[PATCH] test: fix sparse warnings in user_copy tests

From: Kees Cook
Date: Fri Dec 06 2013 - 13:57:46 EST


Sparse fix for "test: check copy_to/from_user boundary validation":

To keep sparse happy with the horrible things being done with the user
memory pointers, declare both __user and non-__user cases ahead of time
to avoid needing to do the casts later.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
lib/test_user_copy.c | 6 ++++--
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/lib/test_user_copy.c b/lib/test_user_copy.c
index b61f3e406e0b..0ecef3e4690e 100644
--- a/lib/test_user_copy.c
+++ b/lib/test_user_copy.c
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ static int __init test_user_copy_init(void)
int ret = 0;
char *kmem;
char __user *usermem;
+ char *bad_usermem;
unsigned long user_addr;
unsigned long value = 0x5A;

@@ -55,6 +56,7 @@ static int __init test_user_copy_init(void)
}

usermem = (char __user *)user_addr;
+ bad_usermem = (char *)user_addr;

/* Legitimate usage: none of these should fail. */
ret |= test(copy_from_user(kmem, usermem, PAGE_SIZE),
@@ -70,13 +72,13 @@ static int __init test_user_copy_init(void)
ret |= test(!copy_from_user(kmem, (char __user *)(kmem + PAGE_SIZE),
PAGE_SIZE),
"illegal all-kernel copy_from_user passed");
- ret |= test(!copy_from_user((char *)usermem, (char __user *)kmem,
+ ret |= test(!copy_from_user(bad_usermem, (char __user *)kmem,
PAGE_SIZE),
"illegal reversed copy_from_user passed");
ret |= test(!copy_to_user((char __user *)kmem, kmem + PAGE_SIZE,
PAGE_SIZE),
"illegal all-kernel copy_to_user passed");
- ret |= test(!copy_to_user((char __user *)kmem, (char *)usermem,
+ ret |= test(!copy_to_user((char __user *)kmem, bad_usermem,
PAGE_SIZE),
"illegal reversed copy_to_user passed");
ret |= test(!get_user(value, (unsigned long __user *)kmem),
--
1.7.9.5


--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
--
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