Re: [ 26/48] udf: Avoid run away loop when partition table lengthis corrupted

From: Jan Kara
Date: Tue Jul 10 2012 - 12:04:50 EST


On Tue 10-07-12 16:52:26, Ben Hutchings wrote:
> On Mon, Jul 09, 2012 at 03:31:42PM +0100, Ben Hutchings wrote:
> > 3.2-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
> >
> > ------------------
> >
> > From: Jan Kara <jack@xxxxxxx>
> >
> > commit adee11b2085bee90bd8f4f52123ffb07882d6256 upstream.
> >
> > Check provided length of partition table so that (possibly maliciously)
> > corrupted partition table cannot cause accessing data beyond current buffer.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@xxxxxxx>
> > Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > ---
> > fs/udf/super.c | 10 +++++++++-
> > 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/fs/udf/super.c b/fs/udf/super.c
> > index 9da6f4e..ce911f5 100644
> > --- a/fs/udf/super.c
> > +++ b/fs/udf/super.c
> [...]
> > @@ -1232,13 +1233,20 @@ static int udf_load_logicalvol(struct super_block *sb, sector_t block,
> > return 1;
> > BUG_ON(ident != TAG_IDENT_LVD);
> > lvd = (struct logicalVolDesc *)bh->b_data;
> > + table_len = le32_to_cpu(lvd->mapTableLength);
> > + if (sizeof(*lvd) + table_len > sb->s_blocksize) {
> [...]
>
> I don't think this is sufficient, unless there has been some prior
> validation of lvd->mapTableLength. On a 32-bit machine, the addition
> may overflow. The untrusted value has to be validated before doing
> any arithmetic on it, e.g.:
>
> if (table_len > sb->s_blocksize - sizeof(*lv)) {
Yeah, thanks for spotting this! I've queued the attached patch. I don't
find this really pressing so I'll push it in the next merge window. OK?

Honza

--
Jan Kara <jack@xxxxxxx>
SUSE Labs, CR