Re: [PATCH v2] sanitize task->comm to avoid leaking escape codes

From: Stefani Seibold
Date: Mon Jun 28 2010 - 13:48:56 EST

Am Freitag, den 25.06.2010, 08:56 +0900 schrieb KOSAKI Motohiro:
> > Through get_task_comm() and many direct uses of task->comm in the kernel,
> > it is possible for escape codes and other non-printables to leak into
> > dmesg, syslog, etc. In the worst case, these strings could be used to
> > attack administrators using vulnerable terminal emulators, and at least
> > cause confusion through the injection of \r characters.
> >
> > This patch sanitizes task->comm to only contain printable characters
> > when it is set. Additionally, it redefines get_task_comm so that it is
> > more obvious when misused by callers (presently nothing was incorrectly
> > calling get_task_comm's unsafe use of strncpy).
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> I've reviewed this patch briefly, Here is my personal concern...
> On Linux, non-printable leaking is fundamental, only fixing task->comm
> doesn't solve syslog exploit issue. Probably all /proc/kmsg user should
> have escaping non-pritables code.
> However, task->comm is one of most easy injection data of kernel, because
> we have prctl(PR_SET_NAME), attacker don't need root privilege. So,
> conservative assumption seems guard from crappy fault. Plus, this patch
> is very small and our small TASK_COMM_LEN lead that we don't need
> big performance concern.
> So, I don't find demerit in this proposal. but I'm not security specialist,
> it's only personal thinking.
Agree. I think a escaped printk should be a more generic solution.


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