Re: [PATCH] Dynamic port labeling V2

[David P. Quigley]

I have several questions about this.

1) Where is it located?
2) Is your proposal to implement it as a new fs with a name something
like portfs?
3) How does it get populated initially? Do you have a file for each port
right off the bat? Do you only have files for ports with policy or whose
permissions differ from the default?
4) How do I assign a label to the port? You have an issue here that
these files are objects themselves. You can't just label the file with
what you want the port labeled because now you can't mediate access to
these file objects outside of the label on the port itself.

On Mon, 2009-11-30 at 20:52 -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> Paul Nuzzi wrote:
> > Second version of the dynamic port labeling patch.
> 
> So I've looked through both versions of this patch and I can't
> help but think that you'd get better mileage out of a file system
> interface than this SELinux specific implementation. If you had
> something like
> 
>     /port/22
> 
> with default owner root and mode rw-------
> 
>     /port/3306
> 
> with default owner root and mode rw-rw-rw-
> 
> you could address a bunch of the complaints about port ownership that
> you hear every day. Further, if the port filesystem supported xattrs
> you could tie in SELinux as easily as you are doing it below and get
> Smack for an extra $1.98, not to mention saving every other LSM the
> grief of defining Yet Another way to define port accesses.
> 
> It bothers me that there is a perfectly reasonable way to provide the
> specific behavior you're looking for (SELinux label on a port) that
> generalizes so cleanly and that it's not being proposed.
> 
> 
> >   Changed the name of
> > the selinuxfs interface to portcon and changed the interface to only
> > allow five arguments instead of the variable four or five.   
> >
> > Added a mechanism to add/delete/update port labels with an interface in 
> > the selinuxfs filesystem.  This will give administrators the ability to
> > update port labels faster than reloading the entire policy with
> > semanage.  The administrator will also need less privilege since they
> > don't have to be authorized to reload the full policy.
> >
> > A listing of all port labels will be output if the file /selinux/portcon
> > is read.  Labels could be added or deleted with the following commands 
> >
> > echo -n "del system_u:object_r:ssh_port_t:s0 6 22 22" > /selinux/portcon
> > echo -n "add system_u:object_r:telnetd_port_t:s0 6 22 22" > /selinux/portcon
> >
> > Labels can be atomically changed with the add command.  
> >
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Paul Nuzzi <pjnuzzi@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> >
> > --- 
> >  security/selinux/hooks.c            |    1
> >  security/selinux/include/classmap.h |    2
> >  security/selinux/include/security.h |    9 ++
> >  security/selinux/selinuxfs.c        |   96 ++++++++++++++++++++++
> >  security/selinux/ss/services.c      |  154 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >  5 files changed, 260 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > index a29d661..5aceb74 100644
> > --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> > @@ -1224,7 +1224,6 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
> >  	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
> >  	u32 sid;
> >  	struct dentry *dentry;
> > -#define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
> >  	char *context = NULL;
> >  	unsigned len = 0;
> >  	int rc = 0;
> > diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
> > index 8b32e95..925edb6 100644
> > --- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
> > +++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
> > @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
> >  	  { "compute_av", "compute_create", "compute_member",
> >  	    "check_context", "load_policy", "compute_relabel",
> >  	    "compute_user", "setenforce", "setbool", "setsecparam",
> > -	    "setcheckreqprot", NULL } },
> > +	    "setcheckreqprot", "portcon", NULL } },
> >  	{ "process",
> >  	  { "fork", "transition", "sigchld", "sigkill",
> >  	    "sigstop", "signull", "signal", "ptrace", "getsched", "setsched",
> > diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
> > index 2553266..25a5054 100644
> > --- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
> > +++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
> > @@ -169,6 +169,15 @@ int security_fs_use(const char *fstype, unsigned int *behavior,
> >  int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype, char *name, u16 sclass,
> >  	u32 *sid);
> >  
> > +int security_ocon_port_add(u16 protocol, u16 low, u16 high, u32 sid,
> > +			   char *scontext);
> > +
> > +int security_ocon_port_del(u16 protocol, u16 low, u16 high, u32 sid,
> > +			   char *scontext);
> > +
> > +int security_ocon_port_read(char **buf);
> > +#define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
> > +
> >  #ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
> >  int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
> >  				   u32 *sid);
> > diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
> > index fab36fd..a21be6c 100644
> > --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
> > +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
> > @@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ enum sel_inos {
> >  	SEL_COMPAT_NET,	/* whether to use old compat network packet controls */
> >  	SEL_REJECT_UNKNOWN, /* export unknown reject handling to userspace */
> >  	SEL_DENY_UNKNOWN, /* export unknown deny handling to userspace */
> > +	SEL_OCON_PORT,  /* add OCON_PORT to the list */
> >  	SEL_INO_NEXT,	/* The next inode number to use */
> >  };
> >  
> > @@ -253,6 +254,100 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_disable_ops = {
> >  	.write		= sel_write_disable,
> >  };
> >  
> > +static ssize_t sel_write_ocon_port(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
> > +				 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
> > +{
> > +	ssize_t length;
> > +	unsigned int low = 0, high = 0, protocol = 0;
> > +	char *page, *scontext, *command;
> > +	u32 sid;
> > +#define OCONCOMMANDLEN 4
> > +#define OCON_ADD_COMMAND "add"
> > +#define OCON_DEL_COMMAND "del"
> > +
> > +	length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__PORTCON);
> > +	if (length)
> > +		return length;
> > +
> > +	if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
> > +		return -ENOMEM;
> > +	if (*ppos != 0) {
> > +		/* No partial writes. */
> > +		return -EINVAL;
> > +	}
> > +	page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
> > +	if (!page)
> > +		goto nomem;
> > +	scontext = kzalloc(INITCONTEXTLEN, GFP_KERNEL);
> > +	if (!scontext)
> > +		goto nomem1;
> > +	command = kzalloc(OCONCOMMANDLEN, GFP_KERNEL);
> > +	if (!command)
> > +		goto nomem2;
> > +
> > +	length = -EFAULT;
> > +	if (copy_from_user(page, buf, count))
> > +		goto out;
> > +
> > +	length = sscanf(page, "%3s %255s %u %u %u", command, scontext,
> > +			 &protocol, &low, &high);
> > +	if (length < 5) {
> > +		length = -EINVAL;
> > +		goto out;
> > +	}
> > +	length = security_context_to_sid(scontext, strlen(scontext), &sid);
> > +	if (length < 0) {
> > +		length = -EINVAL;
> > +		goto out;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	if (strncmp(OCON_ADD_COMMAND, command, strlen(OCON_ADD_COMMAND)) == 0)
> > +		length = security_ocon_port_add(protocol, low, high, sid,
> > +						 scontext);
> > +	else if (strncmp(OCON_DEL_COMMAND, command, strlen(OCON_DEL_COMMAND))
> > +		 == 0)
> > +		length = security_ocon_port_del(protocol, low, high, sid,
> > +						scontext);
> > +	else {
> > +		length = -EINVAL;
> > +		goto out;
> > +	}
> > +	if (length < 0)
> > +		goto out;
> > +	length = count;
> > +out:
> > +	kfree(command);
> > +	kfree(scontext);
> > +	free_page((unsigned long) page);
> > +	return length;
> > +
> > +nomem2:
> > +	kfree(scontext);
> > +nomem1:
> > +	free_page((unsigned long) page);
> > +nomem:
> > +	return -ENOMEM;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static ssize_t sel_read_ocon_port(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
> > +				   size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
> > +{
> > +	ssize_t length;
> > +	char *buf_tmp = NULL;
> > +
> > +	length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__PORTCON);
> > +	if (length)
> > +		return length;
> > +
> > +	length = security_ocon_port_read(&buf_tmp);
> > +	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, buf_tmp, length);
> > +}
> > +
> > +static const struct file_operations sel_ocon_port_ops = {
> > +	.write		= sel_write_ocon_port,
> > +	.read		= sel_read_ocon_port,
> > +};
> > +
> >  static ssize_t sel_read_policyvers(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
> >  				   size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
> >  {
> > @@ -1596,6 +1691,7 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
> >  		[SEL_CHECKREQPROT] = {"checkreqprot", &sel_checkreqprot_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
> >  		[SEL_REJECT_UNKNOWN] = {"reject_unknown", &sel_handle_unknown_ops, S_IRUGO},
> >  		[SEL_DENY_UNKNOWN] = {"deny_unknown", &sel_handle_unknown_ops, S_IRUGO},
> > +		[SEL_OCON_PORT] = {"portcon", &sel_ocon_port_ops, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR},
> >  		/* last one */ {""}
> >  	};
> >  	ret = simple_fill_super(sb, SELINUX_MAGIC, selinux_files);
> > diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> > index f270e37..3b920e3 100644
> > --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> > +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> > @@ -1827,6 +1827,160 @@ err:
> >  
> >  }
> >  
> > +int security_ocon_port_add(u16 protocol, u16 low, u16 high, u32 sid,
> > +							 char *scontext)
> > +{
> > +	int rc = 0;
> > +	struct ocontext *c;
> > +	struct context ctx;
> > +	struct ocontext *add = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ocontext), GFP_KERNEL);
> > +
> > +	if (!add)
> > +		return -ENOMEM;
> > +	else if (low > high) {
> > +		kfree(add);
> > +		return -EINVAL;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
> > +	rc = string_to_context_struct(&policydb, &sidtab, scontext,
> > +					 strlen(scontext), &ctx, sid);
> > +	if (rc) {
> > +		rc = -EINVAL;
> > +		goto out;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	add->u.port.protocol = protocol;
> > +	add->u.port.low_port = low;
> > +	add->u.port.high_port = high;
> > +	add->sid[0] = sid;
> > +	add->context[0] = ctx;
> > +	for (c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_PORT]; c; c = c->next) {
> > +		if (add->u.port.protocol == c->u.port.protocol &&
> > +		    add->u.port.low_port == c->u.port.low_port &&
> > +		    add->u.port.high_port == c->u.port.high_port) {
> > +			printk(KERN_DEBUG "Duplicate netport %d - %d.. "
> > +					  "changing permissions\n",
> > +			       add->u.port.low_port, add->u.port.high_port);
> > +			c->sid[0] = add->sid[0];
> > +			context_destroy(&c->context[0]);
> > +			c->context[0] = add->context[0];
> > +			context_destroy(&add->context[0]);
> > +			kfree(add);
> > +			avc_ss_reset(0);
> > +			goto out;
> > +		}
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	add->next = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_PORT];
> > +	policydb.ocontexts[OCON_PORT] = add;
> > +	avc_ss_reset(0);
> > +out:
> > +	if (rc) {
> > +		context_destroy(&add->context[0]);
> > +		kfree(add);
> > +	}
> > +	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
> > +	return rc;
> > +}
> > +
> > +int security_ocon_port_del(u16 protocol, u16 low, u16 high, u32 sid,
> > +							char *scontext)
> > +{
> > +	int rc = 0;
> > +	struct ocontext *c, *before_c;
> > +	struct context ctx;
> > +
> > +	if (low > high)
> > +		return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > +	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
> > +	rc = string_to_context_struct(&policydb, &sidtab, scontext,
> > +					 strlen(scontext), &ctx, sid);
> > +	if (rc) {
> > +		rc = -EINVAL;
> > +		goto out;
> > +	}
> > +	for (before_c = NULL, c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_PORT]; c;
> > +	     before_c = c, c = c->next) {
> > +		if (c->u.port.protocol == protocol &&
> > +		    c->u.port.low_port == low &&
> > +		    c->u.port.high_port == high &&
> > +		    c->context[0].type == ctx.type &&
> > +		    c->context[0].role == ctx.role &&
> > +		    c->context[0].user == ctx.user) {
> > +			if (before_c == NULL)
> > +				policydb.ocontexts[OCON_PORT] = c->next;
> > +			else
> > +				before_c->next = c->next;
> > +			context_destroy(&c->context[0]);
> > +			kfree(c);
> > +			avc_ss_reset(0);
> > +			break;
> > +		}
> > +	}
> > +	if (c == NULL) {
> > +		printk(KERN_DEBUG "Netport not found %d - %d\n", low, high);
> > +		rc = -ENXIO;
> > +	}
> > +out:
> > +	context_destroy(&ctx);
> > +	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
> > +	return rc;
> > +}
> > +
> > +int security_ocon_port_read(char **buf)
> > +{
> > +	unsigned int buf_size = 0, old_size = 0, len;
> > +	struct ocontext *c;
> > +	char *scontext;
> > +	char *buf_tmp = NULL;
> > +	int rc = 0;
> > +	int line_size = INITCONTEXTLEN + (sizeof(unsigned int) * 3) +
> > +			 (sizeof(char) * 5);
> > +	char addline[line_size];
> > +
> > +	/* protocol low-high scontext */
> > +	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
> > +	if (policydb.ocontexts[OCON_PORT] == NULL)
> > +		goto out;
> > +
> > +	for (c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_PORT]; c; c = c->next) {
> > +		rc = context_struct_to_string(&(c->context[0]), &scontext,
> > +					      &len);
> > +		if (rc < 0) {
> > +			kfree(buf_tmp);
> > +			rc = -EINVAL;
> > +			goto out;
> > +		}
> > +		if (len > INITCONTEXTLEN) {
> > +			kfree(buf_tmp);
> > +			kfree(scontext);
> > +			rc = -EOVERFLOW;
> > +			goto out;
> > +		}
> > +		snprintf(addline, line_size, "%u %u-%u %s\n",
> > +			c->u.port.protocol, c->u.port.low_port,
> > +			c->u.port.high_port, scontext);
> > +		kfree(scontext);
> > +		buf_size += strlen(addline);
> > +		buf_tmp = krealloc(buf_tmp, buf_size, GFP_KERNEL);
> > +		if (!buf_tmp) {
> > +			rc = -ENOMEM;
> > +			goto out;
> > +		}
> > +		for (rc = old_size; rc < buf_size; rc++)
> > +			buf_tmp[rc] = '\0';
> > +		strncat(buf_tmp, addline, buf_size);
> > +		old_size = buf_size;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	*buf = buf_tmp;
> > +out:
> > +	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
> > +	return rc;
> > +}
> > +
> >  /**
> >   * security_port_sid - Obtain the SID for a port.
> >   * @protocol: protocol number
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> > This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list.
> > If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxx with
> > the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
> >
> >
> >   
> 
> 
> --
> This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list.
> If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxx with
> the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.

--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/