Re: [PATCH 0/10] Add additional security checks when module loadingis restricted

From: Lenny Szubowicz
Date: Wed Aug 28 2013 - 18:37:51 EST




----- Original Message -----
> From: "Matthew Garrett" <matthew.garrett@xxxxxxxxxx>
> To: linux-kernel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Cc: linux-efi@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, jwboyer@xxxxxxxxxx, keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx
> Sent: Monday, August 19, 2013 1:26:01 PM
> Subject: [PATCH 0/10] Add additional security checks when module loading is restricted
>
> We have two in-kernel mechanisms for restricting module loading - disabling
> it entirely, or limiting it to the loading of modules signed with a trusted
> key. These can both be configured in such a way that even root is unable to
> relax the restrictions.
>
> However, right now, there's several other straightforward ways for root to
> modify running kernel code. At the most basic level these allow root to
> reset the configuration such that modules can be loaded again, rendering
> the existing restrictions useless.
>
> This patchset adds additional restrictions to various kernel entry points
> that would otherwise make it straightforward for root to disable enforcement
> of module loading restrictions. It also provides a patch that allows the
> kernel to be configured such that module signing will be automatically
> enabled when the system is booting via UEFI Secure Boot, allowing a stronger
> guarantee of kernel integrity.
>
> --
> To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
> the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
> Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
>

Did you purposely exclude similar checks for hibernate that were covered
by earlier versions of your patch set?

I think you should include it and any patch set that attempts to add support
for doing hibernate securely would make appropriate changes.

-Lenny.
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/