Re: linux-next: add utrace tree
From: Frank Ch. Eigler
Date: Sat Jan 23 2010 - 07:04:33 EST
On Sat, Jan 23, 2010 at 07:04:01AM +0100, Ingo Molnar wrote:
> [...] Also, if any systemtap person is interested in helping us
> create a more generic filter engine out of the current ftrace filter
> engine (which is really a precursor of a safe, sandboxed in-kernel
> script engine), that would be excellent as well. [...]
Thank you for the invitation.
> More could be done - a simple C-like set of function perhaps - some minimal
> per probe local variable state, etc. (perhaps even looping as well, with a
> limit on number of predicament executions per filter invocation.)
Yes, at some point when such bytecode intepreter gets rich enough, one
may not need the translated-to-C means of running scripts.
> ( _Such_ a facility, could then perhaps be used to allow applications access
> to safe syscall sandboxing techniques: i.e. a programmable seccomp concept
> in essence, controlled via ASCII space filter expressions [...]
> IMHO that would be a superior concept for security modules too [...]
> [...] specific functionality with an immediately visible upside,
> with no need for opaque hooks.
This OTOH seem like rather a stretch. If one claims that "opaque
hooks" are bad, so instead have hooks that jump not to auditable C
code but an bytecode interpreter? And have the bytecodes be uploaded
from userspace? How is this supposed to produce "transparency" from
the kernel/hook point of view?
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