[PATCH 7/8] SELinux selinuxfs.c non trivial fixes.

From: Justin P. Mattock
Date: Thu Jul 02 2009 - 01:33:48 EST


Signed-off-by: Justin P. Mattock <justinmattock@xxxxxxxxx>

Fix some comments.
Fix some debug messages.
---
security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
1 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index b4fc506..97d728b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -58,17 +58,17 @@ __setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);

static DEFINE_MUTEX(sel_mutex);

-/* global data for booleans */
+/* Global data for booleans. */
static struct dentry *bool_dir;
static int bool_num;
static char **bool_pending_names;
static int *bool_pending_values;

-/* global data for classes */
+/* Global data for classes. */
static struct dentry *class_dir;
static unsigned long last_class_ino;

-/* global data for policy capabilities */
+/* Global data for policy capabilities. */
static struct dentry *policycap_dir;

extern void selnl_notify_setenforce(int val);
@@ -94,23 +94,23 @@ static int task_has_security(struct task_struct *tsk,

enum sel_inos {
SEL_ROOT_INO = 2,
- SEL_LOAD, /* load policy */
- SEL_ENFORCE, /* get or set enforcing status */
+ SEL_LOAD, /* Load policy. */
+ SEL_ENFORCE, /* Get or set enforcing status. */
SEL_CONTEXT, /* validate context */
- SEL_ACCESS, /* compute access decision */
- SEL_CREATE, /* compute create labeling decision */
- SEL_RELABEL, /* compute relabeling decision */
- SEL_USER, /* compute reachable user contexts */
- SEL_POLICYVERS, /* return policy version for this kernel */
- SEL_COMMIT_BOOLS, /* commit new boolean values */
- SEL_MLS, /* return if MLS policy is enabled */
- SEL_DISABLE, /* disable SELinux until next reboot */
- SEL_MEMBER, /* compute polyinstantiation membership decision */
- SEL_CHECKREQPROT, /* check requested protection, not kernel-applied one */
- SEL_COMPAT_NET, /* whether to use old compat network packet controls */
- SEL_REJECT_UNKNOWN, /* export unknown reject handling to userspace */
- SEL_DENY_UNKNOWN, /* export unknown deny handling to userspace */
- SEL_INO_NEXT, /* The next inode number to use */
+ SEL_ACCESS, /* Compute access decision. */
+ SEL_CREATE, /* Compute create labeling decision. */
+ SEL_RELABEL, /* Compute relabeling decision. */
+ SEL_USER, /* Compute reachable user contexts. */
+ SEL_POLICYVERS, /* Return policy version for this kernel. */
+ SEL_COMMIT_BOOLS, /* Commit new boolean values. */
+ SEL_MLS, /* Return if MLS policy is enabled. */
+ SEL_DISABLE, /* Disable SELinux until next reboot. */
+ SEL_MEMBER, /* Compute polyinstantiation membership decision. */
+ SEL_CHECKREQPROT, /* Check requested protection, not kernel-applied one. */
+ SEL_COMPAT_NET, /* Whether to use old compat network packet controls. */
+ SEL_REJECT_UNKNOWN, /* Export unknown reject handling to userspace. */
+ SEL_DENY_UNKNOWN, /* Export unknown deny handling to userspace. */
+ SEL_INO_NEXT, /* The next inode number to use. */
};

static unsigned long sel_last_ino = SEL_INO_NEXT - 1;
@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_policyvers_ops = {
.read = sel_read_policyvers,
};

-/* declaration for sel_write_load */
+/* Declaration for sel_write_load. */
static int sel_make_bools(void);
static int sel_make_classes(void);
static int sel_make_policycap(void);
@@ -377,7 +377,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_context(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)

if (len > SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: context size (%u) exceeds "
- "payload max\n", __func__, len);
+ "payload max.\n", __func__, len);
length = -ERANGE;
goto out;
}
@@ -581,7 +581,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)

if (len > SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: context size (%u) exceeds "
- "payload max\n", __func__, len);
+ "payload max.\n", __func__, len);
length = -ERANGE;
goto out3;
}
@@ -978,7 +978,7 @@ static int sel_make_bools(void)
int *values = NULL;
u32 sid;

- /* remove any existing files */
+ /* Remove any existing files. */
kfree(bool_pending_names);
kfree(bool_pending_values);
bool_pending_names = NULL;
@@ -1400,7 +1400,8 @@ static int sel_make_perm_files(char *objclass, int classvalue,
goto out1;
}
inode->i_fop = &sel_perm_ops;
- /* i+1 since perm values are 1-indexed */
+ /* i+1 Since perm values are 1-indexed. */
+
inode->i_ino = sel_perm_to_ino(classvalue, i+1);
d_add(dentry, inode);
}
@@ -1481,14 +1482,14 @@ static int sel_make_classes(void)
int rc = 0, nclasses, i;
char **classes;

- /* delete any existing entries */
+ /* Delete any existing entries. */
sel_remove_classes();

rc = security_get_classes(&classes, &nclasses);
if (rc < 0)
goto out;

- /* +2 since classes are 1-indexed */
+ /* +2 Since classes are 1-indexed. */
last_class_ino = sel_class_to_ino(nclasses+2);

for (i = 0; i < nclasses; i++) {
@@ -1564,10 +1565,10 @@ static int sel_make_dir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
inode->i_op = &simple_dir_inode_operations;
inode->i_fop = &simple_dir_operations;
inode->i_ino = ++(*ino);
- /* directory inodes start off with i_nlink == 2 (for "." entry) */
+ /* Directory inodes start off with i_nlink == 2 (for "." entry). */
inc_nlink(inode);
d_add(dentry, inode);
- /* bump link count on parent directory, too */
+ /* Bump link count on parent directory, too. */
inc_nlink(dir);
out:
return ret;
@@ -1692,7 +1693,7 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
out:
return ret;
err:
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: failed while creating inodes\n",
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: Failed while creating inodes.\n",
__func__);
goto out;
}
@@ -1722,7 +1723,7 @@ static int __init init_sel_fs(void)
if (!err) {
selinuxfs_mount = kern_mount(&sel_fs_type);
if (IS_ERR(selinuxfs_mount)) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "selinuxfs: could not mount!\n");
+ printk(KERN_ERR "selinuxfs: Could not mount!\n");
err = PTR_ERR(selinuxfs_mount);
selinuxfs_mount = NULL;
}
--
1.6.3.2

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