Re: AppArmor Security Goal

[Andi Kleen]

Crispin Cowan <crispin@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes:

The document should be a good base for a merge.

>     * A confined process can operate on a file descriptor passed to it
>       by an unconfined process, even if it manipulates a file not in the
>       confined process's profile. To block this attack, confine the
>       process that passed the file descriptor.

That is the only thing that tripped me up a bit while reading the document.
Can you expand a bit on the reasons why the fd is not rechecked in
the context of the target process? Best do it in a new version of the
document.

-Andi
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