Re: Linux capabilities shouldn't be lost during setuid to non-rootfrom root or to another non-root uid from a non-root uid.

[Serge E. Hallyn]

Quoting crocket (crockabiscuit@xxxxxxxxx):
> I don't like the fact that an application should be linux-specific to
> keep capabilities after setuid.
> If users added capabilities to a file, they would know what they were
> doing, and they would want applications to keep capabilities even
> after setuid.

Alternatively, you could call the program using a wrapper which first
sets the SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP securebit, after which setuid would
not trigger any capability changes.

-serge
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