Re: [PATCH net-next 1/2] net_sched: don't do precise pkt_lencomputation for untrusted packets

From: Eric Dumazet
Date: Tue Mar 19 2013 - 08:10:50 EST

On Tue, 2013-03-19 at 17:25 +0800, Jason Wang wrote:

> I believe before doing header check for untrusted packets, the only
> thing we can trust is skb->len and that's we've used before
> 1def9238d4aa2. But after that, we're trying to use unchecked or
> meaningless value (e.g gso_segs were reset to zero in
> tun/macvtap/packet), and guest then can utilize this to result a very
> huge (-1U) pkt_len by filling evil value in the header. Can all kinds of
> packet scheduler survive this kinds of possible DOS?

I would use the flow dissector to fix the transport header from all
DODGY providers.

Daniel Borkmann is working on a patch serie adding nhoff into flow_keys,
and adding __skb_get_poff(const struct sk_buff *skb), for a BPF
extension we talked about in Copenhagen / Netfilter Workshop.

You could then set the transport header offset to the right value.

(and drop evil packets before they go further in the stack)

if (gso_packet(skb)) {
u32 poff = __skb_get_poff(skb);

if (!poff) {
} else {
skb_set_transport_header(skb, poff);

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