[PATCH] NX protection for kernel data : fix xen boot

From: Matthieu CASTET
Date: Thu Jan 20 2011 - 15:11:45 EST


Xen want page table pages read only.

But the initial page table (from head_*.S) live in .data or .bss.

That was broken by 64edc8ed5ffae999d8d413ba006850e9e34166cb.
Revert the problematic part as it is only a protection and
not really needed.

Signed-off-by: Matthieu CASTET <castet.matthieu@xxxxxxx>
Tested-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c | 8 --------
1 files changed, 0 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c b/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c
index 2ad6c48..951eb4a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c
@@ -256,7 +256,6 @@ static inline pgprot_t static_protections(pgprot_t prot, unsigned long address,
unsigned long pfn)
{
pgprot_t forbidden = __pgprot(0);
- pgprot_t required = __pgprot(0);

/*
* The BIOS area between 640k and 1Mb needs to be executable for
@@ -286,12 +285,6 @@ static inline pgprot_t static_protections(pgprot_t prot, unsigned long address,
if (within(pfn, __pa((unsigned long)__start_rodata) >> PAGE_SHIFT,
__pa((unsigned long)__end_rodata) >> PAGE_SHIFT))
pgprot_val(forbidden) |= _PAGE_RW;
- /*
- * .data and .bss should always be writable.
- */
- if (within(address, (unsigned long)_sdata, (unsigned long)_edata) ||
- within(address, (unsigned long)__bss_start, (unsigned long)__bss_stop))
- pgprot_val(required) |= _PAGE_RW;

#if defined(CONFIG_X86_64) && defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA)
/*
@@ -331,7 +324,6 @@ static inline pgprot_t static_protections(pgprot_t prot, unsigned long address,
#endif

prot = __pgprot(pgprot_val(prot) & ~pgprot_val(forbidden));
- prot = __pgprot(pgprot_val(prot) | pgprot_val(required));

return prot;
}
--
1.7.2.3


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