[RFC] First attempt at kernel secure boot support

[Matthew Garrett]

The UEFI Secure Boot trust model is based on it not being possible for a
user to cause a signed OS to boot an unsigned OS, even if that user has
administrative privileges. This is an initial attempt at a set of patches
to reduce root's ability to modify the kernel. We've done this with an
additional capability for a couple of reasons:

1) CAP_SYS_RAWIO already covers pretty much everything we want, but also
   disables a lot of functionality that we don't want to lose. Following
   the same model seems reasonable.
2) This capability may be more generically useful for some use-cases.
   Adding a set of hardcoded is_secure_boot() checks in the same places would
   prevent that.

Feedback welcome.

-- 
Matthew Garrett | mjg59@xxxxxxxxxxxxx

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