Re: [PATCH] don't allow CAP_NET_ADMIN to load non-netdev kernelmodules

From: Vasiliy Kulikov
Date: Fri Feb 25 2011 - 14:02:16 EST

On Fri, Feb 25, 2011 at 10:47 -0800, David Miller wrote:
> From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Date: Fri, 25 Feb 2011 18:14:14 +0300
> > Since a8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c any process with
> > CAP_NET_ADMIN may load any module from /lib/modules/. This doesn't mean
> > that CAP_NET_ADMIN is a superset of CAP_SYS_MODULE as modules are limited
> > to /lib/modules/**. However, CAP_NET_ADMIN capability shouldn't allow
> > anybody load any module not related to networking.
> Why go through this naming change, which does break things, instead of
> simply adding a capability mask tag or similar to modules somehow. You
> could stick it into a special elf section or similar.
> Doesn't that make tons more sense than this?

This is not "simply", adding special section for a single workaround
seems like an overkill for me - this touches the core (modules'
internals), which is not related to the initial CAP_* problem at all.

I'd be happy with not breaking anything, but I don't see any acceptable


Vasiliy Kulikov - bringing security into open computing environments
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