT_TIME;
+	inode->i_mtime = inode->i_atime;
+	inode->i_ctime = inode->i_atime;
+	inode->i_ino = inum++;
+	inode->i_op = &smackfs_symlink_inode_operations;
+	d_add(dentry, inode);
+
+	strcpy(slp->sl_name, name);
+	strcpy(slp->sl_target, target);
+	slp->sl_inum = inode->i_ino;
+	slp->sl_next = smk_links;
+	smk_links = slp;
+	smk_links_count++;
+
+	return;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_read_links - read() for /smack/links
+ * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to put the result
+ * @count: maximum to send along
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_read_links(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+			     size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	ssize_t bytes = sizeof(struct smk_link) * smk_links_count;
+	struct smk_link *slp;
+	char *result;
+	char *cp;
+	
+
+	result = kzalloc(bytes, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (result == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	*result = '\0';
+
+	for (slp = smk_links, cp = result; slp != NULL; slp = slp->sl_next)
+		cp += sprintf(cp, "%s %s\n", slp->sl_name, slp->sl_target);
+
+	bytes = simple_read_from_buffer(buf,count,ppos,result,strlen(result));
+	
+	kfree(result);
+
+	return bytes;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_links - write() for /smack/links
+ * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ *
+ * This might be better done using "real" symlink creation.
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_links(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+			      size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	ssize_t rc = count;
+	char *data;
+	char *cp;
+	char name[SMK_TMPPATH_SIZE];
+	char target[SMK_TMPPATH_SIZE];
+
+	/*
+	 * No partial writes.
+	 */
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	/*
+	 * 80 characters per line ought to be enough.
+	 */
+	if (count > SMACK_LIST_MAX * 80)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	data = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (data == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) {
+		kfree(data);
+		return -EFAULT;
+	}
+
+	data[count] = '\0';
+
+	for (cp = data - 1; cp != NULL; cp = strchr(cp + 1, '\n')) {
+		if (*++cp == '\0')
+			break;
+		if (sscanf(cp, "%14s %30s\n", name, target) != 2) {
+			printk("%s:%d bad scan\n",
+				__func__, __LINE__);
+			break;
+		}
+		smk_add_symlink(name, target);
+		printk("%s:%d add %s -> %s\n",
+			__func__, __LINE__, name, target);
+	}
+
+	kfree(data);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_links_ops = {
+	.read		= smk_read_links,
+	.write		= smk_write_links,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_fill_super - fill the /smackfs superblock
+ * @sb: the empty superblock
+ * @data: unused
+ * @silent: unused
+ *
+ * Fill in the well known entries for /smack and set up for
+ * symlinks
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure
+ */
+static int smk_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void * data, int silent)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct inode *root_inode;
+
+	static struct tree_descr smack_files[] = {
+		[SMK_LOAD]	= {"load", &smk_load_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		[SMK_LINKS]	= {"links", &smk_links_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		[SMK_CIPSO]	= {"cipso", &smk_cipso_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		[SMK_DOI]	= {"doi", &smk_doi_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		[SMK_DIRECT]	= {"direct", &smk_direct_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		[SMK_AMBIENT]	= {"ambient", &smk_ambient_ops,S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		[SMK_NLTYPE]	= {"nltype", &smk_nltype_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		/* last one */ {""}
+	};
+
+	/*
+	 * There will be only one smackfs. Casey says so.
+	 */
+	smk_sb = sb;
+
+	rc = simple_fill_super(sb, SMACK_MAGIC, smack_files);
+	if (rc != 0) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "%s failed %d while creating inodes\n",
+			__func__, rc);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	root_inode = sb->s_root->d_inode;
+	root_inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(&smack_known_floor.smk_known);
+
+	/*
+	 * Create a directory for /smack/tmp
+	 */
+	smk_add_symlink("tmp", SMK_TMPPATH_ROOT);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_get_sb - get the smackfs superblock
+ * @fs_type: passed along without comment
+ * @flags: passed along without comment
+ * @dev_name: passed along without comment
+ * @data: passed along without comment
+ * @mnt: passed along without comment
+ *
+ * Just passes everything along.
+ *
+ * Returns what the lower level code does.
+ */
+static int smk_get_sb(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
+		      int flags, const char *dev_name, void *data,
+		      struct vfsmount *mnt)
+{
+	return get_sb_single(fs_type, flags, data, smk_fill_super, mnt);
+}
+
+static struct file_system_type smk_fs_type = {
+	.name		= "smackfs",
+	.get_sb		= smk_get_sb,
+	.kill_sb	= kill_litter_super,
+};
+
+static struct vfsmount *smackfs_mount;
+
+/**
+ * init_smk_fs - get the smackfs superblock
+ *
+ * register the smackfs
+ *
+ * Returns 0 unless the registration fails.
+ */
+static int __init init_smk_fs(void)
+{
+	int err;
+
+	err = register_filesystem(&smk_fs_type);
+	if (!err) {
+		smackfs_mount = kern_mount(&smk_fs_type);
+		if (IS_ERR(smackfs_mount)) {
+			printk(KERN_ERR "smackfs:  could not mount!\n");
+			err = PTR_ERR(smackfs_mount);
+			smackfs_mount = NULL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+__initcall(init_smk_fs);
diff -uprN -X linux-2.6.22-base/Documentation/dontdiff linux-2.6.22-base/security/smack/smack.h linux-2.6.22-smack/security/smack/smack.h
--- linux-2.6.22-base/security/smack/smack.h	1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
+++ linux-2.6.22-smack/security/smack/smack.h	2007-08-23 20:13:28.000000000 -0700
@@ -0,0 +1,232 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2007 Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
+ *
+ *      This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *      it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *      the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
+ *
+ * Author:
+ *      Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SECURITY_SMACK_H
+#define _SECURITY_SMACK_H
+
+#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <net/netlabel.h>
+
+/*
+ * A smack_t contains an 8 byte string, 7 characters
+ * and a terminating NULL. Yes, it's short and 12.5%
+ * wasted.
+ * 
+ * There is likely to be experimentation with alternative
+ * representations, perhaps a u32 so that it's the same
+ * as what's used in Other LSM MAC schemes, or an array
+ * of 20 chars so that the names aren't so tightly constrained.
+ */
+typedef u64 smack_t;
+
+struct superblock_smack {
+	smack_t *smk_root;
+	smack_t *smk_floor;
+	smack_t *smk_hat;
+	smack_t *smk_default;
+	int	smk_initialized;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Socket smack data
+ */
+struct socket_smack {
+	smack_t	*smk_out;	/* label to associate with outbound packets */
+	smack_t	*smk_in;	/* label to check on incoming packets */
+	smack_t smk_packet;	/* label of incoming packet on request */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Inode smack data
+ */
+struct inode_smack {
+	smack_t		*smk_inode;	/* label of the fso */
+	struct mutex	smk_lock;	/* initialization lock */
+	int		smk_flags;	/* smack inode flags */
+};
+
+#define	SMK_INODE_INSTANT	0x01	/* inode is instantiated */
+
+/*
+ * A label access rule.
+ */
+struct smack_rule {
+	smack_t		*smk_subject;
+	smack_t		*smk_object;
+	int		smk_access;
+};
+
+/*
+ * An entry in the table of permitted label accesses.
+ */
+struct smk_list_entry {
+	struct smk_list_entry	*smk_next;
+	struct smack_rule	smk_rule;
+};
+
+/*
+ * An entry in the table mapping smack values to
+ * CIPSO level/category-set values.
+ */
+struct smack_cipso {
+	int	smk_level;
+	smack_t	smk_catset;
+};
+
+/*
+ * This is the repository for labels seen so that it is
+ * not necessary to keep allocating tiny chuncks of memory
+ * and so that they can be shared.
+ *
+ * Labels are never modified in place. Anytime a label
+ * is imported (e.g. xattrset on a file) the list is checked
+ * for it and it is added if it doesn't exist. The address
+ * is passed out in either case. Entries are added, but
+ * never deleted.
+ *
+ * Since labels are hanging around anyway it doesn't
+ * hurt to maintain a secid for those awkward situations
+ * where kernel components that ought to use LSM independent
+ * interfaces don't. The secid should go away when all of
+ * these components have been repaired.
+ *
+ * If there is a cipso value associated with the label it
+ * gets stored here, too. This will most likely be rare as
+ * the cipso direct mapping in used internally.
+ */
+struct smack_known {
+	struct smack_known	*smk_next;
+	smack_t			smk_known;
+	u32			smk_secid;
+	struct smack_cipso	*smk_cipso;
+	spinlock_t		smk_cipsolock;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Mount options
+ */
+#define SMK_FSDEFAULT	"smackfsdef="
+#define SMK_FSFLOOR	"smackfsfloor="
+#define SMK_FSHAT	"smackfshat="
+#define SMK_FSROOT	"smackfsroot="
+
+/*
+ * xattr names
+ */
+#define XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX	"SMACK64"
+#define XATTR_SMACK_IPIN	"SMACK64IPIN"
+#define XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT	"SMACK64IPOUT"
+#define XATTR_SMACK_PACKET	"SMACK64PACKET"
+#define XATTR_NAME_SMACK	XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX
+
+/*
+ * smackfs macic number
+ */
+#define SMACK_MAGIC	0x43415d53 /* "SMAC" */
+
+/*
+ * A limit on the number of entries in the lists
+ * makes some of the list administration easier.
+ */
+#define SMACK_LIST_MAX	10000
+
+/*
+ * CIPSO defaults.
+ */
+#define SMACK_CIPSO_DOI_DEFAULT		3	/* Historical */
+#define SMACK_CIPSO_DIRECT_DEFAULT	250	/* Arbitrary */
+#define SMACK_CIPSO_MAXCAT		63	/* Bigger gets harder */
+
+/*
+ * Pre-defined smack label values.
+ */
+#define SMK_INVALID	0x00LL		/* NULLSTRING */
+#define SMK_HAT		0x5ELL		/* "^" */
+#define SMK_FLOOR	0x5FLL		/* "_" */
+#define SMK_STAR	0x2ALL		/* "*" */
+#define SMK_HUH		0x3FLL		/* "?" */
+#define SMK_UNSET	0x5445534e55LL	/* "UNSET" */
+/*
+ * There's a place in the CIPSO initialization that
+ * wants this.
+ */
+#define SMK32_FLOOR	0x5F /* "_" */
+
+#define SMK_MAXLEN	(sizeof(smack_t) - 1)	/* NULL terminated */
+/*
+ * Just to make the common cases easier to deal with
+ */
+#define MAY_ANY		(MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
+#define MAY_ANYREAD	(MAY_READ | MAY_EXEC)
+#define MAY_ANYWRITE	(MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND)
+#define MAY_READWRITE	(MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE)
+#define MAY_NOT		0
+
+/*
+ * There are not enough CAP bits available to make this
+ * real, so Casey borrowed the capability that looks to
+ * him like it has the best balance of similarity amd
+ * low use.
+ */
+#define CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE
+
+/*
+ * These functions are in smack_lsm.c
+ */
+struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(smack_t *);
+
+/*
+ * These functions are in smack_access.c
+ */
+int smk_access(smack_t *, smack_t *, int);
+int smk_curacc(smack_t *, u32);
+int smack_to_cipso(const smack_t *, struct smack_cipso *);
+void smack_from_cipso(u32, smack_t *, smack_t *);
+smack_t *smack_from_secid(const u32);
+smack_t *smk_import(const char *, int);
+
+/*
+ * Stricly for CIPSO level manipulation.
+ * Set the category bit number in a smack_t.
+ */
+static inline void smack_catset_bit(int cat, smack_t *catsetp)
+{
+        char *cp = (char *)catsetp;
+
+        if (cat > sizeof(smack_t) * 8)
+                return;
+
+        cp[(cat - 1) / 8] |= 0x80 >> ((cat - 1) % 8);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Present a pointer to the smack label in an inode blob.
+ */
+static inline smack_t *smk_of_inode(const struct inode *isp)
+{
+	struct inode_smack *sip = isp->i_security;
+	return sip->smk_inode;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Present the secid associated with a smack value.
+ */
+static inline u32 smack_to_secid(const smack_t *smack)
+{
+	struct smack_known *kp;
+
+	kp = container_of(smack, struct smack_known, smk_known);
+	return kp->smk_secid;
+}
+
+#endif  /* _SECURITY_SMACK_H */
diff -uprN -X linux-2.6.22-base/Documentation/dontdiff linux-2.6.22-base/security/smack/smack_lsm.c linux-2.6.22-smack/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
--- linux-2.6.22-base/security/smack/smack_lsm.c	1969-12-31 16:00:00.000000000 -0800
+++ linux-2.6.22-smack/security/smack/smack_lsm.c	2007-08-24 21:28:33.000000000 -0700
@@ -0,0 +1,2618 @@
+/*
+ *  Simplified MAC Kernel (smack) security module
+ *
+ *  This file contains the smack hook function implementations.
+ *
+ *  Author:
+ *	Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
+ *
+ *  Copyright (C) 2007 Casey Schaufler <casey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
+ *
+ *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
+ *      as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/stat.h>
+#include <linux/ext2_fs.h>
+#include <linux/kd.h>
+#include <asm/ioctls.h>
+#include <linux/tcp.h>
+#include <linux/udp.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <net/netlabel.h>
+#include <net/cipso_ipv4.h>
+
+#include "smack.h"
+
+/*
+ * I hope these are the hokeyist lines of code in the module. Casey.
+ */
+#define DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC	0x1cd1
+#define SOCKFS_MAGIC		0x534F434B
+#define PIPEFS_MAGIC		0x50495045
+#define TMPFS_MAGIC		0x01021994
+
+
+/*
+ * These are in smack_access.c
+ */
+extern struct smack_known smack_known_unset;
+extern struct smack_known smack_known_huh;
+extern struct smack_known smack_known_hat;
+extern struct smack_known smack_known_star;
+extern struct smack_known smack_known_floor;
+extern struct smack_known smack_known_invalid;
+
+/*
+ * These are maintained in smackfs.c
+ */
+extern smack_t *smack_net_ambient;
+extern int smack_net_nltype;
+extern int smack_cipso_direct;
+
+/**
+ * smk_fetch - Fetch the smack label from a file.
+ * @ip: a pointer to the inode
+ * @dp: a pointer to the dentry
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the master list entry for the Smack label
+ * or NULL if there was no label to fetch.
+ */
+static smack_t *smk_fetch(struct inode *ip, struct dentry *dp)
+{
+	int rc;
+	char in[sizeof(smack_t)];
+	smack_t *result;
+
+	if (ip->i_op->getxattr == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+
+	rc = ip->i_op->getxattr(dp, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, in, sizeof(smack_t));
+	if (rc < 0)
+		return NULL;
+
+	result = smk_import(in, rc);
+	if (*result == SMK_INVALID)
+		return NULL;
+
+	return result;
+}
+
+/**
+ * new_inode_smack - allocate an inode security blob
+ * @smack: a pointer to the Smack label to use in the blob
+ *
+ * Returns the new blob or NULL if there's no memory available
+ */
+struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(smack_t *smack)
+{
+	struct inode_smack *isp;
+
+	isp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct inode_smack), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (isp == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+
+	isp->smk_inode = smack;
+	isp->smk_flags = 0;
+	mutex_init(&isp->smk_lock);
+
+	return isp;
+}
+
+/*
+ * LSM hooks.
+ * We he, that is fun!
+ */
+
+/**
+ * smack_ptrace - Smack approval on ptrace
+ * @ptp: parent task pointer
+ * @ctp: child task pointer
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
+ *
+ * Do the capability checks, and require read and write.
+ */
+static int smack_ptrace(struct task_struct *ptp, struct task_struct *ctp)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = cap_ptrace(ptp, ctp);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = smk_access(ptp->security, ctp->security, MAY_READWRITE);
+	if (rc != 0 && __capable(ptp, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+		return 0;
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_syslog - Smack approval on syslog
+ * @type: message type
+ *
+ * Require that the task has the floor label
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, error code otherwise.
+ */
+static int smack_syslog(int type)
+{
+	int rc;
+	smack_t *sp = current->security;
+
+	rc = cap_syslog(type);
+	if (rc == 0)
+		 if (*sp != SMK_FLOOR)
+			rc = -EACCES;
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_alloc_security - "allocate" a task blob
+ * @tsk: the task in need of a blob
+ *
+ * Smack isn't using copies of blobs. Everyone
+ * points to an immutible list. No alloc required.
+ * No data copy required.
+ *
+ * Always returns 0
+ */
+static int smack_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+	tsk->security = current->security;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_free_security - "free" a task blob
+ * @task: the task with the blob
+ *
+ * Smack isn't using copies of blobs. Everyone
+ * points to an immutible list. The blobs never go away.
+ * There is no leak here.
+ */
+static void smack_task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	task->security = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_setpgid - Smack check on setting pgid
+ * @p: the task object
+ * @pgid: unused
+ *
+ * Return 0 if write access is permitted
+ */
+static int smack_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
+{
+	return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_setnice - Smack check on setting nice
+ * @p: the task object
+ * @nice: unused
+ *
+ * Return 0 if write access is permitted
+ */
+static int smack_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
+{
+	return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_setioprio - Smack check on setting ioprio
+ * @p: the task object
+ * @ioprio: unused
+ *
+ * Return 0 if write access is permitted
+ */
+static int smack_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
+{
+	return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_getioprio - Smack check on reading ioprio
+ * @p: the task object
+ *
+ * Return 0 if read access is permitted
+ */
+static int smack_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_READ);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_setscheduler - Smack check on setting scheduler
+ * @p: the task object
+ * @policy: unused
+ * @lp: unused
+ *
+ * Return 0 if read access is permitted
+ */
+static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy,
+				   struct sched_param *lp)
+{
+	return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_getscheduler - Smack check on reading scheduler
+ * @p: the task object
+ *
+ * Return 0 if read access is permitted
+ */
+static int smack_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_READ);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_movememory - Smack check on moving memory
+ * @p: the task object
+ *
+ * Return 0 if write access is permitted
+ */
+static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_kill - Samck check on signal delivery
+ * @p: the task object
+ * @info: unused
+ * @sig: unused
+ * @secid: identifies the smack to use in lieu of current's
+ *
+ * Return 0 if write access is permitted
+ *
+ * The secid behavior is an artifact of an SELinux hack
+ * in the USB code. Someday it may go away.
+ */
+static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
+			   int sig, u32 secid)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Sending a signal requires that the sender
+	 * can write the receiver.
+	 */
+	if (secid == 0)
+		return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+	/*
+	 * If the secid isn't 0 we're dealing with some USB IO
+	 * specific behavior. This is not clean. For one thing
+	 * we can't take privilege into account.
+	 */
+	return smk_access(smack_from_secid(secid), p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Superblock Hooks.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * smack_sb_alloc_security - allocate a superblock blob
+ * @sb: the superblock getting the blob
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
+ */
+static int smack_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
+
+	sbsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_smack), GFP_KERNEL);
+
+	if (sbsp == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	sbsp->smk_root = &smack_known_floor.smk_known;
+	sbsp->smk_default = &smack_known_floor.smk_known;
+	sbsp->smk_floor = &smack_known_floor.smk_known;
+	sbsp->smk_hat = &smack_known_hat.smk_known;
+	sbsp->smk_initialized = 0;
+
+	sb->s_security = sbsp;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sb_free_security - free a superblock blob
+ * @sb: the superblock getting the blob
+ *
+ */
+static void smack_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	kfree(sb->s_security);
+	sb->s_security = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sb_copy_data - copy mount options data for processing
+ * @type: file system type
+ * @orig: where to start
+ * @smackopts
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
+ *
+ * Copy the Smack specific mount options out of the mount
+ * options list.
+ */
+static int smack_sb_copy_data(struct file_system_type *type, void *orig,
+			      void *smackopts)
+{
+	char *cp, *commap, *otheropts, *dp;
+
+	/* Binary mount data: just copy */
+	if (type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) {
+		copy_page(smackopts, orig);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	otheropts = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (otheropts == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	for (cp = orig, commap = orig; commap != NULL; cp = commap + 1) {
+		if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSDEFAULT) == cp)
+			dp = smackopts;
+		else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSFLOOR) == cp)
+			dp = smackopts;
+		else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSHAT) == cp)
+			dp = smackopts;
+		else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSROOT) == cp)
+			dp = smackopts;
+		else
+			dp = otheropts;
+
+		commap = strchr(cp, ',');
+		if (commap != NULL)
+			*commap = '\0';
+
+		if (*dp != '\0')
+			strcat(dp, ",");
+		strcat(dp, cp);
+	}
+
+	strcpy(orig, otheropts);
+	free_page((unsigned long)otheropts);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sb_kern_mount - Smack specific mount processing
+ * @sb: the file system superblock
+ * @data: the smack mount options
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure
+ */
+static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
+	struct inode *inode = root->d_inode;
+	struct superblock_smack *sp = sb->s_security;
+	struct inode_smack *isp;
+	char *op;
+	char *commap;
+
+	if (sp == NULL) {
+		rc = smack_sb_alloc_security(sb);
+		if (rc != 0)
+			return rc;
+	}
+	if (sp->smk_initialized != 0)
+		return 0;
+	if (inode == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	sp->smk_initialized = 1;
+
+	for (op = data; op != NULL; op = commap) {
+		commap = strchr(op, ',');
+		if (commap != NULL)
+			*commap++ = '\0';
+
+		if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSHAT, strlen(SMK_FSHAT)) == 0) {
+			op += strlen(SMK_FSHAT);
+			if (strlen(op) <= SMK_MAXLEN)
+				sp->smk_hat = smk_import(op, 0);
+		} else if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSFLOOR, strlen(SMK_FSFLOOR)) == 0) {
+			op += strlen(SMK_FSFLOOR);
+			if (strlen(op) <= SMK_MAXLEN)
+				sp->smk_floor = smk_import(op, 0);
+		} else if (strncmp(op,SMK_FSDEFAULT,strlen(SMK_FSDEFAULT))==0) {
+			op += strlen(SMK_FSDEFAULT);
+			if (strlen(op) <= SMK_MAXLEN)
+				sp->smk_default = smk_import(op, 0);
+		} else if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSROOT, strlen(SMK_FSROOT)) == 0) {
+			op += strlen(SMK_FSROOT);
+			if (strlen(op) <= SMK_MAXLEN)
+				sp->smk_root = smk_import(op, 0);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Initialize the root inode.
+	 */
+	isp = inode->i_security;
+	if (isp == NULL)
+		inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(sp->smk_root);
+	else
+		isp->smk_inode = sp->smk_root;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sb_statfs - Smack check on statfs
+ * @dentry: identifies the file system in question
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current can read the floor of the filesystem,
+ * and error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	struct superblock_smack *sbp;
+
+	if (dentry == NULL || dentry->d_sb == NULL ||
+	    dentry->d_sb->s_security == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	sbp = dentry->d_sb->s_security;
+
+	return smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_READ);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sb_mount - Smack check for mounting
+ * @dev_name: unused
+ * @nd: mount point
+ * @type: unused
+ * @flags: unused
+ * @data: unused
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current can write the floor of the filesystem
+ * being mounted on, an error code otherwise.
+ */
+static int smack_sb_mount(char *dev_name, struct nameidata *nd,
+			  char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
+{
+	struct superblock_smack *sbp;
+
+	if (nd == NULL || nd->mnt == NULL || nd->mnt->mnt_sb == NULL ||
+	    nd->mnt->mnt_sb->s_security == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	sbp = nd->mnt->mnt_sb->s_security;
+
+	return smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_WRITE);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sb_umount - Smack check for unmounting
+ * @mnt: file system to unmount
+ * @flags: unused
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current can write the floor of the filesystem
+ * being unmounted, an error code otherwise.
+ */
+static int smack_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
+{
+	struct superblock_smack *sbp;
+
+	sbp = mnt->mnt_sb->s_security;
+
+	return smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_WRITE);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Inode hooks
+ */
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_alloc_security - allocate an inode blob
+ * @inode - the inode in need of a blob
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if it gets a blob, -ENOMEM otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(current->security);
+	if (inode->i_security == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_free_security - free an inode blob
+ * @inode - the inode with a blob
+ *
+ * Clears the blob pointer in inode
+ */
+static void smack_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	kfree(inode->i_security);
+	inode->i_security = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_init_security - copy out the smack from an inode
+ * @inode: the inode
+ * @dir: unused
+ * @name: where to put the attribute name
+ * @value: where to put the attribute value
+ * @len: where to put the length of the attribute
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if it all works out, -ENOMEM if there's no memory
+ */
+static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
+			             char **name, void **value, size_t *len)
+{
+	smack_t *isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
+
+	if (name) {
+		*name = kstrdup(XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (*name == NULL)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	if (value) {
+		*value = kstrdup((char *)isp, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (*value == NULL)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	if (len)
+		*len = strlen((char *)isp) + 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_link - Smack check on link
+ * @old_dentry: unused
+ * @dir: the directory with the entry to change
+ * @new_dentry: unused
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
+			    struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+	return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_symlink - Smack check on symlink
+ * @dir: the directory to add the entry to
+ * @dentry: unused
+ * @name: unused
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+			       const char *name)
+{
+	return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_mknod - Smack check on mknod
+ * @dir: the directory to add the entry to
+ * @dentry: unused
+ * @mode: unused
+ * @dev: unused
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+			     int mode, dev_t dev)
+{
+	return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_rename - Smack check on rename
+ * @old_inode: the old directory
+ * @old_dentry: unused
+ * @new_inode: the new directory
+ * @new_dentry: unused
+ *
+ * Read and write access is required on both the old and
+ * new directories.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode,
+			      struct dentry *old_dentry,
+			      struct inode *new_inode,
+			      struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(old_inode), MAY_READWRITE);
+	if (rc == 0)
+		rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(new_inode), MAY_READWRITE);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_readlink - Smack check on readlink
+ * @dentry: the symlink
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_READ);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_follow_link - Smack check on following a symlink
+ * @dentry: the symlink
+ * @nameidata: unused
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry,
+				   struct nameidata *nameidata)
+{
+	return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_READ);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_permission - Smack version of permission()
+ * @inode: the inode in question
+ * @mask: the access requested
+ * @nd: unused
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
+				  struct nameidata *nd)
+{
+	/*
+	 * No permission to check. Existence test. Yup, it's there.
+	 */
+	if (mask == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), mask);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_setattr - Smack check for setting attributes
+ * @dentry: the object
+ * @iattr: unused
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
+{
+	return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_getattr - Smack check for getting attributes
+ * @mnt: unused
+ * @dentry: the object
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_READ);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_setxattr - Smack check for setting xattrs
+ * @dentry: the object
+ * @name: passed to the cap call
+ * @value: passed to the cap call
+ * @size: passed to the cap call
+ * @flags: passed to the cap call
+ *
+ * Check with cap_inode_setxattr to see if the capability
+ * scheme approves, then check the Smack access
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name,
+			        void *value, size_t size, int flags)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 &&
+		!__capable(current, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
+	if (rc == 0)
+		rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_post_setxattr - Apply the Smack update approved above
+ * @dentry: object
+ * @name: attribute name
+ * @value: attribute value
+ * @size: attribute size
+ * @flags: unused
+ *
+ * Set the pointer in the inode blob to the entry found
+ * in the master label list.
+ */
+static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name,
+				      void *value, size_t size, int flags)
+{
+	struct inode_smack *isp;
+
+	/*
+	 * Not SMACK
+	 */
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK))
+		return;
+
+	if (size >= sizeof(smack_t))
+		return;
+
+	isp = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
+
+	/*
+	 * No locking is done here. This is a pointer
+	 * assignment.
+	 */
+	isp->smk_inode = smk_import(value, size);
+
+	return;
+}
+
+/*
+ * smack_inode_getxattr - Smack check on getxattr
+ * @dentry: the object
+ * @name: unused
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
+{
+	return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_READ);
+}
+
+/*
+ * smack_inode_listxattr - Smack check on listxattr
+ * @dentry: the object
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_READ);
+}
+
+/*
+ * smack_inode_removexattr - Smack check on removexattr
+ * @dentry: the object
+ * @name: name of the attribute
+ *
+ * Removing the Smack attribute requires CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 &&
+		!__capable(current, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
+	if (rc == 0)
+		rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_getsecurity - get smack xattrs
+ * @inode: the object
+ * @name: attribute name
+ * @buffer: where to put the result
+ * @size: size of the buffer
+ * @err: unused
+ *
+ * Returns the size of the attribute or an error code
+ */
+static int smack_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err)
+{
+	struct socket_smack *ssp;
+	struct socket *sock;
+	struct super_block *sbp;
+	struct inode *ip = (struct inode *)inode;
+	smack_t *bsp = buffer;
+	smack_t *isp;
+
+	if (size < sizeof(smack_t) || name == NULL || bsp == NULL ||
+	    inode == NULL || inode->i_security == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) {
+		isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
+		*bsp = *isp;
+		return strlen((char *)isp) + 1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets.
+	 */
+	sbp = ip->i_sb;
+	if (sbp->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	sock = SOCKET_I(ip);
+	if (sock == NULL)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_PACKET) == 0)
+		*bsp = ssp->smk_packet;
+	else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
+		*bsp = *ssp->smk_in;
+	else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0)
+		*bsp = *ssp->smk_out;
+	else
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	return strlen((char *)bsp) + 1;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_setsecurity - set smack xattrs
+ * @inode: the object
+ * @name: attribute name
+ * @value: attribute value
+ * @size: size of the attribute
+ * @flags: unused
+ *
+ * Sets the named attribute in the appropriate blob
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, or an error code
+ */
+static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
+				   const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
+{
+	smack_t *sp;
+	struct inode_smack *nsp = (struct inode_smack *)inode->i_security;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp;
+	struct socket *sock;
+
+	if (value == NULL || size > sizeof(smack_t))
+		return -EACCES;
+
+	sp = smk_import(value, size);
+	if (*sp == SMK_INVALID)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) {
+		mutex_lock(&nsp->smk_lock);
+		nsp->smk_inode = sp;
+		mutex_unlock(&nsp->smk_lock);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets.
+	 */
+	if (inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
+	if (sock == NULL)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_PACKET) == 0)
+		ssp->smk_packet = *sp;
+	else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
+		ssp->smk_in = sp;
+	else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0)
+		ssp->smk_out = sp;
+	else
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_listsecurity - list the Smack attributes
+ * @inode: the object
+ * @buffer: where they go
+ * @buffer_size: size of buffer
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -EINVAL otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
+				    size_t buffer_size)
+{
+	int len = strlen(XATTR_NAME_SMACK);
+
+	if (buffer != NULL && len <= buffer_size) {
+		memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, len);
+		return len;
+	}
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_d_instantiate - Make sure the blob is correct on an inode
+ * @opt_dentry: unused
+ * @inode: the object
+ *
+ * Set the inode's security blob if it hasn't been done already.
+ */
+static void smack_d_instantiate (struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct super_block *sbp;
+	struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
+	struct inode_smack *isp;
+	smack_t *csp = current->security;
+	smack_t *fetched;
+	smack_t *final;
+	struct dentry *dp;
+
+	if (inode == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	if (inode->i_security == NULL)
+		inode->i_security =
+			new_inode_smack(&smack_known_unset.smk_known);
+
+	isp = inode->i_security;
+
+	mutex_lock(&isp->smk_lock);
+	/*
+	 * If the inode is already instantiated
+	 * take the quick way out
+	 */
+	if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_INSTANT)
+		goto unlockandout;
+
+	sbp = inode->i_sb;
+	sbsp = sbp->s_security;
+	/*
+	 * We're going to use the superblock default label
+	 * if there's no label on the file.
+	 */
+	final = sbsp->smk_default;
+
+	/*
+	 * This is pretty hackish.
+	 * Casey says that we shouldn't have to do
+	 * file system specific code, but it does help
+	 * with keeping it simple.
+	 */
+	switch (sbp->s_magic) {
+	case SMACK_MAGIC:
+		/*
+		 * Casey says that it's a little embarassing
+		 * that the smack file system doesn't do
+		 * extended attributes.
+		 */
+		final = &smack_known_star.smk_known;
+		break;
+	case PIPEFS_MAGIC:
+		/*
+		 * Casey says pipes are easy (?)
+		 */
+		final = &smack_known_star.smk_known;
+		break;
+	case DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC:
+		/*
+		 * devpts seems content with the label of the task.
+		 * Programs that change smack have to treat the
+		 * pty with respect.
+		 */
+		final = csp;
+		break;
+	case SOCKFS_MAGIC:
+		/*
+		 * Casey says sockets get the smack of the task.
+		 */
+		final = csp;
+		break;
+	case PROC_SUPER_MAGIC:
+		/*
+		 * Casey says procfs appears not to care.
+		 * The superblock default suffices.
+		 */
+		break;
+	case TMPFS_MAGIC:
+		/*
+		 * Device labels should come from the filesystem,
+		 * but watch out, because they're volitile,
+		 * getting recreated on every reboot.
+		 */
+		final = &smack_known_star.smk_known;
+		/*
+		 * No break.
+		 *
+		 * If a smack value has been set we want to use it,
+		 * but since tmpfs isn't giving us the opportunity
+		 * to set mount options simulate setting the
+		 * superblock default.
+		 */
+	default:
+		/*
+		 * This isn't an understood special case.
+		 * Get the value from the xattr.
+		 *
+		 * No xattr support means, alas, no SMACK label.
+		 * Use the aforeapplied default.
+		 * It would be curious if the label of the task
+		 * does not match that assigned.
+		 */
+		if (inode->i_op->getxattr == NULL)
+			break;
+		/*
+		 * Get the dentry for xattr.
+		 */
+		if (opt_dentry == NULL) {
+			dp = d_find_alias(inode);
+			if (dp == NULL)
+				break;
+		} else {
+			dp = dget(opt_dentry);
+			if (dp == NULL)
+				break;
+		}
+
+		fetched = smk_fetch(inode, dp);
+		if (fetched != NULL)
+			final = fetched;
+		
+		dput(dp);
+		break;
+	}
+
+	if (final == NULL)
+		isp->smk_inode = csp;
+	else
+		isp->smk_inode = final;
+
+	isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
+
+unlockandout:
+	mutex_unlock(&isp->smk_lock);
+	return;
+}
+
+/*
+ * File Hooks
+ */
+
+/**
+ * smack_file_alloc_security - assign a file security blob
+ * @file: the object
+ *
+ * The security blob for a file is a pointer to the master
+ * label list, so no allocation is done.
+ *
+ * Returns 0
+ */
+static int smack_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
+{
+	file->f_security = current->security;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_file_free_security - clear a file security blob
+ * @file: the object
+ *
+ * The security blob for a file is a pointer to the master
+ * label list, so no memory is freed.
+ */
+static void smack_file_free_security(struct file *file)
+{
+	file->f_security = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_file_permission - Smack check on file operations
+ * @file: unused
+ * @mask: unused
+ *
+ * Returns 0
+ *
+ * Should access checks be done on each read or write?
+ * UNICOS and SELinux say yes.
+ * Trusted Solaris, Trusted Irix, and just about everyone else says no.
+ *
+ * I'll say no for now. Smack does not do the frequent
+ * label changing that SELinux does.
+ */
+static int smack_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_file_ioctl - Smack check on ioctls
+ * @file: the object
+ * @cmd: what to do
+ * @arg: unused
+ *
+ * Relies heavily on the correct use of the ioctl command conventions.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if allowed, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+			    unsigned long arg)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
+		rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE);
+
+	if (rc == 0 && (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ))
+		rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_READ);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_file_lock - Smack check on file locking
+ * @file: the object
+ * @cmd unused
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has write access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
+{
+	return smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_file_fcntl - Smack check on fcntl
+ * @file: the object
+ * @cmd: what action to check
+ * @arg: unused
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+			    unsigned long arg)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case F_DUPFD:
+	case F_GETFD:
+	case F_GETFL:
+	case F_GETLK:
+	case F_GETOWN:
+	case F_GETSIG:
+		rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_READ);
+		break;
+	case F_SETFD:
+	case F_SETFL:
+	case F_SETLK:
+	case F_SETLKW:
+	case F_SETOWN:
+	case F_SETSIG:
+		rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE);
+		break;
+	default:
+		rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_READWRITE);
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_file_send_sigiotask - Smack on sigio
+ * @tsk: The target task
+ * @fown: the object the signal come from
+ * @signum: unused
+ *
+ * Allow a privileged task to get signals even if it shouldn't
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if a subject with the object's smack could
+ * write to the task, an error code otherwise.
+ */
+static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
+				     struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
+{
+	struct file *file;
+	int rc;
+
+	/*
+	 * struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file
+	 */
+	file = (struct file *)((long)fown - offsetof(struct file,f_owner));
+	rc = smk_access(file->f_security, tsk->security, MAY_WRITE);
+	if (rc != 0 && __capable(tsk, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+		return 0;
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_file_receive - Smack file receive check
+ * @file: the object
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
+{
+	int may = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * This code relies on bitmasks.
+	 */
+	if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
+		may = MAY_READ;
+	if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
+		may |= MAY_WRITE;
+
+	return smk_curacc(file->f_security, may);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Socket hooks.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * smack_sk_alloc_security - Allocate a socket blob
+ * @sk: the socket
+ * @family: unused
+ * @priority: memory allocation priority
+ *
+ * Assign Smack pointers to current except for smk_packet which
+ * is not a pointer but the real thing.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM is there's no memory
+ */
+static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
+{
+	smack_t *csp = current->security;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp;
+
+	ssp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct socket_smack), priority);
+	if (ssp == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	ssp->smk_in = csp;
+	ssp->smk_out = csp;
+	ssp->smk_packet = smack_known_invalid.smk_known;
+
+	sk->sk_security = ssp;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sk_free_security - Free a socket blob
+ * @sk: the socket
+ *
+ * Clears the blob pointer
+ */
+static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
+{
+	kfree(sk->sk_security);
+	sk->sk_security = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_set_catset - convert a capset to netlabel mls categories
+ * @catset: the Smack categories
+ * @sap: where to put the netlabel categories
+ *
+ * Allocates and fills mls_cat
+ */
+static void smack_set_catset(smack_t catset, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap)
+{
+	unsigned char *cp;
+	unsigned char m;
+	int cat;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (catset == 0)
+		return;
+
+	sap->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT;
+	sap->mls_cat = netlbl_secattr_catmap_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
+	sap->mls_cat->startbit = 0;
+
+	for (cat = 1, cp = (unsigned char *)&catset; *cp != 0; cp++)
+		for (m = 0x80; m != 0; m >>= 1, cat++) {
+			if ((m & *cp) == 0)
+				continue;
+			rc = netlbl_secattr_catmap_setbit(sap->mls_cat, cat,
+							  GFP_ATOMIC);
+		}
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_to_secattr - fill a secattr from a smack value
+ * @smack: the smack value
+ * @nlsp: where the result goes
+ *
+ * Casey says that CIPSO is good enough for now.
+ * It can be used to effect.
+ * It can also be abused to effect when necessary.
+ * Appologies to the TSIG group in general and GW in particular.
+ */
+static void smack_to_secattr(smack_t *smack, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *nlsp)
+{
+	struct smack_cipso cipso;
+	int rc;
+
+	switch (smack_net_nltype) {
+	case NETLBL_NLTYPE_CIPSOV4:
+		nlsp->domain = NULL;
+		nlsp->flags = NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN;
+		nlsp->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL;
+
+		rc = smack_to_cipso(smack, &cipso);
+		if (rc == 0) {
+			nlsp->mls_lvl = cipso.smk_level;
+			smack_set_catset(cipso.smk_catset, nlsp);
+		} else {
+			nlsp->mls_lvl = smack_cipso_direct;
+			smack_set_catset(*smack, nlsp);
+		}
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_netlabel - Set the secattr on a socket
+ * @sk: the socket
+ *
+ * Convert the outbound smack value (smk_out) to a
+ * secattr and attach it to the socket.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or an error code
+ */
+static int smack_netlabel(struct sock *sk)
+{
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
+	int rc;
+
+	netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
+	smack_to_secattr(ssp->smk_out, &secattr);
+	if (secattr.flags != NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE)
+		rc = netlbl_sock_setattr(sk, &secattr);
+	else
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+
+	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_socket_post_create - finish socket setup
+ * @sock: the socket
+ * @family: protocol family
+ * @type: unused
+ * @protocol: unused
+ * @kern: indicates kern vs task socket
+ *
+ * Sets the security blob on the socket's inode.
+ * Sets the secattr value for outgoing packets.
+ * 
+ * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
+				    int type, int protocol, int kern)
+{
+	struct inode_smack *isp;
+
+	isp = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
+
+	if (isp == NULL) {
+		if (kern)
+			isp = new_inode_smack(&smack_known_floor.smk_known);
+		else
+			isp = new_inode_smack(current->security);
+		SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security = isp;
+	}
+
+	if (family != PF_INET)
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Set the outbound netlbl.
+	 */
+	return smack_netlabel(sock->sk);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_create - Smack check on inode creation
+ * @dir: containing directory object
+ * @dentry: unused
+ * @mode: unused
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current can write the containing directory,
+ * error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+			      int mode)
+{
+	return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_unlink - Smack check on inode deletion
+ * @dir: containing directory object
+ * @dentry: file to unlink
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current can write the containing directory
+ * and the object, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	struct inode *ip = dentry->d_inode;
+	int rc;
+
+	/*
+	 * You need write access to the thing you're unlinking
+	 */
+	rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(ip), MAY_WRITE);
+	if (rc == 0)
+		/*
+		 * You also need write access to the containing directory
+		 */
+		rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_mkdir - Smack check on directory creation
+ * @dir: containing directory object
+ * @dentry: unused
+ * @mode: unused
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current can write the containing directory,
+ * error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode)
+{
+	return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_rmdir - Smack check on directory deletion
+ * @dir: containing directory object
+ * @dentry: directory to unlink
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current can write the containing directory
+ * and the directory, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	struct inode *ip = dentry->d_inode;
+	int rc;
+
+	/*
+	 * You need write access to the thing you're removing
+	 */
+	rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(ip), MAY_WRITE);
+	if (rc == 0)
+		/*
+		 * You also need write access to the containing directory
+		 */
+		rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_file_set_fowner - set the file security blob value
+ * @file: object in question
+ *
+ * Returns 0
+ * Further research may be required on this one.
+ */
+static int smack_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
+{
+	file->f_security = current->security;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_getpgid - Smack access check for getpgid
+ * @p: the object task
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current can read the object task, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_READ);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_getsid - Smack access check for getsid
+ * @p: the object task
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current can read the object task, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_READ);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_getsecid - get the secid of the task
+ * @p: the object task
+ * @secid: where to put the result
+ *
+ * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the smack label.
+ */
+static void smack_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+{
+	*secid = smack_to_secid(p->security);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_flags_to_may - convert S_ to MAY_ values
+ * @flags: the S_ value
+ *
+ * Returns the equivalent MAY_ value
+ */
+static int smack_flags_to_may(int flags)
+{
+	int may = 0;
+
+	if (flags & S_IRUGO)
+		may |= MAY_READ;
+	if (flags & S_IWUGO)
+		may |= MAY_WRITE;
+	if (flags & S_IXUGO)
+		may |= MAY_EXEC;
+
+	return may;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_msg_msg_alloc_security - Set the security blob for msg_msg
+ * @msg: the object
+ *
+ * Returns 0
+ */
+static int smack_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
+{
+	msg->security = current->security;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_msg_msg_free_security - Clear the security blob for msg_msg
+ * @msg: the object
+ *
+ * Clears the blob pointer
+ */
+static void smack_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
+{
+	msg->security = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_of_shm - the smack pointer for the shm
+ * @shp: the object
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the smack value
+ */
+static smack_t *smack_of_shm(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
+{
+	if (shp == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+
+	return (smack_t *)shp->shm_perm.security;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_shm_alloc_security - Set the security blob for shm
+ * @shp: the object
+ *
+ * Returns 0
+ */
+static int smack_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
+{
+	struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &shp->shm_perm;
+
+	isp->security = current->security;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_shm_free_security - Clear the security blob for shm
+ * @shp: the object
+ *
+ * Clears the blob pointer
+ */
+static void smack_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
+{
+	struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &shp->shm_perm;
+
+	isp->security = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_shm_associate - Smack access check for shm
+ * @shp: the object
+ * @shmflg: access requested
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
+{
+	smack_t *ssp = smack_of_shm(shp);
+	int may;
+
+	if (ssp == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	may = smack_flags_to_may(shmflg);
+	return smk_curacc(ssp, may);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_shm_shmctl - Smack access check for shm
+ * @shp: the object
+ * @cmd: what it wants to do
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
+{
+	smack_t *ssp = smack_of_shm(shp);
+	int may;
+
+	if (ssp == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	switch(cmd) {
+	case IPC_STAT:
+	case SHM_STAT:
+		may = MAY_READ;
+		break;
+	case IPC_SET:
+	case SHM_LOCK:
+	case SHM_UNLOCK:
+	case IPC_RMID:
+		may = MAY_READWRITE;
+		break;
+	case IPC_INFO:
+	case SHM_INFO:
+		/*
+		 * System level information.
+		 */
+		return 0;
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return smk_curacc(ssp, may);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_shm_shmat - Smack access for shmat
+ * @shp: the object
+ * @shmaddr: unused
+ * @shmflg: access requested
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp, char __user *shmaddr,
+			   int shmflg)
+{
+	smack_t *ssp = smack_of_shm(shp);
+	int may;
+
+	if (ssp == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	may = smack_flags_to_may(shmflg);
+	return smk_curacc(ssp, may);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_of_sem - the smack pointer for the sem
+ * @sma: the object
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the smack value
+ */
+static smack_t *smack_of_sem(struct sem_array *sma)
+{
+	if (sma == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+
+	return (smack_t *)sma->sem_perm.security;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sem_alloc_security - Set the security blob for sem
+ * @sma: the object
+ *
+ * Returns 0
+ */
+static int smack_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
+{
+	struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &sma->sem_perm;
+
+	isp->security = current->security;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sem_free_security - Clear the security blob for sem
+ * @sma: the object
+ *
+ * Clears the blob pointer
+ */
+static void smack_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
+{
+	struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &sma->sem_perm;
+
+	isp->security = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sem_associate - Smack access check for sem
+ * @sma: the object
+ * @semflg: access requested
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
+{
+	smack_t *ssp = smack_of_sem(sma);
+	int may;
+
+	if (ssp == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	may = smack_flags_to_may(semflg);
+	return smk_curacc(ssp, may);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sem_shmctl - Smack access check for sem
+ * @sma: the object
+ * @cmd: what it wants to do
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
+{
+	smack_t *ssp = smack_of_sem(sma);
+	int may;
+
+	if (ssp == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	switch(cmd) {
+	case GETPID:
+	case GETNCNT:
+	case GETZCNT:
+	case GETVAL:
+	case GETALL:
+	case IPC_STAT:
+	case SEM_STAT:
+		may = MAY_READ;
+		break;
+	case SETVAL:
+	case SETALL:
+	case IPC_RMID:
+	case IPC_SET:
+		may = MAY_READWRITE;
+		break;
+	case IPC_INFO:
+	case SEM_INFO:
+		/*
+		 * System level information
+		 */
+		return 0;
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return smk_curacc(ssp, may);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sem_semop - Smack checks of semaphore operations
+ * @sma: the object
+ * @sops: unused
+ * @nsops: unused
+ * @alter: unused
+ *
+ * Treated as read and write in all cases.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is allowed, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma, struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
+{
+	smack_t *ssp = smack_of_sem(sma);
+
+	if (ssp == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	return smk_curacc(ssp, MAY_READWRITE);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_msg_alloc_security - Set the security blob for msg
+ * @msq: the object
+ *
+ * Returns 0
+ */
+static int smack_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
+{
+	struct kern_ipc_perm *kisp = &msq->q_perm;
+
+	kisp->security = current->security;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_msg_free_security - Clear the security blob for msg
+ * @msq: the object
+ *
+ * Clears the blob pointer
+ */
+static void smack_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
+{
+	struct kern_ipc_perm *kisp = &msq->q_perm;
+
+	kisp->security = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_of_msq - the smack pointer for the msq
+ * @msq: the object
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the smack value
+ */
+static smack_t *smack_of_msq(struct msg_queue *msq)
+{
+	if (msq == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+
+	return (smack_t *)msq->q_perm.security;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_msg_queue_associate - Smack access check for msg_queue
+ * @msq: the object
+ * @msqflg: access requested
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
+{
+	smack_t *msp = smack_of_msq(msq);
+	int may;
+
+	if (msp == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	may = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg);
+	return smk_curacc(msp, may);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_msg_queue_msgctl - Smack access check for msg_queue
+ * @msq: the object
+ * @cmd: what it wants to do
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
+{
+	smack_t *msp = smack_of_msq(msq);
+	int may;
+
+	if (msp == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	switch(cmd) {
+	case IPC_STAT:
+	case MSG_STAT:
+		may = MAY_READ;
+		break;
+	case IPC_SET:
+	case IPC_RMID:
+		may = MAY_READWRITE;
+		break;
+	case IPC_INFO:
+	case MSG_INFO:
+		/*
+		 * System level information
+		 */
+		return 0;
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return smk_curacc(msp, may);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_msg_queue_msgsnd - Smack access check for msg_queue
+ * @msq: the object
+ * @msg: unused
+ * @msqflg: access requested
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
+				  int msqflg)
+{
+	smack_t *msp = smack_of_msq(msq);
+	int rc;
+
+	if (msp == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	rc = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg);
+	return smk_curacc(msp, rc);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_msg_queue_msgsnd - Smack access check for msg_queue
+ * @msq: the object
+ * @msg: unused
+ * @target: unused
+ * @type: unused
+ * @mode: unused
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has read and write access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
+			struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode)
+{
+	smack_t *msp = smack_of_msq(msq);
+
+	if (msp == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	return smk_curacc(msp, MAY_READWRITE);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_ipc_permission - Smack access for ipc_permission()
+ * @ipp: the object permissions
+ * @flag: access requested
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has read and write access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, short flag)
+{
+	smack_t *isp = ipp->security;
+	int may;
+
+	may = smack_flags_to_may(flag);
+	return smk_curacc(isp, may);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_to_inode - copy task smack into the inode blob
+ * @p: task to copy from
+ * inode: inode to copy to
+ *
+ * Sets the smack pointer in the inode security blob
+ */
+static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
+	isp->smk_inode = p->security;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_wait - Smack access check for waiting
+ * @p: task to wait for
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current can wait for p, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = smk_access(current->security, p->security, MAY_WRITE);
+	if (rc == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Allow the operation to succeed if either task
+	 * has privilege to perform operations that might
+	 * account for the smack labels having gotten to
+	 * be different in the first place.
+	 *
+	 * This breaks the strict subjet/object access
+	 * control ideal, taking the object's privilege
+	 * state into account in the decision as well as
+	 * the smack value.
+	 */
+	if (__capable(current, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE) ||
+		__capable(p, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+		return 0;
+	
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_getprocattr - Smack process attribute access
+ * @p: the object task
+ * @name: the name of the attribute in /proc/.../attr
+ * @value: where to put the result
+ *
+ * Places a copy of the task Smack into value
+ *
+ * Returns the length of the smack label or an error code
+ */
+static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
+{
+	char *cp;
+	int slen;
+
+	if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	cp = kstrdup(current->security, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (cp == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	slen = strlen(cp);
+	*value = cp;
+	return slen;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_setprocattr - Smack process attribute setting
+ * @p: the object task
+ * @name: the name of the attribute in /proc/.../attr
+ * @value: the value to set
+ * @size: the size of the value
+ *
+ * Sets the Smack value of the task. Only setting self
+ * is permitted and only with privilege
+ *
+ * Returns the length of the smack label or an error code
+ */
+static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name,
+			     void *value, size_t size)
+{
+	smack_t *newsmack;
+
+	if (!__capable(p, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	/*
+	 * Changing another process' Smack value is too dangerous
+	 * and supports no sane use case.
+	 */
+	if (p != current)
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (value == NULL || size == 0 || size >= sizeof(smack_t))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	newsmack = smk_import(value, size);
+	if (*newsmack == SMK_INVALID)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	p->security = newsmack;
+	return size;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_unix_stream_connect - Smack access on UDS
+ * @sock: one socket
+ * @other: the other socket
+ * @newsk: unused
+ *
+ * Return 0 if a subject with the smack of sock could access
+ * an object with the smack of other, otherwise an error code
+ */
+static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
+				     struct socket *other, struct sock *newsk)
+{
+	struct inode *sp = SOCK_INODE(sock);
+	struct inode *op = SOCK_INODE(other);
+
+	return smk_access(smk_of_inode(sp), smk_of_inode(op), MAY_READWRITE);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_unix_may_send - Smack access on UDS
+ * @sock: one socket
+ * @other: the other socket
+ *
+ * Return 0 if a subject with the smack of sock could access
+ * an object with the smack of other, otherwise an error code
+ */
+static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
+{
+	struct inode *sp = SOCK_INODE(sock);
+	struct inode *op = SOCK_INODE(other);
+
+	return smk_access(smk_of_inode(sp), smk_of_inode(op), MAY_WRITE);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_from_secattr - Convert a netlabel mls_lvl/mls_cat pair to smack
+ * @sap: netlabel secattr
+ * @sip: where to put the result
+ *
+ * Copies a smack label into sip
+ */
+static void smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap, smack_t *sip)
+{
+	smack_t smack = 0;
+	int pcat;
+
+	if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) == 0) {
+		/*
+		 * If there are flags but no level netlabel isn't
+		 * behaving the way we expect it to.
+		 *
+		 * Without guidance regarding the smack value
+		 * for the packet fall back on the network
+		 * ambient value.
+		 */
+		*sip = *smack_net_ambient;
+		return;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Get the categories, if any
+	 */
+	if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) != 0)
+		for (pcat = -1;;) {
+			pcat = netlbl_secattr_catmap_walk(sap->mls_cat, pcat+1);
+			if (pcat < 0)
+				break;
+			smack_catset_bit(pcat, &smack);
+		}
+	/*
+	 * If it is CIPSO using smack direct mapping
+	 * we are already done. WeeHee.
+	 */
+	if (sap->mls_lvl == smack_cipso_direct) {
+		*sip = smack;
+		return;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Look it up in the supplied table if it is not a direct mapping.
+	 */
+	smack_from_cipso(sap->mls_lvl, &smack, sip);
+	return;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb - Smack packet delivery access check
+ * @sk: socket
+ * @skb: packet
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if the packet should be delivered, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+	smack_t smack;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6)
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Translate what netlabel gave us.
+	 */
+	netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
+	rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, &secattr);
+	if (rc == 0)
+		smack_from_secattr(&secattr, &smack);
+	else
+		smack = *smack_net_ambient;
+	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+	/*
+	 * Receiving a packet requires that the other end
+	 * be able to write here. Read access is not required.
+	 * This is the simplist possible security model
+	 * for networking.
+	 */
+	rc = smk_access(&smack, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE);
+
+	/*
+	 * Set the receive packet on success.
+	 */
+	if (rc == 0)
+		ssp->smk_packet = smack;
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sock_graft - graft access state between two sockets
+ * @sk: fresh sock
+ * @parent: donor socket
+ *
+ * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
+ */
+static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
+{
+	struct socket_smack *ssp;
+	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
+	smack_t smack;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (sk == NULL || parent == NULL || parent->sk == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	if (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6)
+		return;
+
+	ssp = parent->sk->sk_security;
+
+	netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
+	rc = netlbl_sock_getattr(sk, &secattr);
+	if (rc == 0)
+		smack_from_secattr(&secattr, &smack);
+	else
+		smack = smack_known_huh.smk_known;
+	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+
+	netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
+
+	smack_to_secattr(&smack, &secattr);
+	if (secattr.flags != NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE)
+		rc = netlbl_sock_setattr(parent->sk, &secattr);
+	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inet_conn_request - Smack access check on connect
+ * @sk: socket involved
+ * @skb: packet
+ * @req: unused
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if a task with the packet label could write to
+ * the socket, otherwise an error code
+ */
+static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
+				   struct request_sock *req)
+{
+	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr skb_secattr;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+	smack_t smack;
+	int rc;
+	
+	if (skb == NULL)
+		return -EACCES;
+
+	netlbl_secattr_init(&skb_secattr);
+	rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, &skb_secattr);
+	if (rc == 0)
+		smack_from_secattr(&skb_secattr, &smack);
+	else
+		smack = smack_known_huh.smk_known;
+	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&skb_secattr);
+	/*
+	 * Receiving a packet requires that the other end
+	 * be able to write here. Read access is not required.
+	 */
+	return smk_access(&smack, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Key management security hooks
+ *
+ * Casey has not tested key support very heavily.
+ * The permission check is most likely too restrictive.
+ * If you care about keys please have a look.
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+
+/**
+ * smack_key_alloc - Set the key security blob
+ * @key: object
+ * @tsk: the task associated with the key
+ * @flags: unused
+ *
+ * No allocation required
+ *
+ * Returns 0
+ */
+static int smack_key_alloc(struct key *key, struct task_struct *tsk,
+			   unsigned long flags)
+{
+	key->security = tsk->security;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_key_free - Clear the key security blob
+ * @key: the object
+ *
+ * Clear the blob pointer
+ */
+static void smack_key_free(struct key *key)
+{
+	key->security = NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * smack_key_permission - Smack access on a key
+ * @key_ref: gets to the object
+ * @context: task involved
+ * @perm: unused
+ *
+ * Return 0 if the task has read and write to the object,
+ * an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
+			        struct task_struct *context, key_perm_t perm)
+{
+	struct key *keyp;
+
+	keyp = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
+	if (keyp == NULL)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	/*
+	 * If the key hasn't been initialized give it access so that
+	 * it may do so.
+	 */
+	if (keyp->security == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	/*
+	 * This should not occur
+	 */
+	if (context->security == NULL)
+		return -EACCES;
+
+	return smk_access(context->security, keyp->security, MAY_READWRITE);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
+
+static struct security_operations smack_ops = {
+	.ptrace = 			smack_ptrace,
+	.capget = 			cap_capget,
+	.capset_check = 		cap_capset_check,
+	.capset_set = 			cap_capset_set,
+	.capable = 			cap_capable,
+	/* .acct			No hook required */
+	/* .sysctl			No hook required */
+	/* .quotactl			No hook required */
+	/* .quota_on			No hook required */
+	.syslog = 			smack_syslog,
+	.settime = 			cap_settime,
+	.vm_enough_memory = 		cap_vm_enough_memory,
+
+	/* .bprm_alloc_security		No hook required */
+	/* .bprm_free_security		No hook required */
+	.bprm_apply_creds = 		cap_bprm_apply_creds,
+	/* .bprm_post_apply_creds	No hook required */
+	.bprm_set_security = 		cap_bprm_set_security,
+	/* .bprm_check_security		No hook required */
+	.bprm_secureexec = 		cap_bprm_secureexec,
+
+	.sb_alloc_security = 		smack_sb_alloc_security,
+	.sb_free_security = 		smack_sb_free_security,
+	.sb_copy_data = 		smack_sb_copy_data,
+	.sb_kern_mount = 		smack_sb_kern_mount,
+	.sb_statfs = 			smack_sb_statfs,
+	.sb_mount = 			smack_sb_mount,
+	/* .sb_check_sb			No hook required */
+	.sb_umount = 			smack_sb_umount,
+	/* .sb_umount_close		No hook required */
+	/* .sb_umount_busy		No hook required */
+	/* .sb_post_remount		No hook required */
+	/* .sb_post_mountroot		No hook required */
+	/* .sb_post_addmount		No hook required */
+	/* .sb_pivotroot		No hook required */
+	/* .sb_post_pivotroot		No hook required */
+
+	.inode_alloc_security = 	smack_inode_alloc_security,
+	.inode_free_security = 		smack_inode_free_security,
+	.inode_init_security = 		smack_inode_init_security,
+	.inode_create = 		smack_inode_create,
+	.inode_link = 			smack_inode_link,
+	.inode_unlink = 		smack_inode_unlink,
+	.inode_symlink = 		smack_inode_symlink,
+	.inode_mkdir = 			smack_inode_mkdir,
+	.inode_rmdir = 			smack_inode_rmdir,
+	.inode_mknod = 			smack_inode_mknod,
+	.inode_rename = 		smack_inode_rename,
+	.inode_readlink = 		smack_inode_readlink,
+	.inode_follow_link = 		smack_inode_follow_link,
+	.inode_permission = 		smack_inode_permission,
+	.inode_setattr = 		smack_inode_setattr,
+	.inode_getattr = 		smack_inode_getattr,
+	/* .inode_delete		No hook required */
+	.inode_setxattr = 		smack_inode_setxattr,
+	.inode_post_setxattr = 		smack_inode_post_setxattr,
+	.inode_getxattr = 		smack_inode_getxattr,
+	.inode_listxattr = 		smack_inode_listxattr,
+	.inode_removexattr = 		smack_inode_removexattr,
+	/* .inode_xattr_getsuffix	No hook required */
+	.inode_getsecurity = 		smack_inode_getsecurity,
+	.inode_setsecurity = 		smack_inode_setsecurity,
+	.inode_listsecurity = 		smack_inode_listsecurity,
+
+	.file_permission = 		smack_file_permission,
+	.file_alloc_security = 		smack_file_alloc_security,
+	.file_free_security = 		smack_file_free_security,
+	.file_ioctl = 			smack_file_ioctl,
+	/* .file_mmap			No hook required */
+	/* .file_mprotect		No hook required */
+	.file_lock = 			smack_file_lock,
+	.file_fcntl = 			smack_file_fcntl,
+	.file_set_fowner = 		smack_file_set_fowner,
+	.file_send_sigiotask = 		smack_file_send_sigiotask,
+	.file_receive = 		smack_file_receive,
+
+	/* .task_create			No hook required */
+	.task_alloc_security = 		smack_task_alloc_security,
+	.task_free_security = 		smack_task_free_security,
+	/* .task_setuid			No hook required */
+	.task_post_setuid =		cap_task_post_setuid,
+	/* .task_setgid			No hook required */
+	.task_setpgid = 		smack_task_setpgid,
+	.task_getpgid = 		smack_task_getpgid,
+	.task_getsid = 			smack_task_getsid,
+	.task_getsecid = 		smack_task_getsecid,
+	/* .task_setgroups		No hook required */
+	.task_setnice = 		smack_task_setnice,
+	.task_setioprio = 		smack_task_setioprio,
+	.task_getioprio = 		smack_task_getioprio,
+	/* .task_setrlimit		No hook required */
+	.task_setscheduler = 		smack_task_setscheduler,
+	.task_getscheduler = 		smack_task_getscheduler,
+	.task_movememory = 		smack_task_movememory,
+	.task_kill = 			smack_task_kill,
+	.task_wait = 			smack_task_wait,
+	/* .task_prctl			No hook required */
+	.task_reparent_to_init =	cap_task_reparent_to_init,
+	.task_to_inode = 		smack_task_to_inode,
+
+	.ipc_permission = 		smack_ipc_permission,
+
+	.msg_msg_alloc_security = 	smack_msg_msg_alloc_security,
+	.msg_msg_free_security = 	smack_msg_msg_free_security,
+
+	.msg_queue_alloc_security = 	smack_msg_queue_alloc_security,
+	.msg_queue_free_security = 	smack_msg_queue_free_security,
+	.msg_queue_associate = 		smack_msg_queue_associate,
+	.msg_queue_msgctl = 		smack_msg_queue_msgctl,
+	.msg_queue_msgsnd = 		smack_msg_queue_msgsnd,
+	.msg_queue_msgrcv = 		smack_msg_queue_msgrcv,
+
+	.shm_alloc_security = 		smack_shm_alloc_security,
+	.shm_free_security = 		smack_shm_free_security,
+	.shm_associate = 		smack_shm_associate,
+	.shm_shmctl = 			smack_shm_shmctl,
+	.shm_shmat = 			smack_shm_shmat,
+
+	.sem_alloc_security = 		smack_sem_alloc_security,
+	.sem_free_security = 		smack_sem_free_security,
+	.sem_associate = 		smack_sem_associate,
+	.sem_semctl = 			smack_sem_semctl,
+	.sem_semop = 			smack_sem_semop,
+
+	.netlink_send =			cap_netlink_send,
+	.netlink_recv = 		cap_netlink_recv,
+
+	/* .register_security		No hook required */
+	/* .unregister_security		No hook required */
+
+	.d_instantiate = 		smack_d_instantiate,
+
+	.getprocattr = 			smack_getprocattr,
+	.setprocattr = 			smack_setprocattr,
+	/* .secid_to_secctx		No hook required */
+	/* .release_secctx		No hook required */
+
+	.unix_stream_connect = 		smack_unix_stream_connect,
+	.unix_may_send = 		smack_unix_may_send,
+
+	/* .socket_create 		No hook required */
+	.socket_post_create = 		smack_socket_post_create,
+	/* .socket_bind 		No hook required */
+	/* .socket_connect 		No hook required */
+	/* .socket_listen 		No hook required */
+	/* .socket_accept 		No hook required */
+	/* .socket_post_accept 		No hook required */
+	/* .socket_sendmsg 		No hook required */
+	/* .socket_recvmsg 		No hook required */
+	/* .socket_getsockname		No hook required */
+	/* .socket_getpeername		No hook required */
+	/* .socket_getsockopt		No hook required */
+	/* .socket_setsockopt		No hook required */
+	/* .socket_shutdown		No hook required */
+	.socket_sock_rcv_skb = 		smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
+	/* .socket_getpeersec_stream	No hook required */
+	/* .socket_getpeersec_dgram	No hook required */
+	.sk_alloc_security = 		smack_sk_alloc_security,
+	.sk_free_security = 		smack_sk_free_security,
+	/* .sk_clone_security 		No hook required */
+	/* .sk_getsecid 		No hook required */
+	.sock_graft = 			smack_sock_graft,
+	.inet_conn_request = 		smack_inet_conn_request,
+	/* .inet_csk_clone		No hook required */
+	/* .inet_conn_established	No hook required */
+
+	/* .req_classify_flow 		No hook required */
+	/* .xfrm_policy_alloc_security	no xfrm for smack */
+	/* .xfrm_policy_clone_security	no xfrm for smack */
+	/* .xfrm_policy_free_security	no xfrm for smack */
+	/* .xfrm_policy_delete_security	no xfrm for smack */
+	/* .xfrm_state_alloc_security	no xfrm for smack */
+	/* .xfrm_state_free_security	no xfrm for smack */
+	/* .xfrm_state_delete_security	no xfrm for smack */
+	/* .xfrm_policy_lookup		no xfrm for smack */
+	/* .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match	no xfrm for smack */
+	/* .xfrm_decode_session		no xfrm for smack */
+
+ /* key management security hooks */
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+	.key_alloc = 			smack_key_alloc,
+	.key_free = 			smack_key_free,
+	.key_permission = 		smack_key_permission,
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
+
+};
+
+DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_list_lock);
+DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_known_lock);
+
+/**
+ * smack_init - initialize the smack system
+ *
+ * Returns 0
+ */
+static __init int smack_init(void)
+{
+	printk(KERN_INFO "Smack:  Initializing.\n");
+
+	/* Set the security state for the initial task. */
+
+	current->security = &smack_known_floor.smk_known;
+
+	mutex_init(&smack_known_lock);
+	mutex_init(&smack_list_lock);
+
+	if (register_security(&smack_ops))
+		panic("smack: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Smack requires early initialization in order to label
+ * all processes and objects when they are created.
+ */
+security_initcall(smack_init);
+


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