Re: [PATCH -v3 1/3] Capabilities: move cap_file_mmap to commoncap.c

[Eric Paris]

On Thu, 2009-07-30 at 13:50 -0400, Eric Paris wrote:
> On Thu, 2009-07-30 at 11:58 -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> > On Thu, 2009-07-30 at 10:54 -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > > Quoting Eric Paris (eparis@xxxxxxxxxx):
> > > > On Thu, 2009-07-30 at 00:14 -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > > > > Quoting Eric Paris (eparis@xxxxxxxxxx):
> > > > > > Currently we duplicate the mmap_min_addr test in cap_file_mmap and in
> > > > > > security_file_mmap if !CONFIG_SECURITY.  This patch moves cap_file_mmap
> > > > > > into commoncap.c and then calls that function directly from
> > > > > > security_file_mmap ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY like all of the other capability
> > > > > > checks are done.
> > > > > 
> > > > > It also
> > > > > 
> > > > > 	1. changes the return value in error case from -EACCES to
> > > > > 	   -EPERM
> > > > > 	2. no onger sets PF_SUPERPRIV in t->flags if the capability
> > > > > 	   is used.
> > > > > 
> > > > > Do we care about these?
> > > > 
> > > > Personally, not really, but I'll gladly put them back if you care.   #2
> > > > seems more interesting to me than number 1.   I actually kinda like
> > > > getting EPERM from caps rather than EACCES since them I know if I was
> > > > denied by selinux or by caps.....
> > > > 
> > > > -Eric
> > > 
> > > Yup, I asked bc I didn't particularly care myself.
> > > 
> > > I think I agree with you about -EPERM being better anyway.  However I
> > > (now) think in this case PF_SUPERPRIV definately should be set, as this
> > > is a clear use of a capability to do something that couldn't have been
> > > done without it.
> > 
> > On a related but different note, we should consider all current uses of
> > cap_capable(), as they represent capability checks that will not be
> > subject to a further restrictive check by other security modules.  In
> > this case and in the vm_enough_memory case, that is intentional, but not
> > so clear for other uses in commoncap.c.
> 
> Most of commoncap.c is called either as a secondary hook from the active
> lsm (aka selinux calls the commoncap.c functions) or in the !
> CONFIG_SECURITY case.
> 
> I'll audit this afternoon to see which of them might not fit these
> rules....

I just went through all of the cap_* function in commoncap.c to see
which of them are being or are not being called from the selinux hooks.
Only 3 of them look interesting.

cap_inode_setxattr
cap_inode_removexattr
cap_vm_enough_memory

All of the other functions are either called from hooks.c or SELinux
does not define that LSM hook, so it just defaults to the cap_* hook.

These 3 are all a bit odd because the logic inside the cap_ hook is
duplicated inside the selinux_ hook.  I'd much rather see the selinux_
hook call the cap_ hook.  I'm going to think on that topic, but it's a
different set of patches and I don't see missing checks today as the
logic seems to line up.

-Eric

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