Re: [PATCH v8 3/8] seccomp: add system call filtering using BPF

[Indan Zupancic]

On Thu, February 16, 2012 21:02, Will Drewry wrote:
> [This patch depends on luto@xxxxxxx's no_new_privs patch:
>  https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/1/30/264
> ]
>
> This patch adds support for seccomp mode 2.  Mode 2 introduces the
> ability for unprivileged processes to install system call filtering
> policy expressed in terms of a Berkeley Packet Filter (BPF) program.
> This program will be evaluated in the kernel for each system call
> the task makes and computes a result based on data in the format
> of struct seccomp_data.
>
> A filter program may be installed by calling:
>   struct sock_fprog fprog = { ... };
>   ...
>   prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, 2, &fprog);

Please add an arg to tell the filter mode.

>
> The return value of the filter program determines if the system call is
> allowed to proceed or denied.  If the first filter program installed
> allows prctl(2) calls, then the above call may be made repeatedly
> by a task to further reduce its access to the kernel.  All attached
> programs must be evaluated before a system call will be allowed to
> proceed.
>
> To avoid CONFIG_COMPAT related landmines, once a filter program is
> installed using specific is_compat_task() value, it is not allowed to
> make system calls using the alternate entry point.

Just allow paths with a filter and deny paths without a filter installed.

> Filter programs will be inherited across fork/clone and execve.
> However, if the task attaching the filter is unprivileged
> (!CAP_SYS_ADMIN) the no_new_privs bit will be set on the task.  This
> ensures that unprivileged tasks cannot attach filters that affect
> privileged tasks (e.g., setuid binary).
>
> There are a number of benefits to this approach. A few of which are
> as follows:
> - BPF has been exposed to userland for a long time
> - BPF optimization (and JIT'ing) are well understood
> - Userland already knows its ABI: system call numbers and desired
>   arguments
> - No time-of-check-time-of-use vulnerable data accesses are possible.
> - system call arguments are loaded on access only to minimize copying
>   required for system call policy decisions.
>
> Mode 2 support is restricted to architectures that enable
> HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER.  In this patch, the primary dependency is on
> syscall_get_arguments().  The full desired scope of this feature will
> add a few minor additional requirements expressed later in this series.
> Based on discussion, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO and SECCOMP_RET_TRACE seem to be
> the desired additional functionality.
>
> No architectures are enabled in this patch.
>
>  v8: - use bpf_chk_filter, bpf_run_filter. update load_fns
>      - Lots of fixes courtesy of indan@xxxxxx:
>      -- fix up load behavior, compat fixups, and merge alloc code,
>      -- renamed pc and dropped __packed, use bool compat.
>      -- Added a hidden CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER to synthesize non-arch
>         dependencies
>  v7:  (massive overhaul thanks to Indan, others)
>      - added CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
>      - merged into seccomp.c
>      - minimal seccomp_filter.h
>      - no config option (part of seccomp)
>      - no new prctl
>      - doesn't break seccomp on systems without asm/syscall.h
>        (works but arg access always fails)
>      - dropped seccomp_init_task, extra free functions, ...
>      - dropped the no-asm/syscall.h code paths
>      - merges with network sk_run_filter and sk_chk_filter
>  v6: - fix memory leak on attach compat check failure
>      - require no_new_privs || CAP_SYS_ADMIN prior to filter
>        installation. (luto@xxxxxxx)
>      - s/seccomp_struct_/seccomp_/ for macros/functions (amwang@xxxxxxxxxx)
>      - cleaned up Kconfig (amwang@xxxxxxxxxx)
>      - on block, note if the call was compat (so the # means something)
>  v5: - uses syscall_get_arguments
>        (indan@xxxxxx,oleg@xxxxxxxxxx, mcgrathr@xxxxxxxxxxxx)
>       - uses union-based arg storage with hi/lo struct to
>         handle endianness.  Compromises between the two alternate
>         proposals to minimize extra arg shuffling and account for
>         endianness assuming userspace uses offsetof().
>         (mcgrathr@xxxxxxxxxxxx, indan@xxxxxx)
>       - update Kconfig description
>       - add include/seccomp_filter.h and add its installation
>       - (naive) on-demand syscall argument loading
>       - drop seccomp_t (eparis@xxxxxxxxxx)
>  v4:  - adjusted prctl to make room for PR_[SG]ET_NO_NEW_PRIVS
>       - now uses current->no_new_privs
>         (luto@xxxxxxx,torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx)
>       - assign names to seccomp modes (rdunlap@xxxxxxxxxxxx)
>       - fix style issues (rdunlap@xxxxxxxxxxxx)
>       - reworded Kconfig entry (rdunlap@xxxxxxxxxxxx)
>  v3:  - macros to inline (oleg@xxxxxxxxxx)
>       - init_task behavior fixed (oleg@xxxxxxxxxx)
>       - drop creator entry and extra NULL check (oleg@xxxxxxxxxx)
>       - alloc returns -EINVAL on bad sizing (serge.hallyn@xxxxxxxxxxxxx)
>       - adds tentative use of "always_unprivileged" as per
>         torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx and luto@xxxxxxx
>  v2:  - (patch 2 only)
>
> Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
>  arch/Kconfig            |   17 +++
>  include/linux/Kbuild    |    1 +
>  include/linux/seccomp.h |   69 ++++++++++-
>  kernel/fork.c           |    3 +
>  kernel/seccomp.c        |  327 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>  kernel/sys.c            |    2 +-
>  6 files changed, 399 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig
> index 4f55c73..c6ba1db 100644
> --- a/arch/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/Kconfig
> @@ -199,4 +199,21 @@ config HAVE_CMPXCHG_LOCAL
>  config HAVE_CMPXCHG_DOUBLE
>  	bool
>
> +config HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
> +	bool
> +	help
> +	  This symbol should be selected by an architecure if it provides
> +	  asm/syscall.h, specifically syscall_get_arguments().
> +
> +config SECCOMP_FILTER
> +	def_bool y
> +	depends on HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER && SECCOMP && NET
> +	help
> +	  Enable tasks to build secure computing environments defined
> +	  in terms of Berkeley Packet Filter programs which implement
> +	  task-defined system call filtering polices.
> +
> +	  See Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt for more
> +	  information on the topic of seccomp filtering.
> +
>  source "kernel/gcov/Kconfig"
> diff --git a/include/linux/Kbuild b/include/linux/Kbuild
> index c94e717..d41ba12 100644
> --- a/include/linux/Kbuild
> +++ b/include/linux/Kbuild
> @@ -330,6 +330,7 @@ header-y += scc.h
>  header-y += sched.h
>  header-y += screen_info.h
>  header-y += sdla.h
> +header-y += seccomp.h
>  header-y += securebits.h
>  header-y += selinux_netlink.h
>  header-y += sem.h
> diff --git a/include/linux/seccomp.h b/include/linux/seccomp.h
> index d61f27f..2bee1f7 100644
> --- a/include/linux/seccomp.h
> +++ b/include/linux/seccomp.h
> @@ -1,14 +1,60 @@
>  #ifndef _LINUX_SECCOMP_H
>  #define _LINUX_SECCOMP_H
>
> +#include <linux/compiler.h>
> +#include <linux/types.h>
> +
> +
> +/* Valid values for seccomp.mode and prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, <mode>) */
> +#define SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED	0 /* seccomp is not in use. */
> +#define SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT	1 /* uses hard-coded filter. */
> +#define SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER	2 /* uses user-supplied filter. */
> +
> +/*
> + * BPF programs may return a 32-bit value.
> + * The bottom 16-bits are reserved for future use.
> + * The upper 16-bits are ordered from least permissive values to most.
> + *
> + * The ordering ensures that a min_t() over composed return values always
> + * selects the least permissive choice.
> + */
> +#define SECCOMP_RET_MASK	0xffff0000U
> +#define SECCOMP_RET_KILL	0x00000000U /* kill the task immediately */
> +#define SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW	0x7fff0000U /* allow */
> +
> +/* Format of the data the BPF program executes over. */
> +struct seccomp_data {
> +	int nr;
> +	__u32 __reserved[3];
> +	struct {
> +		__u32	lo;
> +		__u32	hi;
> +	} instruction_pointer;
> +	__u32 lo32[6];
> +	__u32 hi32[6];
> +};

I wouldn't use a struct for the IP. And I'd move the args to the front.
Why not call it something with "arg" in the names?

>
> +#ifdef __KERNEL__
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
>
>  #include <linux/thread_info.h>
>  #include <asm/seccomp.h>
>
> +struct seccomp_filter;
> +/**
> + * struct seccomp - the state of a seccomp'ed process
> + *
> + * @mode:  indicates one of the valid values above for controlled
> + *         system calls available to a process.
> + * @filter: The metadata and ruleset for determining what system calls
> + *          are allowed for a task.
> + *
> + *          @filter must only be accessed from the context of current as there
> + *          is no locking.
> + */
>  struct seccomp {
>  	int mode;
> +	struct seccomp_filter *filter;
>  };
>
>  extern void __secure_computing(int);
> @@ -19,7 +65,7 @@ static inline void secure_computing(int this_syscall)
>  }
>
>  extern long prctl_get_seccomp(void);
> -extern long prctl_set_seccomp(unsigned long);
> +extern long prctl_set_seccomp(unsigned long, char __user *);
>
>  static inline int seccomp_mode(struct seccomp *s)
>  {
> @@ -31,15 +77,16 @@ static inline int seccomp_mode(struct seccomp *s)
>  #include <linux/errno.h>
>
>  struct seccomp { };
> +struct seccomp_filter { };
>
> -#define secure_computing(x) do { } while (0)
> +#define secure_computing(x) 0
>
>  static inline long prctl_get_seccomp(void)
>  {
>  	return -EINVAL;
>  }
>
> -static inline long prctl_set_seccomp(unsigned long arg2)
> +static inline long prctl_set_seccomp(unsigned long arg2, char __user *arg3)
>  {
>  	return -EINVAL;
>  }
> @@ -48,7 +95,21 @@ static inline int seccomp_mode(struct seccomp *s)
>  {
>  	return 0;
>  }
> -
>  #endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP */
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
> +extern void put_seccomp_filter(struct seccomp_filter *);
> +extern void copy_seccomp(struct seccomp *child,
> +			 const struct seccomp *parent);
> +#else  /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */
> +/* The macro consumes the ->filter reference. */
> +#define put_seccomp_filter(_s) do { } while (0)
> +
> +static inline void copy_seccomp(struct seccomp *child,
> +				const struct seccomp *prev)
> +{
> +	return;
> +}

Why a macro for one but an empty inline for the other?

> +#endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */
> +#endif /* __KERNEL__ */
>  #endif /* _LINUX_SECCOMP_H */
> diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
> index b77fd55..a5187b7 100644
> --- a/kernel/fork.c
> +++ b/kernel/fork.c
> @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
>  #include <linux/cgroup.h>
>  #include <linux/security.h>
>  #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
> +#include <linux/seccomp.h>
>  #include <linux/swap.h>
>  #include <linux/syscalls.h>
>  #include <linux/jiffies.h>
> @@ -169,6 +170,7 @@ void free_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
>  	free_thread_info(tsk->stack);
>  	rt_mutex_debug_task_free(tsk);
>  	ftrace_graph_exit_task(tsk);
> +	put_seccomp_filter(tsk->seccomp.filter);
>  	free_task_struct(tsk);
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL(free_task);
> @@ -1113,6 +1115,7 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags,
>  		goto fork_out;
>
>  	ftrace_graph_init_task(p);
> +	copy_seccomp(&p->seccomp, &current->seccomp);
>
>  	rt_mutex_init_task(p);
>
> diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
> index e8d76c5..14d1869 100644
> --- a/kernel/seccomp.c
> +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
> @@ -3,16 +3,297 @@
>   *
>   * Copyright 2004-2005  Andrea Arcangeli <andrea@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
>   *
> - * This defines a simple but solid secure-computing mode.
> + * Copyright (C) 2012 Google, Inc.
> + * Will Drewry <wad@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> + *
> + * This defines a simple but solid secure-computing facility.
> + *
> + * Mode 1 uses a fixed list of allowed system calls.
> + * Mode 2 allows user-defined system call filters in the form
> + *        of Berkeley Packet Filters/Linux Socket Filters.
>   */
>
>  #include <linux/audit.h>
> +#include <linux/filter.h>
>  #include <linux/seccomp.h>
>  #include <linux/sched.h>
>  #include <linux/compat.h>
>
> +#include <linux/atomic.h>
> +#include <linux/security.h>
> +
> +#include <linux/slab.h>
> +#include <linux/uaccess.h>
> +#include <linux/user.h>

Are those still needed since you got rid of that manual user-copying stuff?

> +
> +#include <linux/tracehook.h>
> +#include <asm/syscall.h>
> +
>  /* #define SECCOMP_DEBUG 1 */
> -#define NR_SECCOMP_MODES 1
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
> +/**
> + * struct seccomp_filter - container for seccomp BPF programs
> + *
> + * @usage: reference count to manage the object liftime.
> + *         get/put helpers should be used when accessing an instance
> + *         outside of a lifetime-guarded section.  In general, this
> + *         is only needed for handling filters shared across tasks.
> + * @prev: points to a previously installed, or inherited, filter
> + * @compat: indicates the value of is_compat_task() at creation time
> + * @insns: the BPF program instructions to evaluate
> + * @count: the number of instructions in the program
> + *
> + * seccomp_filter objects are organized in a tree linked via the @prev
> + * pointer.  For any task, it appears to be a singly-linked list starting
> + * with current->seccomp.filter, the most recently attached or inherited filter.
> + * However, multiple filters may share a @prev node, by way of fork(), which
> + * results in a unidirectional tree existing in memory.  This is similar to
> + * how namespaces work.
> + *
> + * seccomp_filter objects should never be modified after being attached
> + * to a task_struct (other than @usage).
> + */
> +struct seccomp_filter {
> +	atomic_t usage;
> +	struct seccomp_filter *prev;
> +	bool compat;
> +	unsigned short count;  /* Instruction count */
> +	struct sock_filter insns[];
> +};
> +
> +static void seccomp_filter_log_failure(int syscall)
> +{
> +	int compat = 0;
> +#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
> +	compat = is_compat_task();
> +#endif
> +	pr_info("%s[%d]: %ssystem call %d blocked at 0x%lx\n",
> +		current->comm, task_pid_nr(current),
> +		(compat ? "compat " : ""),
> +		syscall, KSTK_EIP(current));
> +}
> +
> +static inline u32 get_high_bits(unsigned long value)
> +{
> +	int bits = 32;
> +	return value >> bits;
> +}
> +
> +static inline u32 bpf_length(const void *data)
> +{
> +	return sizeof(struct seccomp_data);
> +}

This doesn't change, so why not pass in the length directly instead of
getting it via a function? And stop adding inline to functions that are
used for function pointers, it's misleading.

> +
> +/**
> + * bpf_pointer: checks and returns a pointer to the requested offset
> + * @nr: int syscall passed as a void * to bpf_run_filter
> + * @off: index to load a from in @data

?

> + * @size: load width requested
> + * @buffer: temporary storage supplied by bpf_run_filter
> + *
> + * Returns a pointer to @buffer where the value was stored.
> + * On failure, returns NULL.
> + */
> +static void *bpf_pointer(const void *nr, int off, unsigned int size, void *buf)
> +{
> +	unsigned long value;
> +	u32 *A = (u32 *)buf;

No need to cast a void pointer. That's the whole point of void pointers.

> +
> +	if (size != sizeof(u32))
> +		return NULL;
> +
> +#define BPF_DATA(_name) offsetof(struct seccomp_data, _name)

I'd move this outside of the function and don't bother with the undef.
Undeffing is important in header files. But here, if it's needed, it's
just plain confusing.

> +	/* Index by entry instead of by byte. */
> +	if (off == BPF_DATA(nr)) {
> +		*A = (u32)(uintptr_t)nr;

Why the double cast? Once should be enough. Or is it a special Sparse thing?

> +	} else if (off == BPF_DATA(instruction_pointer.lo)) {
> +		*A = KSTK_EIP(current);
> +	} else if (off == BPF_DATA(instruction_pointer.hi)) {
> +		*A = get_high_bits(KSTK_EIP(current));
> +	} else if (off >= BPF_DATA(lo32[0]) && off <= BPF_DATA(lo32[5])) {
> +		struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(current);
> +		int arg = (off - BPF_DATA(lo32[0])) >> 2;
> +		syscall_get_arguments(current, regs, arg, 1, &value);
> +		*A = value;
> +	} else if (off >= BPF_DATA(hi32[0]) && off <= BPF_DATA(hi32[5])) {
> +		struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(current);
> +		int arg = (off - BPF_DATA(hi32[0])) >> 2;
> +		syscall_get_arguments(current, regs, arg, 1, &value);
> +		*A = get_high_bits(value);
> +	} else {
> +		return NULL;
> +	}
> +#undef BPF_DATA
> +	return buf;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * seccomp_run_filters - run 'current' against the given syscall
> + * @syscall: number of the current system call

Strange comments.

> + *
> + * Returns valid seccomp BPF response codes.
> + */
> +static u32 seccomp_run_filters(int syscall)
> +{
> +	struct seccomp_filter *f;
> +	const struct bpf_load_fns loaders = { bpf_pointer, bpf_length };

I don't see the point of this.

The return values for seccomp filters are different than the networking
ones, so there is never a need to get bpf_length from the filter code
as it's known at compile time. So just declare BPF_S_LD_W_LEN and
S_LDX_W_LEN networking-only instructions and don't bother with all this.

> +	u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_KILL;
> +	const void *sc_ptr = (const void *)(uintptr_t)syscall;
> +
> +	/* It's not possible for the filter to be NULL here. */
> +#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
> +	if (current->seccomp.filter->compat != !!(is_compat_task()))
> +		return ret;
> +#endif
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * All filters are evaluated in order of youngest to oldest. The lowest
> +	 * BPF return value always takes priority.
> +	 */
> +	for (f = current->seccomp.filter; f; f = f->prev) {
> +		ret = bpf_run_filter(sc_ptr, f->insns, &loaders);
> +		if (ret != SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW)
> +			break;
> +	}
> +	return ret;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * seccomp_attach_filter: Attaches a seccomp filter to current.
> + * @fprog: BPF program to install
> + *
> + * Returns 0 on success or an errno on failure.
> + */
> +static long seccomp_attach_filter(struct sock_fprog *fprog)
> +{
> +	struct seccomp_filter *filter = NULL;

Don't initialize it to NULL, next time 'filter' is used it's set
by kzalloc's return value.

> +	unsigned long fp_size = fprog->len * sizeof(struct sock_filter);
> +	long ret = -EINVAL;
> +
> +	if (fprog->len == 0 || fprog->len > BPF_MAXINSNS)
> +		goto out;

Oh wait, you need the NULL because you can call put_filter() via out.
Well, just return EINVAL directly instead here I'd say.

> +
> +	/* Allocate a new seccomp_filter */
> +	ret = -ENOMEM;
> +	filter = kzalloc(sizeof(struct seccomp_filter) + fp_size, GFP_KERNEL);
> +	if (!filter)
> +		goto out;

Same here, just return ENOMEM.

> +	atomic_set(&filter->usage, 1);
> +	filter->count = fprog->len;

Why is it called count in one place and len in the other? Isn't it clearer
when always using len?

> +
> +	/* Copy the instructions from fprog. */
> +	ret = -EFAULT;
> +	if (copy_from_user(filter->insns, fprog->filter, fp_size))
> +		goto out;
> +
> +	/* Check the fprog */
> +	ret = bpf_chk_filter(filter->insns, filter->count, BPF_CHK_FLAGS_NO_SKB);
> +	if (ret)
> +		goto out;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Installing a seccomp filter requires that the task
> +	 * have CAP_SYS_ADMIN in its namespace or be running with
> +	 * no_new_privs.  This avoids scenarios where unprivileged
> +	 * tasks can affect the behavior of privileged children.
> +	 */
> +	ret = -EACCES;
> +	if (!current->no_new_privs &&
> +	    security_capable_noaudit(current_cred(), current_user_ns(),
> +				     CAP_SYS_ADMIN) != 0)
> +		goto out;
> +
> +	/* Lock the filter to the current calling convention. */
> +#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
> +	filter->compat = !!(is_compat_task());
> +#endif
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * If there is an existing filter, make it the prev
> +	 * and don't drop its task reference.
> +	 */
> +	filter->prev = current->seccomp.filter;
> +	current->seccomp.filter = filter;
> +	return 0;
> +out:
> +	put_seccomp_filter(filter);  /* for get or task, on err */
> +	return ret;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * seccomp_attach_user_filter - attaches a user-supplied sock_fprog
> + * @user_filter: pointer to the user data containing a sock_fprog.
> + *
> + * This function may be called repeatedly to install additional filters.
> + * Every filter successfully installed will be evaluated (in reverse order)
> + * for each system call the task makes.
> + *
> + * Returns 0 on success and non-zero otherwise.
> + */
> +long seccomp_attach_user_filter(char __user *user_filter)
> +{
> +	struct sock_fprog fprog;
> +	long ret = -EFAULT;
> +
> +	if (!user_filter)
> +		goto out;
> +#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
> +	if (is_compat_task()) {
> +		/* XXX: Share with net/compat.c */

You can't share this with net/compat.c because they have to pass a __user
pointer to a generic sock_setsockopt(). You could refactor their code to
push the compat check later, but I think they prefer to keep all the compat
stuff in one place.

> +		struct {
> +			u16 len;
> +			compat_uptr_t filter;	/* struct sock_filter */
> +		} fprog32;
> +		if (copy_from_user(&fprog32, user_filter, sizeof(fprog32)))
> +			goto out;
> +		fprog.len = fprog32.len;
> +		fprog.filter = compat_ptr(fprog32.filter);
> +	} else
> +#endif
> +	if (copy_from_user(&fprog, user_filter, sizeof(fprog)))
> +		goto out;

Probably a good idea to intend the else if one more time to make it more
obvious. Or add a comment after the else.

> +	ret = seccomp_attach_filter(&fprog);
> +out:
> +	return ret;
> +}
> +
> +/* get_seccomp_filter - increments the reference count of @orig. */
> +static struct seccomp_filter *get_seccomp_filter(struct seccomp_filter *orig)
> +{
> +	if (!orig)
> +		return NULL;
> +	/* Reference count is bounded by the number of total processes. */
> +	atomic_inc(&orig->usage);
> +	return orig;
> +}
> +
> +/* put_seccomp_filter - decrements the ref count of @orig and may free. */
> +void put_seccomp_filter(struct seccomp_filter *orig)
> +{
> +	/* Clean up single-reference branches iteratively. */
> +	while (orig && atomic_dec_and_test(&orig->usage)) {
> +		struct seccomp_filter *freeme = orig;
> +		orig = orig->prev;
> +		kfree(freeme);
> +	}
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * copy_seccomp: manages inheritance on fork
> + * @child: forkee's seccomp
> + * @prev: forker's seccomp
> + *
> + * Ensures that @child inherits seccomp mode and state if
> + * seccomp filtering is in use.
> + */
> +void copy_seccomp(struct seccomp *child,
> +		  const struct seccomp *prev)
> +{
> +	child->mode = prev->mode;
> +	child->filter = get_seccomp_filter(prev->filter);
> +}
> +#endif	/* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */
>
>  /*
>   * Secure computing mode 1 allows only read/write/exit/sigreturn.
> @@ -34,10 +315,10 @@ static int mode1_syscalls_32[] = {
>  void __secure_computing(int this_syscall)
>  {
>  	int mode = current->seccomp.mode;
> -	int * syscall;
> +	int *syscall;
>
>  	switch (mode) {
> -	case 1:
> +	case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT:
>  		syscall = mode1_syscalls;
>  #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
>  		if (is_compat_task())
> @@ -48,6 +329,13 @@ void __secure_computing(int this_syscall)
>  				return;
>  		} while (*++syscall);
>  		break;
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
> +	case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER:
> +		if (seccomp_run_filters(this_syscall) == SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW)
> +			return;
> +		seccomp_filter_log_failure(this_syscall);
> +		break;
> +#endif
>  	default:
>  		BUG();
>  	}
> @@ -64,25 +352,34 @@ long prctl_get_seccomp(void)
>  	return current->seccomp.mode;
>  }
>
> -long prctl_set_seccomp(unsigned long seccomp_mode)
> +long prctl_set_seccomp(unsigned long seccomp_mode, char __user *filter)
>  {
> -	long ret;
> +	long ret = -EINVAL;
>
> -	/* can set it only once to be even more secure */
> -	ret = -EPERM;
> -	if (unlikely(current->seccomp.mode))
> +	if (current->seccomp.mode &&
> +	    current->seccomp.mode != seccomp_mode)
>  		goto out;
>
> -	ret = -EINVAL;
> -	if (seccomp_mode && seccomp_mode <= NR_SECCOMP_MODES) {
> -		current->seccomp.mode = seccomp_mode;
> -		set_thread_flag(TIF_SECCOMP);
> +	switch (seccomp_mode) {
> +	case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT:
> +		ret = 0;
>  #ifdef TIF_NOTSC
>  		disable_TSC();
>  #endif
> -		ret = 0;
> +		break;
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
> +	case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER:
> +		ret = seccomp_attach_user_filter(filter);
> +		if (ret)
> +			goto out;
> +		break;
> +#endif
> +	default:
> +		goto out;
>  	}
>
> - out:
> +	current->seccomp.mode = seccomp_mode;
> +	set_thread_flag(TIF_SECCOMP);
> +out:
>  	return ret;
>  }
> diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
> index 4070153..905031e 100644
> --- a/kernel/sys.c
> +++ b/kernel/sys.c
> @@ -1899,7 +1899,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2,
unsigned long, arg3,
>  			error = prctl_get_seccomp();
>  			break;
>  		case PR_SET_SECCOMP:
> -			error = prctl_set_seccomp(arg2);
> +			error = prctl_set_seccomp(arg2, (char __user *)arg3);
>  			break;
>  		case PR_GET_TSC:
>  			error = GET_TSC_CTL(arg2);
> --
> 1.7.5.4
>
>

Greetings,

Indan


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