Re: [libseccomp-discuss] ARM audit, seccomp, etc are broken wrt OABI syscalls

From: Kees Cook
Date: Wed Nov 06 2013 - 16:26:57 EST

On Wed, Nov 6, 2013 at 1:20 PM, Will Drewry <wad@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Wed, Nov 6, 2013 at 9:51 AM, Russell King - ARM Linux
> <linux@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> On Wed, Nov 06, 2013 at 10:32:31AM -0500, Eric Paris wrote:
>>> On Tue, 2013-11-05 at 14:36 -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>> > 1. Set a different audit arch for OABI syscalls (e.g.
>>> > AUDIT_ARCH_ARMOABI). That is, treat OABI syscall entries the same way
>>> > that x86_64 treats int 80.
>>> As the audit maintainer, I like #1. It might break ABI, but the ABI is
>>> flat wrong now and not maintainable...
>> If you read the whole thread, you will see that this corner case is just
>> not worth the effort to support. Audit may as well be disabled by
>> kernel config if any OABI support is enabled.
> This might be the best move for seccomp too (as Kees suggested). I'd
> love to have audit arch visibility, but it's not clear that it's worth
> any sort of larger changes ...
> ... like adding a task_thread_info.compat flag that bubbles up to
> syscall_get_arch(), or if we assume consumers of syscall_get_nr() are
> broken today (I haven't checked), then it would be possible to at
> least re-add the 0x900000 bits, if compat, before handing back the
> system call number but leave the audit arch pieces alone.

How does this look, for the seccomp part?


diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig
index af2cc6eabcc7..3610c2d9910f 100644
--- a/arch/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/Kconfig
@@ -331,7 +331,7 @@ config HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER

def_bool y
Enable tasks to build secure computing environments defined
in terms of Berkeley Packet Filter programs which implement

Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
More majordomo info at
Please read the FAQ at