Re: [PATCH v2] vfs: Tighten up linkat(..., AT_EMPTY_PATH)

[Willy Tarreau]

On Thu, Aug 22, 2013 at 12:05:50PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Thu, Aug 22, 2013 at 11:53 AM, Willy Tarreau <w@xxxxxx> wrote:
> > On Thu, Aug 22, 2013 at 11:48:10AM -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> >> And I'm wondering if we shouldn't actually do that at "path_init"
> >> time. Right now the code says:
> >>
> >>                 /* Caller must check execute permissions on the
> >> starting path component */
> >>                 struct fd f = fdget_raw(dfd);
> >>
> >> and then uses the struct file mindlessly.
> >>
> >> I'm wondering if we should just do some validation in that place, and say:
> >>
> >>  - for directories, we require exec permissions here
> >>  - for everything else, we require that f->f_cred == current->cred check.
> 
> Does this work for the procfs case?  As far as I understand it (which
> isn't saying much), it goes through the symlink-following path.

Indeed I checked yesterday that it seems to use proc_pid_follow_link() for
fd/, cwd, root and exe, which means the same tests are used everywhere.

> >> I dunno. But that I_LINKABLE thing just bothers me. It screams "I'm
> >> hacky" to me.
> >
> > I agreed, simply because the condition here is different from the one in /proc.
> >
> > I have read some code last evening to try to understand how /proc/pid/fd
> > entries were granted access to various processes, because I would love to
> > see the same condition being used in both places. Unfortunately, it's beyond
> > my skills, and I stopped after my random attempts gave me some panics.
> 
> What if we added another field to struct nameidata that's indicates
> what restrictions need to be enforced when following magical symlinks
> and then enforcing them when nd_jump_link gets used.  (There are only
> two of these, both in procfs.)

I tried to add a test based on a mount option before this call to
nd_jump_link() when I realized my attempt was a total disaster because
I'm a noob. But what I think would be nice (at least as an opt-in) would
be :

  - processes which don't share the same root should not be allowed to
    access files through /proc/pid/{root,cwd,exe,fd/*}

  - keep the current restrictions as well of course

  - the exact same restrictions should apply to AT_EMPTY_PATH

I might be totally wrong, but as a user that's what I find natural and
what I tend to expect.

> Then open could check that the original fd was opened for a superset
> of the requested permissions (or that the caller has
> CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE), linkat could check whatever it feels like checking,
> etc.

Do not forget that 2 other syscalls seem to support AT_EMPTH_PATH as
well if that makes a difference.

> This would allow all of these issues to be fixed for real (controlled
> by sysctl, presumably).

If needed for backwards compatibility, possibly, though I doubt that
there are apps that *rely* on the current lack of isolation between
chroots. But at the same time I hate to break existing setups :-)

> --Andy

Willy

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