Re: [PATCH] don't allow CAP_NET_ADMIN to load non-netdev kernelmodules
From: Ben Hutchings
Date: Fri Feb 25 2011 - 12:48:24 EST
On Fri, 2011-02-25 at 12:25 -0500, Valdis.Kletnieks@xxxxxx wrote:
> On Fri, 25 Feb 2011 18:14:14 +0300, Vasiliy Kulikov said:
> > Since a8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c any process with
> > CAP_NET_ADMIN may load any module from /lib/modules/. This doesn't mean
> > that CAP_NET_ADMIN is a superset of CAP_SYS_MODULE as modules are limited
> > to /lib/modules/**. However, CAP_NET_ADMIN capability shouldn't allow
> > anybody load any module not related to networking.
> > This patch restricts an ability of autoloading modules to netdev modules
> > with explicit aliases. Currently there are only three users of the
> > feature: ipip, ip_gre and sit.
> And you stop an attacker from simply recompiling the module with a suitable
> MODULE_ALIAS line added, how, exactly? This patch may make sense down the
> road, but not while it's still trivial for a malicious root user to drop stuff
> into /lib/modules.
A process running as root normally has CAP_NET_ADMIN, but not every
process with CAP_NET_ADMIN will be running as root.
> And if you're going the route "but SELinux/SMACK/Tomoyo will prevent a malicious
> root user from doing that", then the obvious reply is "this should be part of those
> subsystems rather than something done one-off like this (especially as it has a chance
> of breaking legitimate setups that use the current scheme).
The notional attacker has CAP_NET_ADMIN, perhaps through a vulnerable
service or a vulnerable set-capability executable. They do not yet have
full root access and so cannot install a module, even in the absence of
So long as the attacker is able to load arbitrary modules, however, they
could exploit a vulnerability in any installed (not loaded) module.
Again, LSMs are irrelevant to this as they do not protect against kernel
Ben Hutchings, Senior Software Engineer, Solarflare Communications
Not speaking for my employer; that's the marketing department's job.
They asked us to note that Solarflare product names are trademarked.
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