Re: [PATCH] capabilities: introduce per-process capability boundingset (v10)

From: KaiGai Kohei
Date: Wed Dec 05 2007 - 21:15:47 EST


Andrew Morgan wrote:
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KaiGai Kohei wrote:
Andrew Morgan wrote:
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KaiGai Kohei wrote:
+ if (!!cap_issubset(*inheritable,
+ cap_combine(target->cap_inheritable,
+ current->cap_bset))) {
+ /* no new pI capabilities outside bounding set */
+ return -EPERM;
+ }

Yes, the !! was a bug. The correct check is a single !.
I was in trouble with getting -EPERM at pam_cap.so :-)

(Thus, the correct check says no 'new' pI bits can be outside cap_bset.)
If this condition intends to dominate 'new' pI bits by 'old' pI bits masked
with bounding set, we should not apply cap_combine() here.
I think applying cap_intersect() is correct for the purpose.

The check is not meant to limit existing pI bits.

The check is meant to limit what new bits can be 'added' to pI (in the
case that pE & CAP_SETPCAP is true).

Thanks, I got understood as I wrote in the previous reply.

BTW, could you tell me your intention about pam_cap.c is implemented
with pam_sm_authenticate() and pam_sm_setcred()?
I think it can be done with pam_sm_open_session(), and this approach
enables to reduce the iteration of reading /etc/security/capability.conf.

How do you think the idea?
--
OSS Platform Development Division, NEC
KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
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