Re: [TOMOYO #10 (linux-next) 3/8] LSM adapter functions.

[Kentaro Takeda]

KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki wrote:
>> + * Version: 2.2.0-pre   2008/10/01
<snip>
> What is this Version for ?
> Is this exported to userland via some interface ?
Yes. This version is exported via /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/version .

>> +static int tmy_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int op)
>> +{
>> +	int error;
>> +	char *name;
>> +	if ((op & 6) == 0)
>> +		return 0;
> 
> It seems that you need a blanc line between variable declaration and
> start of code, like this.
> 
> ==
>   char *name;
>                                  << 
>   if ((op & 6) == 0)
> 		return 0;
> ==
Fixed.

> BTW, is this "6" need to be "6" rather than some readable macro ?
Replaced "6" with "(MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE)" .

> This tmy_check_open_permission() is defiend in 7/8.
> Because people uses "bisect" in these days, I think it's better to avoid
> this kind of reversed dependency of patch stack.
I see. I'll change patch order next time.
Thanks for your advice. :)

Regards,

---
Subject: LSM adapter functions.

Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
 security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c |  328 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/tomoyo/tomoyo.h |  106 +++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 434 insertions(+)

--- /dev/null
+++ linux-next/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
@@ -0,0 +1,328 @@
+/*
+ * security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
+ *
+ * LSM hooks for TOMOYO Linux.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2008  NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ *
+ * Version: 2.2.0-pre   2008/10/01
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include "common.h"
+#include "tomoyo.h"
+#include "realpath.h"
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/device_cgroup.h>
+
+static int tmy_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	new->security = old->security;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int tmy_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	if (bprm->cred_prepared)
+		return 0;
+	if (!sbin_init_started)
+		tmy_load_policy(bprm->filename);
+	bprm->cred->security = NULL;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int tmy_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	struct domain_info *domain = bprm->cred->security;
+
+	/*
+	 * Execute permission is checked against pathname passed to do_execve()
+	 * using current domain.
+	 */
+	if (!domain) {
+		struct domain_info *next_domain = NULL;
+		int retval = tmy_find_next_domain(bprm, &next_domain);
+		if (!retval)
+			bprm->cred->security = next_domain;
+		return retval;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Read permission is checked against interpreters using next domain.
+	 */
+	return tmy_check_open_permission(domain, bprm->file->f_path.dentry,
+					 bprm->file->f_path.mnt, 1);
+}
+
+static int tmy_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int op)
+{
+	int error;
+	char *name;
+
+	if ((op & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE)) == 0)
+		return 0;
+	name = sysctlpath_from_table(table);
+	if (!name)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	error = tmy_check_file_perm(tmy_domain(), name,
+				    op & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE),
+				    "sysctl");
+	tmy_free(name);
+	return error;
+}
+
+struct check_result_entry {
+	struct list_head list;
+	struct task_struct *task;
+	int error;
+};
+
+static LIST_HEAD(check_result_list);
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(check_result_list_lock);
+
+/* Remember error code for security_inode_*(). */
+static int tmy_save_result(const int error)
+{
+	struct check_result_entry *entry;
+
+	if (!error)
+		return 0;
+	entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!entry)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	entry->task = current;
+	entry->error = error;
+	spin_lock(&check_result_list_lock);
+	list_add(&entry->list, &check_result_list);
+	spin_unlock(&check_result_list_lock);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Fetch error code from security_inode_*(). */
+static int tmy_load_result(void)
+{
+	struct task_struct *task = current;
+	struct check_result_entry *p;
+	struct check_result_entry *entry = NULL;
+
+	if (list_empty(&check_result_list))
+		return 0;
+	spin_lock(&check_result_list_lock);
+	list_for_each_entry(p, &check_result_list, list) {
+		if (p->task != task)
+			continue;
+		list_del(&p->list);
+		entry = p;
+		break;
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&check_result_list_lock);
+	if (entry) {
+		int error = entry->error;
+		kfree(entry);
+		return error;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Clear error code if security_inode_*() was not called. */
+static void tmy_path_clear(void)
+{
+	tmy_load_result();
+}
+
+static int tmy_path_truncate(struct path *path, loff_t length,
+			     unsigned int time_attrs, struct file *filp)
+{
+	return tmy_save_result(tmy_check_1path_perm(tmy_domain(),
+						    TMY_TYPE_TRUNCATE_ACL,
+						    path->dentry, path->mnt));
+}
+
+static int tmy_path_unlink(struct path *parent, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	return tmy_save_result(tmy_check_1path_perm(tmy_domain(),
+						    TMY_TYPE_UNLINK_ACL,
+						    dentry, parent->mnt));
+}
+
+static int tmy_path_mkdir(struct path *parent, struct dentry *dentry, int mode)
+{
+	return tmy_save_result(tmy_check_1path_perm(tmy_domain(),
+						    TMY_TYPE_MKDIR_ACL,
+						    dentry, parent->mnt));
+}
+
+static int tmy_path_rmdir(struct path *parent, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	return tmy_save_result(tmy_check_1path_perm(tmy_domain(),
+						    TMY_TYPE_RMDIR_ACL,
+						    dentry, parent->mnt));
+}
+
+static int tmy_path_symlink(struct path *parent, struct dentry *dentry,
+			    const char *old_name)
+{
+	return tmy_save_result(tmy_check_1path_perm(tmy_domain(),
+						    TMY_TYPE_SYMLINK_ACL,
+						    dentry, parent->mnt));
+}
+
+static int tmy_path_mknod(struct path *parent, struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
+			  unsigned int dev)
+{
+	struct vfsmount *mnt = parent->mnt;
+	int type = TMY_TYPE_CREATE_ACL;
+
+	switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
+	case S_IFCHR:
+		type = TMY_TYPE_MKCHAR_ACL;
+		break;
+	case S_IFBLK:
+		type = TMY_TYPE_MKBLOCK_ACL;
+		break;
+	case S_IFIFO:
+		type = TMY_TYPE_MKFIFO_ACL;
+		break;
+	case S_IFSOCK:
+		type = TMY_TYPE_MKSOCK_ACL;
+		break;
+	}
+	return tmy_save_result(tmy_check_1path_perm(tmy_domain(),
+						    type, dentry, mnt));
+}
+
+static int tmy_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir,
+			 struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+	return tmy_save_result(tmy_check_2path_perm(tmy_domain(),
+						    TMY_TYPE_LINK_ACL,
+						    old_dentry, new_dir->mnt,
+						    new_dentry, new_dir->mnt));
+}
+
+static int tmy_path_rename(struct path *old_parent, struct dentry *old_dentry,
+			   struct path *new_parent, struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+	return tmy_save_result(tmy_check_2path_perm(tmy_domain(),
+						    TMY_TYPE_RENAME_ACL,
+						    old_dentry,
+						    old_parent->mnt,
+						    new_dentry,
+						    new_parent->mnt));
+}
+
+static int tmy_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *inode,
+			  struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+	return tmy_load_result();
+}
+
+static int tmy_inode_unlink(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	return tmy_load_result();
+}
+
+static int tmy_inode_symlink(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
+			     const char *name)
+{
+	return tmy_load_result();
+}
+
+static int tmy_inode_mkdir(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
+			   int mask)
+{
+	return tmy_load_result();
+}
+
+static int tmy_inode_rmdir(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	return tmy_load_result();
+}
+
+static int tmy_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode)
+{
+	return tmy_load_result();
+}
+
+static int tmy_inode_mknod(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
+			   int mode, dev_t dev)
+{
+	return tmy_load_result();
+}
+
+static int tmy_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
+			    struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+	return tmy_load_result();
+}
+
+static int tmy_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
+{
+	return tmy_load_result();
+}
+
+static int tmy_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+			  unsigned long arg)
+{
+	if (cmd == F_SETFL && ((arg ^ file->f_flags) & O_APPEND))
+		return tmy_check_rewrite_permission(tmy_domain(), file);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int tmy_dentry_open(struct file *f, const struct cred *cred)
+{
+	int flags = f->f_flags;
+
+	if ((flags + 1) & O_ACCMODE)
+		flags++;
+	flags |= f->f_flags & (O_APPEND | O_TRUNC);
+	/* Don't check read permission here if called from do_execve(). */
+	if (current->in_execve)
+		return 0;
+	return tmy_check_open_permission(tmy_domain(), f->f_path.dentry,
+					 f->f_path.mnt, flags);
+}
+
+static struct security_operations tomoyo_security_ops = {
+	.name                      = "tomoyo",
+	.cred_prepare              = tmy_cred_prepare,
+	.bprm_set_creds            = tmy_bprm_set_creds,
+	.bprm_check_security       = tmy_bprm_check_security,
+	.sysctl                    = tmy_sysctl,
+	.file_fcntl                = tmy_file_fcntl,
+	.dentry_open               = tmy_dentry_open,
+	.path_truncate             = tmy_path_truncate,
+	.path_unlink               = tmy_path_unlink,
+	.path_mkdir                = tmy_path_mkdir,
+	.path_rmdir                = tmy_path_rmdir,
+	.path_symlink              = tmy_path_symlink,
+	.path_mknod                = tmy_path_mknod,
+	.path_link                 = tmy_path_link,
+	.path_rename               = tmy_path_rename,
+	.inode_create              = tmy_inode_create,
+	.inode_setattr             = tmy_inode_setattr,
+	.inode_unlink              = tmy_inode_unlink,
+	.inode_mkdir               = tmy_inode_mkdir,
+	.inode_rmdir               = tmy_inode_rmdir,
+	.inode_symlink             = tmy_inode_symlink,
+	.inode_mknod               = tmy_inode_mknod,
+	.inode_link                = tmy_inode_link,
+	.inode_rename              = tmy_inode_rename,
+	.path_clear                = tmy_path_clear,
+};
+
+static int __init tmy_init(void)
+{
+	struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current_cred();
+
+	if (!security_module_enable(&tomoyo_security_ops))
+		return 0;
+	/* register ourselves with the security framework */
+	if (register_security(&tomoyo_security_ops))
+		panic("Failure registering TOMOYO Linux");
+	printk(KERN_INFO "TOMOYO Linux initialized\n");
+	cred->security = &KERNEL_DOMAIN;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+security_initcall(tmy_init);
--- /dev/null
+++ linux-next/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.h
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+/*
+ * security/tomoyo/tomoyo.h
+ *
+ * Implementation of the Domain-Based Mandatory Access Control.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2008  NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ *
+ * Version: 2.2.0-pre   2008/10/01
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef _LINUX_TOMOYO_H
+#define _LINUX_TOMOYO_H
+
+struct path_info;
+struct dentry;
+struct vfsmount;
+struct inode;
+struct linux_binprm;
+struct pt_regs;
+struct tmy_page_buffer;
+
+char *sysctlpath_from_table(struct ctl_table *table);
+int tmy_check_file_perm(struct domain_info *domain, const char *filename,
+			const u8 perm, const char *operation);
+int tmy_check_exec_perm(struct domain_info *domain,
+			const struct path_info *filename,
+			struct tmy_page_buffer *buf);
+int tmy_check_open_permission(struct domain_info *domain,
+			      struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
+			      const int flag);
+int tmy_check_1path_perm(struct domain_info *domain, const u8 operation,
+			 struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt);
+int tmy_check_2path_perm(struct domain_info *domain, const u8 operation,
+			 struct dentry *dentry1, struct vfsmount *mnt1,
+			 struct dentry *dentry2, struct vfsmount *mnt2);
+int tmy_check_rewrite_permission(struct domain_info *domain,
+				 struct file *filp);
+int tmy_find_next_domain(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
+			 struct domain_info **next_domain);
+
+/* Index numbers for Access Controls. */
+
+#define TYPE_SINGLE_PATH_ACL                 0
+#define TYPE_DOUBLE_PATH_ACL                 1
+
+/* Index numbers for File Controls. */
+
+/*
+ * TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL is special. TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL is automatically set
+ * if both TYPE_READ_ACL and TYPE_WRITE_ACL are set. Both TYPE_READ_ACL and
+ * TYPE_WRITE_ACL are automatically set if TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL is set.
+ * TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL is automatically cleared if either TYPE_READ_ACL or
+ * TYPE_WRITE_ACL is cleared. Both TYPE_READ_ACL and TYPE_WRITE_ACL are
+ * automatically cleared if TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL is cleared.
+ */
+
+#define TMY_TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL    0
+#define TMY_TYPE_EXECUTE_ACL       1
+#define TMY_TYPE_READ_ACL          2
+#define TMY_TYPE_WRITE_ACL         3
+#define TMY_TYPE_CREATE_ACL        4
+#define TMY_TYPE_UNLINK_ACL        5
+#define TMY_TYPE_MKDIR_ACL         6
+#define TMY_TYPE_RMDIR_ACL         7
+#define TMY_TYPE_MKFIFO_ACL        8
+#define TMY_TYPE_MKSOCK_ACL        9
+#define TMY_TYPE_MKBLOCK_ACL      10
+#define TMY_TYPE_MKCHAR_ACL       11
+#define TMY_TYPE_TRUNCATE_ACL     12
+#define TMY_TYPE_SYMLINK_ACL      13
+#define TMY_TYPE_REWRITE_ACL      14
+#define MAX_SINGLE_PATH_OPERATION 15
+
+#define TMY_TYPE_LINK_ACL         0
+#define TMY_TYPE_RENAME_ACL       1
+#define MAX_DOUBLE_PATH_OPERATION 2
+
+#define TMY_DOMAINPOLICY          0
+#define TMY_EXCEPTIONPOLICY       1
+#define TMY_DOMAIN_STATUS         2
+#define TMY_PROCESS_STATUS        3
+#define TMY_MEMINFO               4
+#define TMY_SELFDOMAIN            5
+#define TMY_VERSION               6
+#define TMY_PROFILE               7
+#define TMY_MANAGER               8
+#define TMY_UPDATESCOUNTER        9
+
+extern struct domain_info KERNEL_DOMAIN;
+
+static inline struct domain_info *tmy_domain(void)
+{
+	return current_cred()->security;
+}
+
+static inline struct domain_info *tmy_real_domain(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	/* Caller must hold tasklist_lock. */
+	const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task);
+	struct domain_info *domain = cred->security;
+	put_cred(cred);
+	return domain;
+}
+
+#endif


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