On Fri, Oct 26, 2007 at 01:22:17 +0100, Alan Cox wrote:On Thu, 25 Oct 2007 16:06:40 -0700
Mike Waychison <mikew@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Remove the need for having CAP_SYS_RAWIO when doing a FIBMAP call on an open file descriptor.Historically this was done because people felt it was more secure. It
It would be nice to allow users to have permission to see where their data is landing on disk, and there really isn't a good reason to keep them from getting at this information.
also allows you to make some deductions about other activities on the
disk but thats probably only a concern for very very security crazed
compartmentalised boxes
Also historically at least FIBMAP could be abused to crash the system.
Now if you can verify that has been fixed I have no problem, but given
that I can find no record of that being fixed it would be wise to audit
it first and review Chris Evans and other reports about what occurs when
FIBMAP is passed random block numbers.
FIBMAP has another problem for this general use as well - it takes an int
but the block number can now be bigger for very large files on 32bit.
Additionally, ext3_bmap() has this to say about it:
if (EXT3_I(inode)->i_state & EXT3_STATE_JDATA) {
/*
* This is a REALLY heavyweight approach, but the use of
* bmap on dirty files is expected to be extremely rare:
* only if we run lilo or swapon on a freshly made file
* do we expect this to happen.
*
* (bmap requires CAP_SYS_RAWIO so this does not
* represent an unprivileged user DOS attack --- we'd be
* in trouble if mortal users could trigger this path at
* will.)