Re: [PATCH 2/3] TPM: Close data_pending and data_buffer races

From: Tim Gardner
Date: Fri Dec 23 2011 - 09:26:12 EST


On 12/22/2011 01:02 PM, Rajiv Andrade wrote:

Thanks, Rajiv Andrade Security Development IBM Linux Technology Center

On 22-12-2011 16:44, Tim Gardner wrote:
On 12/22/2011 10:42 AM, Rajiv Andrade wrote:
On 20-12-2011 17:39, Tim Gardner wrote:
On 12/20/2011 09:38 AM, Rajiv Andrade wrote:
On 06/12/11 16:29, Tim Gardner wrote:
There is a race betwen tpm_read() and tpm_write where both
chip->data_pending
and chip->data_buffer can be changed by tpm_write() when tpm_read()
clears chip->data_pending, but before tpm_read() grabs the mutex.

Protect changes to chip->data_pending and chip->data_buffer by
expanding
the scope of chip->buffer_mutex.

Reported-by: Seth Forshee<seth.forshee@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Debora Velarde<debora@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Rajiv Andrade<srajiv@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Marcel Selhorst<m.selhorst@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: tpmdd-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner<tim.gardner@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c | 17 +++++++++--------
1 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
index b366b34..70bf9e5 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
@@ -1074,12 +1074,15 @@ ssize_t tpm_write(struct file *file, const
char __user *buf,
struct tpm_chip *chip = file->private_data;
size_t in_size = size, out_size;

+ mutex_lock(&chip->buffer_mutex);
+
/* cannot perform a write until the read has cleared
either via tpm_read or a user_read_timer timeout */
- while (atomic_read(&chip->data_pending) != 0)
+ while (atomic_read(&chip->data_pending) != 0) {
+ mutex_unlock(&chip->buffer_mutex);
msleep(TPM_TIMEOUT);
-
- mutex_lock(&chip->buffer_mutex);
+ mutex_lock(&chip->buffer_mutex);
+ }

if (in_size> TPM_BUFSIZE)
in_size = TPM_BUFSIZE;
@@ -1112,22 +1115,20 @@ ssize_t tpm_read(struct file *file, char
__user *buf,

del_singleshot_timer_sync(&chip->user_read_timer);
flush_work_sync(&chip->work);
- ret_size = atomic_read(&chip->data_pending);
- atomic_set(&chip->data_pending, 0);
+ mutex_lock(&chip->buffer_mutex);
+ ret_size = atomic_xchg(&chip->data_pending, 0);
if (ret_size> 0) { /* relay data */
ssize_t orig_ret_size = ret_size;
if (size< ret_size)
ret_size = size;

- mutex_lock(&chip->buffer_mutex);
rc = copy_to_user(buf, chip->data_buffer, ret_size);
memset(chip->data_buffer, 0, orig_ret_size);
if (rc)
ret_size = -EFAULT;

What about just moving atomic_set(&chip->data_pending, 0); to here?
If I'm not missing anything, this would be cleaner.

Rajiv

I'm not sure I agree. Moving just that statement doesn't close the
race. Perhaps you could send me your version of this patch so that its
clear what you are suggesting.

rtg
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
index 6a8771f..6a37212b 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.c
@@ -1210,7 +1210,6 @@ ssize_t tpm_read(struct file *file, char __user
*buf,
del_singleshot_timer_sync(&chip->user_read_timer);
flush_work_sync(&chip->work);
ret_size = atomic_read(&chip->data_pending);
- atomic_set(&chip->data_pending, 0);
if (ret_size> 0) { /* relay data */
if (size< ret_size)
ret_size = size;
@@ -1223,6 +1222,7 @@ ssize_t tpm_read(struct file *file, char __user
*buf,
mutex_unlock(&chip->buffer_mutex);
} + atomic_set(&chip->data_pending, 0);
return ret_size;
}

If we reset chip->data_pending after the buffer was copied to userspace,
it's guaranteed that tpm_write() won't touch such buffer before
tpm_read()
handles it, given it polls chip->data_pending first.


NAK - this patch makes it worse (if I'm reading your email client
garbled patch correctly). Now it races with tpm_write() as well as
timeout_work(). You cannot futz with chip->data_pending outside of the
exclusion zones. Consider what will happen if a user process just
loops doing reads. chip->data_pending gets cleared every time
tpm_read() is called, regardless of what tpm_write() or timeout_work()
are doing at the time.

Not sure how it's displaying for you, but your mail client is eating all
whitespaces when sending. Look back here what I said:

http://marc.info/?l=tpmdd-devel&m=132439922903276&w=2


You're right. I'm not sure whats going on with my Thunderbird client, but it appears to be a change in behavior. I've been using this specific instance since Ubuntu 10.04 was released.

It's inside the mutex region.


Actually, the patch you sent (https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/12/22/257) is _outside_ the mutex area, but I got your drift.

Even clearing chip->data_pending _inside_ the mutex area, I'm not sure it closes all of the race windows. I think its still possible to race with mod_timer() and del_singleshot_timer_sync(). Therein lies my point, if the exclusion code is not _obviously_ correct for something this simple, then its probably not. I think my patch is the correct approach.

This would require another fix though. tpm_write() doesn't check
tpm_transmit return code (and it should).
In case it returns an error (< 0), chip->data_pending would remain the
same forever with that change.


This observation is also correct, but not relevant to the exclusion races. It deserves a separate patch.

<snip>
--
Tim Gardner tim.gardner@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
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