Re: [Part1 PATCH 00/22] Add namespace support for audit
From: Gao feng
Date: Thu Jun 20 2013 - 01:20:24 EST
On 06/20/2013 05:03 AM, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> Eric Paris <eparis@xxxxxxxxxx> writes:
>> On Wed, 2013-06-19 at 16:49 -0400, Aristeu Rozanski wrote:
>>> On Wed, Jun 19, 2013 at 09:53:32AM +0800, Gao feng wrote:
>>>> This patchset is first part of namespace support for audit.
>>>> in this patchset, the mainly resources of audit system have
>>>> been isolated. the audit filter, rules havn't been isolated
>>>> now. It will be implemented in Part2. We finished the isolation
>>>> of user audit message in this patchset.
>>>> I choose to assign audit to the user namespace.
>>>> Right now,there are six kinds of namespaces, such as
>>>> net, mount, ipc, pid, uts and user. the first five
>>>> namespaces have special usage. the audit isn't suitable to
>>>> belong to these five namespaces, And since the flag of system
>>>> call clone is in short supply, we can't provide a new flag such
>>>> as CLONE_NEWAUDIT to enable audit namespace separately. so the
>>>> user namespace may be the best choice.
>>> I thought it was said on the last submission that to tie userns and
>>> audit namespace would be a bad idea?
>> I consider it a non-starter. unpriv users are allowed to launch their
>> own user namespace. The whole point of audit is to have only a priv
>> user be allowed to make changes. If you tied audit namespace to user
>> namespace you grant an unpriv user the ability to modify audit.
>> If there are not clone flags you will either need to only do this from
>> unshare and not from clone, or get more flags to clone
> I completely agree that only priveleged user should be able to make
> On the flip side, I don't know if this is at all interesting unless we
> have a solution that works for users in unprivileged user namespaces.
> Something like having the possibility of two or more instances of audit
> working on every action. One for each layer of privilege.
> Gao feng, how do you want to use the audit infrastructure?
I want the root user in container can use the audit related api
(audit_open,audit_log_user_message..) and some network related
audit messages generated by container shouldn't be logged to host.
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