Re: New Security Features, Please Comment

[Alan Cox]

> The idea is to not allow the child to change its own uid, or give the
> child any elevated privlages so that should the child be compromised via
> buffer overflow or some other bug, it cant be abused.

But the child process can modify itself, it can open files etc.

So as uid 1 I patch my own code to add a function call to a private
function that will be called regularly. Now as the other uids are
selected I am able to attack all those users file stores.

I don't think your model actually works.
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