Re: Trusted kernel patchset for Secure Boot lockdown

[One Thousand Gnomes]

> On the other hand, disabling CAP_SYS_RAWIO *definitely* breaks expected
> functionality - firmware loading and the fibmap ioctl are probably the
> most obvious. And changing the use of CAP_SYS_RAWIO potentially breaks
> userspace expectations, so we're kind of stuck there.

Actually I know how to describe the problem better.

Whitelist v Blacklist.

Going around adding extra cases for CAP_SYS_RAWIO is a fails insecure
model. Going around adding CAP_SYS_RAWIO || CAP_SYS_RAWIO_SEC is a 'fails
secure' case.

Alan
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