Re: [PATCH 1/9] Known exploit detection

[Kees Cook]

On Fri, Dec 13, 2013 at 5:23 AM, Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> * Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
>> On Fri, Dec 13, 2013 at 11:31:48AM +0100, Alexander Holler wrote:
>> > I've never seen a comment inside the kernel sources which does point
>> > to a CVE, so I assume there already does exists some agreement about
>> > not doing so.
>>
>> We do occasionally put CVE numbers in the commit message, but
>> normally the commit comes first before we ask for a CVE number.
>
> The detection code will most likely come after the fix is applied.
>
> In that case the 'ID' of the message could also be the commit ID of
> the fix in question:
>
>         detect_exploit("[exploit for d8af4ce490e9: Fix syscall bug]")
>
> or so - no CVE needed, it's a free form ID that can contain anything
> descriptive about the bug the attacker attempted to exploit.

FWIW, I'd vastly prefer the CVE. The commit rapidly becomes
meaningless as things go into -stable, or manual backports. The CVE is
intended to be the single unique descriptor of a security problem.

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
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