Re: [PATCH 2/3] vsyscall_64: allow SECCOMP_RET_TRACErs to skip

From: Will Drewry
Date: Sat Jul 14 2012 - 11:57:54 EST


On Sat, Jul 14, 2012 at 10:50 AM, Will Drewry <wad@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Sat, Jul 14, 2012 at 10:44 AM, Andrew Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxx> wrote:
>> I think I'd prefer if changing to something other than whatever value is
>> used to cancel the syscall resulted in a crash rather than just being
>> ignored.
>
> I was trying to keep as much seccomp-ptrace behavior intact rather
> than making it terminal in this special case. Is there a reason why
> it'd make more sense to crash?

Unless you meant something the tracer could catch? That may make
sense, but they could also use singlestep or whatever else to get
similar behavior. But maybe I'm missing the bigger picture!

thanks!
will


>> How hard is it for a page fault to return into the syscall entry path? It
>> should be possible to do this for rel, although it could be messy and not
>> worth it.
>
> Not sure, tbh. I think given vsyscall's status and the fact that
> ptrace+seccomp+vsyscall=emulate isn't horrible, I think it's fine to
> either ignore (what is in tree now) or to allow ptrace to skip,
> without providing full functionality. But obviously, my view my be
> biased!
>
> thanks!
> will
>
>>
>> On Jul 14, 2012 10:35 AM, "Will Drewry" <wad@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>
>>> Current quirky ptrace behavior with vsyscall and seccomp
>>> does not allow tracers to bypass the call. This change
>>> provides that ability by checking if orig_ax changed.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
>>> ---
>>> arch/x86/kernel/vsyscall_64.c | 10 +++++++---
>>> 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vsyscall_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/vsyscall_64.c
>>> index 5db36ca..5f9640c 100644
>>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/vsyscall_64.c
>>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vsyscall_64.c
>>> @@ -142,11 +142,15 @@ static int addr_to_vsyscall_nr(unsigned long addr)
>>> #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
>>> static int vsyscall_seccomp(struct task_struct *tsk, int syscall_nr)
>>> {
>>> + int ret;
>>> if (!seccomp_mode(&tsk->seccomp))
>>> return 0;
>>> task_pt_regs(tsk)->orig_ax = syscall_nr;
>>> task_pt_regs(tsk)->ax = syscall_nr;
>>> - return __secure_computing(syscall_nr);
>>> + ret = __secure_computing(syscall_nr);
>>> + if (task_pt_regs(tsk)->orig_ax != syscall_nr)
>>> + return 1; /* ptrace syscall skip */
>>> + return ret;
>>> }
>>> #else
>>> #define vsyscall_seccomp(_tsk, _nr) 0
>>> @@ -278,9 +282,9 @@ bool emulate_vsyscall(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned
>>> long address)
>>> current_thread_info()->sig_on_uaccess_error =
>>> prev_sig_on_uaccess_error;
>>>
>>> if (skip) {
>>> - if ((long)regs->ax <= 0L) /* seccomp errno emulation */
>>> + if ((long)regs->ax <= 0L || skip == 1) /* seccomp
>>> errno/trace */
>>> goto do_ret;
>>> - goto done; /* seccomp trace/trap */
>>> + goto done; /* seccomp trap */
>>> }
>>>
>>> if (ret == -EFAULT) {
>>> --
>>> 1.7.9.5
>>>
>>
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/