Re: [RFC] [PATCH 1/7] User Space Breakpoint Assistance Layer (UBP)
From: Peter Zijlstra
Date: Sun Jan 17 2010 - 10:03:28 EST
On Sun, 2010-01-17 at 16:59 +0200, Avi Kivity wrote:
> On 01/17/2010 04:52 PM, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > On Sun, 2010-01-17 at 16:39 +0200, Avi Kivity wrote:
> >> On 01/15/2010 11:50 AM, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> >>> As previously stated, I think poking at a process's address space is an
> >>> utter no-go.
> >> Why not reserve an address space range for this, somewhere near the top
> >> of memory? It doesn't have to be populated if it isn't used.
> > Because I think poking at a process's address space like that is gross.
> > Also, if its fixed size you're imposing artificial limits on the number
> > of possible probes.
> btw, an alternative is to require the caller to provide the address
> space for this. If the caller is in another process, we need to allow
> it to play with the target's address space (i.e. mmap_process()). I
> don't think uprobes justifies this by itself, but mmap_process() can be
> very useful for sandboxing with seccomp.
mmap_process() sounds utterly gross, one process playing with another
process's address space.. yuck!
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